




Nationalizing Transnational Mobility in Asia
Xiang Biao, Brenda S. A. Yeoh, and Mika Toyota, eds.
Duke University Press Durham and London 2013
© 2013 Duke University Press
All rights reserved
Printed in the United States of America on acid- free paper ♾
Cover by Heather Hensley. Interior by Courtney Leigh Baker.
Typeset in Minion Pro by Tseng Information Systems, Inc.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Return : nationalizing transnational mobility in Asia /
Xiang Biao, Brenda S. A. Yeoh, and Mika Toyota, editors.
pages cm
Includes bibliographical references and index.
isbn 978-0-8223-5516-8 (cloth : alk. paper)
isbn 978-0-8223-5531-1 (pbk. : alk. paper)
1. Return migration—Asia. 2. Asia—Emigration and








Return and the Reordering of Transnational Mobility in Asia ➤➤ 1
Xiang biao
Chapter One
To Return or Not to Return ➤➤ 21
The Changing Meaning of Mobility among Japanese Brazilians, 1908–2010
Koji sasaKi
Chapter Two
Soldier’s Home ➤➤ 39
War, Migration, and Delayed Return in Postwar Japan
MariKo asano TaManoi
Chapter Three
Guiqiao as Political Subjects in the Making of the
People’s Republic of China, 1949–1979 ➤➤ 63
Wang Cangbai
Chapter Four
Transnational Encapsulation ➤➤ 83
Compulsory Return as a Labor- Migration Control in East Asia
Xiang biao
Chapter Five
Cambodians Go “Home” ➤➤ 100
Forced Returns and Redisplacement Thirty Years
after the American War in Indochina
sylvia r. CoWan
Chapter Six
Rescue, Return, in Place ➤➤ 122
Deportees, “Victims,” and the Regulation of Indonesian Migration
johan lindquisT
Chapter Seven
Return of the Global Indian ➤➤ 141
Software Professionals and the Worlding of Bangalore
Carol upadhya
Chapter Eight
Ethnicizing, Capitalizing, and Nationalizing ➤➤ 162
South Korea and the Returning Korean Chinese
Melody Chia- Wen lu and shin hyunjoon
Contributors ➤➤ 179 References ➤➤ 183 Index ➤➤ 205
ACknowledgments 
This book is the fruit of five years of collaboration that started with the 
Conference on Return Migration in Asia held at the Asia Research Insti-
tute, National University of Singapore, in the summer of 2008. We thank 
ari for funding the conference and providing additional support through-
out these years. Most of the chapters before our readers are in their fourth 
or fifth versions. The project would be impossible without all the contribu-
tors’ enthusiasm and generosity. Vani S., Lin Weiqiang, and Saharah Abu-
bakar offered valuable comments at the editorial stage. We also thank Ivan 
Small, Sallie Yea, and Priscilla Koh for their important inputs and support.

IntroduCtIon
Return and the Reordering  
of Transnational Mobility in Asia
Xiang biao
When the Washington- based Migration Policy Institute asked a number of 
leading migration experts in the world what surprised them most in 2006, 
Howard Duncan, the executive head of the high- profile International Me-
tropolis Project, identified the return migration of professionals to Asia as 
the most striking. “Although return migration is a common phenomenon, 
the number of returnees, especially to Hong Kong, is significantly higher 
than one would expect,” he commented.1 The significance of the large- scale 
return migration from the West to Hong Kong should be understood in 
the context of the historical return of Hong Kong to the People’s Republic 
of China (PRC). Between 1984, when the Chinese and British governments 
signed the handover agreement, and the handover in 1997, more than half 
a million left Hong Kong due to their apprehension about the handover 
(Ritter 2007). By 2005, however, a third of those who had migrated to 
Canada—the single largest destination country—returned, primarily at-
tracted by the intact or even enhanced prosperity of the former colony.2 
At least 120,000 returned in 1999 alone.3 The return of Hong Kong to the 
PRC and the subsequent return of Hong Kongers can be seen as powerful 
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manifestations of a new global geopolitical order. This order is defined by 
the rise—or the “return” or “redux”—of Asia.4 Indeed, the return of West- 
based professionals and entrepreneurs to Asia, especially to China and 
India, is perceived as a “return to the future”—in the rush ahead of global 
business and technology curves. Return is a project driven by enterprise 
rather than by nostalgia.5
The reverse flows of professionals constitute only a small part of re-
turn migrations in Asia. Much larger numbers of “irregular” migrants 
have been forced to return to their country of citizenship, often from one 
Asian country to another. This became particularly evident after the fi-
nancial crisis in 1997. From June 1997, when the crisis broke out, to Janu-
ary 1998, Malaysia sent back more than 10,000 Bangladeshi and Pakistani 
workers, South Korea expelled between 150,000 and 300,000 migrants, 
and Thailand repatriated 6,000 Burmese (Varona 1998). Initially an emer-
gency measure, forced return was soon turned into a routine. Malaysia 
deported tens, or even hundreds, of thousands of migrants in each of the 
half dozen crackdowns since the end of the 1990s. Japan expelled an aver-
age of 54,000 migrants a year in the 1990s and early 2000s.6 The scope 
and density of forced return in Asia are striking when compared to other 
parts of the world: in the 2000s Australia removed and deported about 
10,000 a year, the United Kingdom more than 60,000, and the United 
States nearly 400,000 in 2011 (compared to just over 30,000 in 1990 and 
less than 200,000 in 2000).7 Indeed, the Malaysian Home Affairs Minister 
Azmi Khalid called the Ops Tegas (Operation Tough) campaign in March 
2005, which expelled 600,000 to 800,000 irregular migrants,8 “one of the 
biggest transmigration programs in the world” (Holst 2009).
Of an even greater scale are compulsory returns of legal labor mi-
grants. The overwhelming majority of the fifteen million workers who mi-
grate from one Asian country to another are on strictly temporary terms 
and have to return home once their contracts are due (P. Martin 2008). 
Migrant- receiving countries across the region commonly adopt a “no re-
turn, no entry” policy. That is, they determine the number of new arrivals 
from a particular country according to the returns to that country. This 
can mean that about three million migrants are returning to various Asian 
countries from the Gulf alone every year. Apart from professionals and 
labor migrants, the return of refugees and victims of human trafficking 
are also major policy concerns in the region.
These diverse return flows are related to each other in that they are en-
couraged, facilitated, and often enforced by states. They are all part of an 
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overarching mode of governance that emerged in Asia in the 1990s. This 
mode of governance seeks to regulate mobility through mobility. The states 
regulate mobility not by blocking but by facilitating movements. Return 
migrations not only intensify individual migrants’ level of mobility when 
the migrants move back and forth but also put more people on the move 
as new recruitments are constantly needed to replace the returned.9 But re-
turn is a mobility of such a kind that it tames mobility.10 Constant in- and- 
out circulations order movements and fit movements into the framework 
of nation- states. Return thus nationalizes transnational mobility.
Following Georg Simmel’s celebration of the “miracle of road” for its 
“freezing movement in a solid structure” (Simmel 1997, 171), we may liken 
return programs to roundabouts. Roundabouts do not directly control the 
movement of each vehicle, but they channel the traffic into certain patterns 
that can be monitored and regulated from a distance. The movements on 
the ground do acquire their own momentum, and drivers do break rules 
from time to time; but the movements are shaped into flows that are gov-
ernable to nation- states. “Nation- state” here stands for particular opera-
tional frameworks and organizational principles, not for closed territorial 
containers. Nationalization is a way of ordering transnational mobility in-
stead of a means of territorial fixing. In contrast to the common proposi-
tion that transnational migrations challenge state sovereignty (e.g., Sassen 
1996, 67–74) and defy national policies (e.g., Castles 2004), transnational 
circulation in Asia serves as a (national) method of migration regulation.
While we follow Lynellyn Long and Ellen Oxfeld’s call for developing 
an “ethnography of return migration” that pays full attention to the di-
versity, complexity, and instability of return as human experiences (2004, 
1–15), this book treats return primarily as a policy subject, as an idea, and 
as a strategic moment when the intersection between nation- states and 
transnational mobility is particularly visible.11 For this book, return is not 
a type of migration—a migration behavior with distinct attributes and 
patterns like “student migration” or “marriage migration.” Empirically, re-
turn is essentially ambiguous. The Philippine government, for instance, 
stages state ceremonies before Christmas every year in the Manila airport 
to welcome the returnees, but at the same time the government encour-
ages the migrants to go overseas again after the holiday season. We would 
be missing the point by fixating on whether the return should be seen 
as real return; what matters is the fact that both the government and the 
migrants invest an enormous amount of energy in making the journey a 
kind of return.12 We ask: why is such fictive return regarded as necessary, 
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appealing, and productive? Why are returnees sometimes treated very dif-
ferently from one another, and yet are sometimes lumped together under 
the rubric of “return”? And what does this tell us about the general socio-
economic developments in Asia and beyond? The heterogeneity of the ex-
periences of return and the ambiguity of its meaning should not be seen 
as difficulties in studying return; they can be turned into sources of theo-
retical innovation.
Asia as a Method for Global Studies
“Europe is hard to get in but easy to stay on; Asian countries are easy to 
get in but hard to stay on.” This was what a would- be migrant in north-
east China told me when he compared different options. Asian countries 
are hard to “stay on” because the migrants have to return.13 It is far from 
accidental that various kinds of return migration in Asia have intensified. 
This reflects particular articulations between state interventions and the 
free market, and between national regulation and transnational flows in 
the region. Most Asian countries strive to globalize their economies, but 
at the same time the countries jealously guard their national sovereignty 
and state power. The combination of strong and often authoritarian states 
with free- market economies was a crucial condition of the East Asian eco-
nomic miracle of the 1970s and 1980s (Evans 1995). The postdevelopmental 
states that emerged in the 1990s are even more entrepreneurial and mar-
ket oriented, but they remain uncompromisingly nationalistic (Ong 2000, 
2004). The so- called asean (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) way 
of regionalization is driven by the twin objectives of pursuing region- wide 
economic integration and safeguarding member states’ political autonomy 
and sovereignty. The asean nations encourage international migration, 
and precisely for this purpose they make it an explicit rule that each mem-
ber must consider others’ concerns on sovereignty when determining its 
own policies.14 Thus there is no surprise that return migration is com-
monly encouraged and effectively enforced in the region. Conversely, re-
turn migration offers a productive lens to examine how territory- bound 
sovereignty and flexible transnational mobility can work together instead 
of exclude each other. As such, examination of return migration helps shed 
light on the “return” of Asia.
The intensification of return migration is not uniquely Asian. On the 
contrary, experiences in Asia are analytically important precisely because 
they cast in relief some general developments across the world. The return 
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of trafficking victims and refugees has been a common concern in Europe 
and other parts of the world. In terms of labor mobility, the eu has pro-
moted “circular migration” between Europe and non- eu countries since 
the late 2000s. Return is a defining feature or even a precondition of mi-
gration (see Castles 2006; Commission of European Communities 2007; 
Martin, Abella, and Kuptsch 2006). The British Parliament member Frank 
Field advocated a migration scenario of “one man in, one man out,” very 
similar to how labor migration is managed in Asia (2008). The Nobel lau-
reate economist Paul Krugman dubbed the proposal for permanent guest- 
worker programs in the United States “the road to Dubai” (2006).
Just as we take return as a conceptual lens, we take Asia as a method 
for global studies. In his seminal work, “China as Method,” Yuzo Mizogu-
chi (1989) urged us to reverse the conventional approach in China studies 
that took the “world” as the method (reference point) to measure China 
as the subject. Since there is no such thing as a truly global standard, the 
“world” often means particular European experiences in practice. In con-
trast, the “China as method” approach examines specific historical devel-
opments in China as part of the global history, and thereby rethinks the 
world as the subject matter from the perspective of Chinese experiences. 
In this framework, China and the world become dynamic, interentangled 
processes instead of static entities in isolation. What Yuzo argued for is 
obviously not specific to China studies. Chen Kuan- Hsing recently ex-
tended the proposition into an advocacy for “Asia as method.” The ap-
proach of “Asia as method” encourages scholars in Asian countries to take 
each other as reference points, and by doing so develop a scholarship that 
is free from Western colonialism and imperialism, and that is both locally 
rooted and generalizable (Chen 2010). Return: Nationalizing Transnational 
Mobility in Asia takes Asia as a method in both senses as articulated by 
Yuzo and Chen. Firstly, our subject matter is global conditions, and it is 
the last agenda of ours to claim Asian uniqueness or exceptionalism. Sec-
ondly, we approach the global by juxtaposing a range of Asian cases and 
examining interactions between Asian countries. We discern the various 
logics, rationalities, and strategies practiced here as part of a global experi-
mentation. An edited volume provides an ideal form for pursuing such a 
research strategy.
Taking Asia as a method certainly does not assume that the rest of 
the world is becoming like Asia or that societies worldwide are adopt-
ing “Asian methods” of development. Asia as a method is an analytical 
strategy. By developing new perspectives based on experiences in Asia, 
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we hope to discern problematics in the world that are otherwise less obvi-
ous or dismissed as aberrations. Modern social research is to a great ex-
tent a product of the practice of using Europe as the method. The main-
stream scholarship on international migration, for instance, has long been 
overshadowed by the European experiences about refugees, especially the 
Holocaust, and this explains why certain concerns and concepts (e.g., indi-
vidual rights and formal citizenship) are prioritized while others are mar-
ginalized (e.g., collective orders). It will not take us very far to simply cri-
tique this scholarship for being biased; we may instead appreciate its value 
as well as limiting it more by explicating its relation to the specific histori-
cal context. Rather than jettisoning established theories for being Eurocen-
trism, it may be more productive to develop multipolar, decentered ways 
of knowledge production. Asia as a method aims at exactly that. We take 
Asia as a method not because Asia is special or superior, but because it en-
ables an extrication of migration research from Western concerns and at 
the same time provides a solid ground for developing substantive theories.
Asia is a method instead of a case of global studies because the relation 
of Asia to the world is not that of a part to the whole. Asia is actively inter-
acting with the world rather than simply reflecting it. More important, 
Asia for us is not only a physical place to be studied but it also provides a 
critical epistemological position from where we study the world. As such, 
geographical coverage per se is of secondary importance in selecting cases. 
Our chapters instead aim to cover different kinds of return regulated by 
different political systems at different times.
The book starts with three chapters on the historical role of return mi-
gration in nation building in Asia. They are followed by five chapters on 
return migration in the current globalization era. Before turning to the 
specific cases, it is necessary to have an overview of returnees’ historical re-
lations to nation- states and global orders, and particularly how post–Cold 
War Asian states form differentiated, partial, selective, unstable, and con-
ditional relations with returnees. The practice of differentiation is accom-
panied by a tendency of coalescence. That is, states seek interstate agree-
ments and international consensus in order to enforce returns, and the 
all- embracing, naturalizing notion of “return” in public discourse ascribes 
particular universalistic meanings to diverse return flows. It is through 
the dialectic between differentiation and coalescence that an overarching 
sociopolitical order is constituted from increasingly diverse transnational 
mobilities.
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The Returnee and the Nation
Return has been a norm rather than an exception in human migration.15 
Ernest Ravenstein’s (1885) “laws of migration” stipulated that every migra-
tion stream is accompanied by a counter flow, and the migration- system 
theory of the 1970s identified return as an integral part of all migration 
systems (Mabogunje 1970; see also Nijkamp and Voskuilen 1996). It was 
historically commonplace that migrants moved back and forth before the 
erection of national borders.16 It was precisely when return became more 
difficult that the figure of the returnee acquired new symbolic and politi-
cal significance. Contemporary returns are no longer a so- called natural 
demographic phenomenon that can be predicted by laws. They are inextri-
cably tied to the politics of nation- states. The word return itself has now be-
come a vocabulary of the nation: migrants seldom return to their place of 
birth (Upadhya, this volume),17 and what the word return actually means 
is the movement from overseas to any part of one’s nation of origin. As 
Wang Gungwu (1981) has established so clearly, overseas Chinese had been 
either unmarked or thought of as traitors until the Qing court in the late 
nineteenth century officially named them huaqiao (Chinese sojourners)— 
temporary migrants who waited to return. The overseas Chinese acquired 
this name not because they suddenly became inclined to return but be-
cause the Qing government now perceived China as a nation instead of 
a civilizational empire potentially covering the entire world, and the gov-
ernment therefore felt compelled to define its relation with its overseas 
population in explicit terms as a way of defining its relation to the world. 
The nationalization of the notion of return can thus be seen as a discursive 
strategy with which the state laid claim to the mobile subjects.
Returnees of the modern times in Asia can be notionally divided into 
four generations, though the empirical boundaries between them are 
always blurred. Each group has distinct relations to the nation- states in-
volved. The first generation refers to the large number of circular migrants, 
primarily traders and laborers, who had, for a long time and particularly 
from the mid- nineteenth century, been undertaking regular return trips 
before nation- states broke down transnational mobility and connections 
in the mid- twentieth century.18 The second generation is represented by 
such iconic figures as Mahatma Gandhi, José Rizal, Jawaharlal Nehru, and 
Lee Kuan Yew, who returned to become founding fathers of their nations 
in the early twentieth century. Their returns were regarded as so important 
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that in 2003 the Indian government designated January 9, the date when 
Gandhi returned from South Africa after a twenty- year sojourn (in 1914), 
as Pravasi Bharatiya Divas (Overseas Indians’ Day), a day celebrated with 
great fanfare. This generation of returnees did not invent nationalism; they 
were pioneering nationalists in Asia because they were most familiar with 
Western imperialism and were directly exposed to political contestations 
in various parts of the world, which made them particularly capable of 
dealing with colonial powers and transforming protonations into the form 
of the modern state. The nation- building project was a global response to 
global colonialism and a result of global dialogue and learning (Anderson 
1991, 4; Chatterjee 1986). Prasenjit Duara says, “Nations are constructed 
in a global space premised upon institutional and discursive circulations” 
(2009, 6). In this process the second generation of returnees served as 
global mediators by disseminating and modifying the general idea of na-
tion, as well as by bringing their particular nation- building projects into 
the global public imagination through their consciously declared return.
The third generation returned between the 1950s and 1990s. Their re-
turns were either pulled by the new nation or pushed by heightened ethnic 
conflicts during the process of nation building in countries of residence 
(see Sasaki, this volume; Wang, this volume), or both.19 These returnees 
were no longer global mediators; they typically cut off overseas connec-
tions after return. The return of the fourth generation after the Cold War is 
different still. Return in the context of escalating globalization once again 
became part of back- and- forth movements instead of the definite end of a 
journey (Upadhya, this volume).
History seems to have come full circle: the first and the last generations 
appear to have similar experiences of return. But, while the first generation 
moved back and forth over long distance because of the nonexistence of 
nation- states, the fourth group does so because many nation- states in Asia 
have developed sophisticated mechanisms for engaging with transnational 
movements. Contemporary returnees simultaneously attach themselves to 
the nation and participate in global circulations. Their national attach-
ment often serves as a basis for their participation in globalization, and 
conversely their global positions are leverages in their interactions with 
national institutions. If the second generation of returnees nationalized 
their home societies, and the returnees of the third generation were them-
selves nationalized by becoming full- fledged citizens residing inside of the 
hardened national border, members of the latest generation remain trans-
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national subjects but have their mobility nationalized in the sense of how 
their mobility is regulated and how their mobility acquires social meaning.
Chapters 1, 2, and 3 in the book provide broad historical overviews 
of how returnees of different generations establish relations with nations 
amid wars, revolutions, ethnic conflicts, and ideological battles. Koji 
Sasaki’s chapter traces the little- known debates about return—whether 
one should return and how—among Japanese migrants in Brazil through-
out the twentieth century, and how transnational flows are domesticated 
by national concerns. The migrants, most of whom left Japan at the end of 
nineteenth century and the early twentieth, yearned to return in the first 
half of the twentieth century. But at that time Japan was preoccupied with 
imperialistic expansion and the emigrants’ return was discouraged. When 
the Japanese government reached out and opened special channels for the 
migrants and their descendants (Nikkeijin) to migrate to Japan to work in 
the 1990s, permanent return lost its sentimental purchase among the mi-
grants because their lives were deeply nationalized. The Nikkeijin ended 
up as quasi- returnees in Japan who enjoy more benefits than other for-
eigners but cannot claim citizenship. This quasi- returnee status reconciles 
the Japanese public’s desire for ethnic homogeneity, the economic need for 
cheap labor, and the state’s tight control over migration. In the wake of the 
2008 financial crisis, the Japanese government offered to pay the Nikkei-
jin for returning to Brazil on the condition of not rereturning to Japan as 
unskilled workers for three years. Many did return to Brazil.
Mariko Asano Tamanoi’s chapter focuses on a special group of return-
ees—the former soldiers of the Japanese Imperial Army who returned 
from the battlefields well after the end of the Second World War. By high-
lighting the awkwardness of the return, the chapter sheds new light on 
Japan’s transformation from a militarist empire to a nation and that trans-
formation’s implications for Japan and Asia today. The soldiers’ return in 
the 1950s was awkward because their presence reminded the public of 
Japan’s atrocities overseas in which many ordinary Japanese people were 
implicated. The return disrupted the dominant narrative that the Japanese 
nation was a victim of a handful of rightist elites and upset the effort to 
forget the complicity. A few soldiers who returned in the 1970s triggered 
little awkwardness in comparison on the part of the Japanese public, and 
the returnees became celebrities instead. By that time the memory of the 
war had faded away; the nation was fascinated by the soldiers’ experiences 
of hiding in jungles for nearly three decades as a biological miracle. It was 
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however awkward for the soldiers to be treated as biological miracles. Al-
though they were enthusiastically embraced by the nation, the soldiers felt 
out of place as such questions as why they had to go to war in the first place 
and why their fellow soldiers had to die were pushed aside. Underlying this 
awkwardness of the delayed returns is Japan’s unsettled relation to its past, 
which remains a source of tensions in Asia today.
Wang Cangbai’s chapter examines even more dramatic experiences of 
return, specifically on how Indonesian Chinese returnees were national-
ized into Mao’s China (1949 to 1979). The returnees, many of whom were 
fleeing the anti- Chinese sentiment in postcolonial Indonesia, were initially 
warmly welcomed by the PRC as fellow Chinese. But they were soon sub-
ject to harsh policies aimed at reforming them from “classed others” into 
part of the proletarian People when the basis for the definition of citizenry 
shifted from ethnic identity to class position. The state invented the special 
category of guiqiao (returned sojourners) and devised a series of institu-
tions and policies in order to accommodate, monitor, and assimilate the 
returnees. The policies ranged from setting up special preparation schools 
for returned students, establishing isolated overseas Chinese farms for re-
turned families, honoring the few who fit the party’s line, and imposing 
close surveillance on the majority of others. Since the end of the Cultural 
Figure i.1. “Need assistance to return?” A postcard from the International 
Organization for (ioM) Migration targeting irregular Chinese migrants in Europe. 
The postcard promises that the ioM will assist with travel documents, itineraries, 
and reintegration to the home society. Assisted return has become one of the most 
important activities of the ioM since the 1990s.
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Revolution, however, the state not only permits but also encourages trans-
national connections, both old and new. The new approach is primarily 
rationalized by the notions of modernization and globalization, while the 
emphasis on ethnic allegiance and socialist rhetoric remains salient. As 
a result, the relation between returnees and nation- states becomes much 
more complex.
The Victim, the Ambiguous, and the Desirable
As Wang’s chapter demonstrates, whether one was a returnee or not was 
deeply consequential for one’s life in Mao’s China. The fact of being a re-
turnee, regardless of what kind and how one returned, invited harassment 
and even humiliation during the Cultural Revolution. In the post–Cold 
War era, what matters more is what kind of returnee one is. This is true 
not only in China but across the region as well. The heterogeneity of re-
turnees should not be taken as a given fact; returnees are made different by 
various policies and discourses. The differentiation is not meant to reflect 
returnees’ varying experiences; it rather results from states’ multiple, and 
sometimes contradictory, objectives. For instance, states simultaneously 
seek economic growth (Upadhya, this volume), national security (Cowan, 
this volume), identity allegiance (Lu and Shin, this volume), and politi-
cal legitimacy (for which rights protection for victims is increasingly im-
portant; Lindquist, this volume). These objectives are often at odds with 
one another in practice. Differentiation enables nation- states to form par-
tial and selective relations with returnees and fit them into multiple state 
 agendas.
According to how they are treated by state policies and how they are 
presented in public media, returnees can be grouped into three categories: 
the “victims” (refugees and especially victims of human trafficking), the 
“desirable” (primarily the highly skilled and investors), and the “ambigu-
ous” (unskilled or irregular migrants who are economically needed but 
socially undesirable). Nation- states form differentiated relations with each 
of the three figures.
Refugees were the first target group of state- initiated return programs 
after the end of the Cold War. Because refugee issues during the Cold War 
were deeply politicized and were attributed to Communist authoritarian 
regimes, the decisive victory of capitalist liberal democracy was supposed 
to reduce the number of refugees dramatically. The un refugee agency 
unhCr identified voluntary repatriation as the optimal durable solution 
12 Xiang biao
for refugee problems and designated the 1990s as the “decade of repatria-
tion” (Koser and Black 1999). In Asia, the return of the five million refugees 
from Pakistan and Iran to Afghanistan between 2002 and 2009 was “the 
single largest return program” in the history of unhCr.20 If the provision 
of protection for refugees during the Cold War was based on apparently 
universalistic, but deeply politicized, humanitarianism, the return of refu-
gees was predicated on the belief that the nation- state, now supposedly 
free of ideological struggles, was the natural and neutral institution that 
every person should belong to. The world was beginning to be imagined 
as a depoliticized “national order of things” (Malkki 1995b).
The depoliticized perception about the world order also underpins the 
return of victims of human trafficking. The four Rs—rescue, return, reha-
bilitation, and reintegration—are recommended by international organi-
zations as well as national governments as the optimal solution to human 
trafficking (Lindquist, this volume). Return is perceived as such a desired 
outcome that international organization staff are sometimes reluctant to 
identify a person as a victim who may not have a place to return to, because 
where there is no point of return, there is no solution.21
Although the return of refugees and victims is supposed to help re-
store a sense of normalcy, the returnees’ experiences on the ground can 
be traumatic. Sylvia R. Cowan’s chapter focuses on the relation between 
the normalizing intention of return policies and traumatizing experiences 
of return. Some former Cambodian refugees and their children were de-
ported from the United States for committing minor crimes, even after 
they had served their full prison terms. The repatriation was implemented 
based on bilateral agreements in a time when negotiation was preferred to 
military intervention to deal with international affairs, and was thus meant 
to maintain law and order by peaceful means.22 But on the ground the re-
patriations were violently disruptive for the deportees and their families. 
They were typically repatriated suddenly, without warning, and many grew 
up in the United States and had no knowledge of their home country. The 
forced return was also historically related to U.S. military interventions in 
postcolonial Indochina and the refugees’ consequent displacement within 
the American host society that turned them into gang members. The suc-
cession from one type of displacement to another as experienced by the 
refugees illustrates the changing global order in the latter half of the twen-
tieth century.
The second group of returnees—primarily unskilled labor migrants 
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whose position is ambiguous for the states—is quickly growing in size. My 
own chapter describes how compulsory return is central to the control of 
unskilled labor mobility in East Asia. Compulsory return effectively ren-
ders the relations between migrants and the host state nothing more than 
a labor contract. A number of countries identify pregnant women and sick 
migrants as primary subjects of repatriation precisely because these “prob-
lematic” bodies bear the danger of developing social relations beyond eco-
nomic contracts with the host nation. Return is enforced through intricate 
collaborations between states, employers, recruiters, and other institutions 
across countries. Such connections between the multiple actors constitute 
an institutional basis for enforced return and making order from migration.
The third group of returnees, the highly skilled and the capital rich, em-
bodies even more complex logics of order making. The return of the highly 
skilled is supposed to bring the nation into the global circuit of flexible 
capital accumulation and knowledge production, as evidenced by the rise 
of the so- called brain- circulation paradigm in the policy thinking of the 
1990s (Global Commission of International Migration 2005). But global 
economic integration is always mediated by specific social institutions and 
political ideologies. Carol Upadhya’s chapter on returning technopreneurs 
in Bangalore, India, suggests that the elite returnees are not only bringing 
back capital, know- how, and international connections but also generat-
ing “neonationalism.” Neonationalism bases national pride on the nation’s 
position in the global market instead of independence and self- sufficiency, 
defines national belonging in cultural terms, and considers economic re-
distribution and political participation less important. In contrast to the 
nationalism that led India’s independence movement, neonationalism is 
outward looking, culturalist, and often elitist.
Finally, Melody Chia- Wen Lu and Shin Hyunjoon, whose study is based 
on returning Korean Chinese from China to South Korea, make a strong 
case that it is policy differentiation, rather than experiential difference, 
that matters. The Korean Chinese were in the 1980s regarded as repre-
sentatives of the global Korean diaspora, and victims who were forced to 
leave the Korean peninsula by historical injustices such as Japanese colo-
nialization. As such their return visits were welcomed and encouraged as a 
means to redress these past injustices. The position of the Korean Chinese, 
however, became much more ambiguous in the late 1990s when South 
Korea attempted to formalize its relations to Korean diasporas as part of 
its state- led globalizing agenda. Korean Chinese were privileged compared 
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to other foreigners due to ethnic connections, but they were treated less 
favorably compared to the more- recent emigrants to the West. The gov-
ernment changed this policy due to protests from the Korean Chinese in 
South Korea in 2004 and replaced nation of residence with one’s educa-
tion level and occupation as the central criteria for differentiating the re-
turn migrants. In practice the Korean Chinese are still required to submit 
more documents to prove their education levels than their counterparts 
returning from developed countries. Thus, the returnees are differentiated, 
and the criteria and methods of differentiation also vary from time to time.
The case of the Korean Chinese shows that nation- states remain the 
defining framework that organizes transnational mobility. The concerns 
about ethnic identity and economic competitiveness are supposed to en-
hance the national position of South Korea. The South Korean vision of 
globalization is equally about opening up the nation to the world as it is 
about nationalizing connections, knowledge, labor, and capital among the 
dispersed Korean diaspora. And in order to maximize the benefit of return 
to the South Korean nation, potential returnees were differentiated accord-
ing to their current nation of residence, especially the nation’s position in 
the global hierarchy. One of the reasons for the 2004 policy change that 
favored the Korean Chinese was the rise of China. The apparent ethno- 
nationalist stance has not undermined the relationship between migrants 
to the sending or receiving nations, as defined in civic terms. This interna-
tional dimension of nationalization leads to the tendency of coalescence, 
which is an equally important aspect as differentiation in governing mo-
bility through return.
Nationalizing and Naturalizing
What is remarkable about the governmental differentiation of returnees 
in Asia is that migrant- receiving and - sending states are increasingly in 
agreement with each other on how the returnees are to be differentiated. 
The highly skilled are desirable for the country that they return to partly 
because they are desirable in the country of residence. Unskilled or irregu-
lar migrants are unattractive to both the receiving and the sending coun-
tries; nevertheless the countries agree that return is a migrant’s right that 
cannot be denied and an obligation that cannot be easily waived. Compul-
sory return has been a basis for intergovernmental agreements on labor 
migration in East Asia since the end of the 1970s (Xiang, this volume). As 
for victims of human trafficking, it is now an obligation for legitimate sov-
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ereignties to repatriate the victims and to admit the returned.23 Sending 
states are willing to collaborate with receiving states because this enables 
them to establish closer relations with their overseas citizens and to tap into 
outmigration for national development. Receiving states also share some 
authority in regulating immigration with the sending states, for instance, 
by delegating power to government and private agencies in the sending 
countries for selecting and screening would- be migrants (see Xiang, this 
volume). This is because, given that immigration control is being tight-
ened across the world, “the labor- sending state is perhaps the institution 
most able to effectively resolve the contradictory forces of labor demand 
and immigration restriction” (Rodriguez 2010, xxiii). Malaysia and Indo-
nesia have developed relatively effective transnational operational systems 
to enforce return (Lindquist, this volume). Instead of resisting the pressure 
from Malaysia to receive deportees, Indonesia as the country of origin in 
fact has used this momentum to tighten its regulations of outmigration.
Such interstate institutional coalescence means that return programs 
enable nation- states to enhance their sovereign power transnationally and 
mutually. Both the sending and receiving states become more powerful 
in relation to migrants. As such, the central tension in international mi-
gration is no longer the one between migrants and the receiving society 
or that between the sending and receiving states, but is rather the one be-
tween migrants and alliances of states. An unskilled migrant worker vio-
lates regulations of both the sending and receiving countries if he or she 
fails to return as required, which can be punishable by both countries. In 
contrast, a highly skilled or a successful entrepreneur can make himself or 
herself more valuable to the multiple countries by moving back and forth 
between them. It is important to note that such institutional coalescence 
between states is largely an intra- Asia phenomenon. The repatriation of 
migrants from Europe and North America to many Asian countries re-
mains cumbersome and is subject to ad hoc bilateral negotiations due to 
the lack of general consensus.
There is also an ideational coalescence regarding return migration. The 
fact that the notion of “return” is used to refer to migration journeys of 
vastly different natures should not be seen as a problem of misnomer. It 
instead indicates the construction of a hegemonic framework, a good com-
mon sense, that gives migration particular meanings. As Johan Lindquist’s 
chapter suggests, the return discourses deployed by governments, ngos, 
and public media on different types of migrants echo each other and col-
lectively naturalize return and home. Since everyone is supposed to love 
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home and is protected at home, return is assumed to be unproblematic for 
all migrants. What’s wrong with asking someone to go back to where he 
or she “really” belongs?
The sense of naturalness lends return policies strong legitimacy. The 
Chinese word for destiny, guisu, literally means the “lodge to return to” 
(see also Wang, this volume, on the meaning of gui). The official Japa-
nese term for foreigners taking up Japanese citizenship is kika (return and 
convert).24 The word return establishes the directionality of mobility— 
directionality in ethical terms instead of only in the physical sense. To re-
turn is to reach one’s destiny. 
Apart from the naturalizing and normalizing effects, return can be 
energizing. The anthropologist Charles Stafford (2001) was puzzled by the 
Chinese custom of sending off and then receiving deities annually.25 Why 
don’t the Chinese make the gods permanent residents in their houses? 
This is because, as Stafford argued, alternating departing and returning 
is crucial to establishing, maintaining, and renewing social relationships. 
Departure and return make us feel sad and joyful and urge us to reflect on 
the past and yearn for the future, thus bringing constant dynamics to re-
lationships. In a world where imagined communities reach far beyond the 
national border (see Appadurai 1996), returnees from overseas are prob-
ably more capable than the supposedly quintessential, deep-rooted peas-
ants or tribal populations of energizing nationalism. If the Tomb of the 
Unknown Soldier is one of most arresting emblems of nationalism, as 
Benedict Anderson (1991, 50–51) pointed out so aptly, in the time of glob-
alization, the returnee is a powerful embodiment of nationalism. If the 
Tomb of the Unknown Soldier combines the senses of the sacred and the 
profane that are essential to modern nationalism, the returnee reconciles 
territoriality and extraterritoriality, which is crucial for neonationalism in 
the globalizing age.
The naturalizing effect of return is of course nothing natural in itself. 
Our chapters show that such effect is historically specific. The natural ap-
pearance of return is constituted by particular international agreements, 
and by the participation of ngos, public media, business associations, and 
private agencies that specialize in recruitment and transport. It is these 
institutional arrangements that underpin the dialectics between differen-
tiation and coalescence, between the national and the transnational, and 
thereby contribute to the ordering of mobility without hindering it.
What does the nationalization of transnational mobility mean for mi-
grants’ political agency? On the one hand, migrants face tremendous ob-
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stacles in challenging the system of tightly interrelated nation- states. State- 
facilitated returns curtail the political agency of transnational connections. 
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s envisaging of the multitude might be 
too optimistic (2000, 2004). On the other hand, the naturalization of re-
turn renders to migrants the appropriate hegemonic discourse to “speak 
back” to nation- states to demand justice and dignity. As Lu and Shin’s 
chapter shows, the Korean Chinese drew on the state ethno- nationalist 
discourse to claim return as their right, which must be met with equitable, 
nondiscriminatory policies. The nationalization of migration may also 
lead to a nationalization of migrant politics; that is, migrants use nation- 
states as the central scale in organizing their actions, take national dis-
courses as the main target of critique as well as the main resource for ar-
ticulating their demand, and identify changing national policies as their 
primary objective. For instance, the contestation of the meaning of “re-
turn” among the former Japanese soldiers and Nikkeijin engendered criti-
cal reflections of the hegemonic perceptions about the Japanese nation and 
its role in the war. For both the highly skilled Indian professionals who cir-
culate freely and voluntarily on the global scale and the forced Cambodian 
returnees, working with national and local organizations seems to be the 
most realistic strategy for making changes in their own lives and beyond. 
But just as the nationalization of mobility does not imply spatial fixing, 
the nationalization of migrant politics is certainly not territorially closed. 
The U.S.- originated ngos play active roles in Cambodia in assisting the re-
turnees, and the Indian returnees’ engagement with the local public is to 
a great extent shaped by their position in the global market. The Chinese 
migrant workers in Japan, as my chapter demonstrates, contested restric-
tive regulations of the Japanese and Chinese states by refusing to return to 
China. Their refusal was meant to ensure that they would be able to seek 
justice through the Japanese national legal system and government, and 
at the same time create international pressure on the Chinese government 
to redress problems on the sending side. The transnational dimension of 
nationalization will to a great extent condition both how mobility is regu-
lated and how migrant politics evolve in the future.
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ChApter one
To Return or Not to Return
The Changing Meaning of Mobility among  
Japanese Brazilians, 1908–2010
Koji sasaKi
In 1938, Shungoro Wako, an officer of the Japanese Imin Takushoku Gaisha 
(Company for Emigration and Colonization) in Brazil, made this remark 
in the introduction to his collection of statistical and historical data on 
Japanese migrants in a rural region in São Paulo:
If someone asks me to choose between return and permanent settle-
ment, I, with all my sincerity, would never hesitate to answer, “I 
ardently desire to return.” . . . [However,] I will work very hard until 
I am buried in this country [Brazil]. I will cherish the visions of my 
dear homeland [Japan] and will pray for its prosperity until the last 
moment of my life. Nonetheless, I will dedicate my body and soul to 
raise my children as outstanding Brazilians. (1938, 3, 11)
His painful inner struggle may look puzzling to today’s readers. What 
compelled him to suppress the burning desire to return? How should we 
reconcile his deep attachment to Japan and the determination to raise off-
spring as Brazilians? It is evident from his writing that his dilemma did 
not arise from his calculation of conflicting personal interests, but was 
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rather deeply ideological and even morally charged. Indeed, to return or 
not to return was a question of utmost importance among the Japanese 
community in Brazil during a good part of the twentieth century. Never a 
straightforward question, whether or not to return aroused considerable 
agony and confusion. The intention to return was driven not only by eco-
nomic considerations but also by migrants’ emotional perceptions of their 
relations to the larger global political order, particularly the rise and fall 
of the Japanese empire and the consolidation of the Japanese and Brazil-
ian nation- states.
This chapter examines the changing perception of return among the 
Japanese in Brazil from the beginning of the twentieth century to the early 
part of the twenty- first century. It follows the analytical strategy of re-
garding “return” as an idea, or, more precisely, as an imaginary that de-
fines the directionality of one’s physical movement, gives particular mean-
ings to mobility, and shapes the mobile subjects’ self- positioning in the 
world (Xiang, introduction, this volume). By taking mobility as a medium 
through which the migrant intentionally acts on the external world, this 
chapter teases out how the meaning of return changes with the rise and fall 
of the Japanese empire over three time periods. These narratives span the 
first half of the century, the establishment of a new world order centered 
on nation- states since the 1950s, and the reemergence of transnational net-
works with intensified globalization after the 1980s.
While the meaning of return has been contested and never stable, a 
particularly sharp historical turning point took place in the 1950s. In the 
first half of the twentieth century, the migrants’ return was discouraged 
because Japan was preoccupied with its imperialistic expansion project; 
furthermore, return was unlikely due to economic and transport con-
straints. Nevertheless, return remained a major concern among the mi-
grants during that period and it was in fact an important topic of heated 
debate among them whether they should return and under what condi-
tions. This continued to be the case for a short while even after the Second 
World War ended in 1945. In the second half of the century, however, re-
turn gradually lost its ideological and sentimental connotation as the mi-
grants had succeeded in establishing a respected minority status in Brazil-
ian society. As a result, when tens of thousands of descendants of former 
Japanese emigrants (Nikkeijin) headed to their ancestors’ homeland in the 
1980s and 1990s, they hardly viewed their experience as a return. Rather, 
the cultural and linguistic differences caused an immense sense of alien-
ation on the part of these migrants. The Japanese government, on the other 
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hand, exploited the ambiguity of their status by creating a special legal mi-
gration channel for these descendants on the basis of their blood relations 
with Japanese citizens. This channel, exclusive to the Nikkeijin, allowed 
them to live and work in Japan relatively freely, although it was less lib-
eral in allowing, let alone encouraging or supporting, the Nikkeijin’s per-
manent settlement. Under this system of quasi- return, the preference for 
ethnic homogeneity and the need for cheap labor in a time of increasing 
globalization were also reconciled. In this sense, the history of return is a 
history fraught with changing logics of what it means to be a mobile sub-
ject. Specifically for the Japanese Brazilians, their subjectivity shifted con-
tinually from self- styled imperial subjects to national citizens (of Brazil) 
and to transitional labor.
The Desire to Return as a “Disease”
The Japanese emigration to the Americas began as part of a state- initiated 
program designed to counter the twin problems of overpopulation and 
rural poverty during the Meiji period (1868–1912) (see Gaimu- sho 1941). 
In the late nineteenth century, the government sent groups of Japanese 
to Hawaii and North America. With the rise of the anti- Japanese move-
ment in the United States in the early twentieth century, however, the Japa-
nese government and numerous “emigration companies” (private enter-
prises that specialized in recruiting and sending Japanese citizens abroad 
for fees) looked to South America for alternative destinations. Meanwhile, 
Brazil was looking for a solution to the labor- shortage problem that it faced 
on its coffee plantations following the abolition of slavery in 1888 and the 
Italian government’s prohibition of emigration to Brazil in 1902 (Lesser 
1999, 85). These events resulted in massive migration from Japan to Bra-
zil. After the first Japanese migration to São Paulo in 1908, initiated by the 
private Imperial Colonization Company, more than 183,000 Japanese had 
headed to Brazil until 1941 (Gaimu- sho 1941, 179–80).
The migrants largely perceived their emigration to Brazil as an alter-
native to the rural- urban seasonal migration (dekasegi), which was com-
monly practiced by Japanese farmers in the Meiji period. The farmer- 
migrants undertook work in the Brazilian coffee fields for a number of 
years, and they expected to return to Japan after that. “Kokyo ni nishiki 
wo kazaru” (to return to the homeland dressed in brocade), as the Japa-
nese saying goes, was the ultimate goal of migration. This mentality was 
further reinforced by the fact that the reality of working in the Brazilian 
24 Koji sasaKi
coffee plantations was far from what was originally promised in the adver-
tisements of the emigration companies. In addition to the extremely harsh 
working conditions that were carried forward from the slavery system, the 
poor harvest in the first years and low wages fell greatly short of the mi-
grants’ expectations. The Japanese migrants were eager to return to Japan 
as early as possible, and they were largely indifferent to improving their 
long- term life prospects in Brazil.
Such an attitude was however criticized in the 1920s by the educated 
members of the migrant community, especially editors of immigrant 
newspapers, leaders of immigration organizations, and Japanese diplo-
mats. During the 1920s and 1930s, immigrant newspapers took it as their 
primary duty to analyze the life of the Japanese in Brazil and to critique 
their behaviors. Usually featured on the front page, opinion editorials often 
sought to pinpoint the problem with the wider Japanese migrant commu-
nity and even provided detailed guidelines on what constituted desirable 
attitudes and behaviors. In this sense, the newspapers were not mere dis-
seminators of information but a means of moral guidance. The editorials 
of such newspapers as Burajiru Jiho (Brazilian news, 1917–41) and Nippak 
Shimbun (Nippak journal, 1916–41) were particularly influential among 
the migrants. Despite their diverse social origins and political orientations, 
the editors agreed that the migrants should abandon their “sojourner men-
tality” (dekasegi konjo) and instead uphold the “determination for perma-
nent settlement” (eijuu ketsui). For instance, an editorial published in Nip-
pak Shimbun in 1924 bitterly bemoaned the fact that the migrants lacked 
the determination to stay: “Because the Japanese immigrants are not lib-
erated from the temporary, sojourner disposition, we have not succeeded 
as much as we could have. . . . Most of the newly arriving immigrants have 
repeated the same mistakes, without being able to establish a firm basis. 
Indeed, this temporary, sojourner disposition is the fundamental disease 
that inhibits the development of the Japanese immigrants” (Nippak Shim-
bun 1924; my translation).
This criticism of the desire for return can be attributed to the percep-
tion that some migrants’ inclination for short- term economic success was 
detrimental to their own agricultural development in Brazil because agri-
cultural development required long- term investments. However, the edu-
cated migrants’ desire to assimilate into the Brazilian society and oppo-
sition to return reflected their consciousness about Japan’s rise as an 
international power. To many migrants, Japan’s rising status required its 
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subjects to demonstrate to the world respectful cultural dispositions. The 
anti- Japanese movements in North America, which excluded Japanese im-
migrants as racially and culturally inferior, made the migrants even more 
eager to prove that they were capable of assimilating into the host society. 
For example, in 1921 Toshiro Fujita, the Japanese consul in São Paulo, ad-
vised Japanese migrants in Brazil to follow Brazilian cultural norms. He 
insisted that every one of them “should respect the manners and customs 
of this country and make efforts in assimilating our clothes, foods, hous-
ings and even the everyday behaviors into those of the people in Brazil” 
(Fujita 1921; my translation). Remarkably, this call for assimilation even 
led to an official recommendation of naturalization, that is, acquiring a 
Brazilian citizenship. For instance, Burajiru Jiho, which was run by the 
quasi- governmental Kaigai Kogyo Kabushiki Gaisha (Overseas Develop-
ment Company), supported the naturalization of Japanese subjects in Bra-
zil throughout the 1920s (Burajiru Jiho 1920b; my translation). The news-
paper stressed that the migrants should see themselves as pioneers in the 
mission of Japan’s overseas development, declaring that “there is no reason 
why being a Japanese requires living and dying in Japan” (Burajiru Jiho 
1920a; my translation).
These views, stemming from agricultural and diplomatic reasoning, were 
solidified in the late 1920s with the emerging cosmopolitanism of the Taisho 
(1912–26) and the early Showa (1926–89) periods. In the 1920s, a number of 
Japanese local “overseas associations”—not- for- profit organizations set up 
by prefectural governments throughout Japan between the 1910s and 1930s 
aimed at promoting overseas emigration and development through educa-
tion, research, and recruitment—acquired lands in the rural São Paulo re-
gions to build new plantations to facilitate long- term settlement of the Japa-
nese migrants. Some of the settlers in these plantations were members of a 
newly formed middle class in Japan, who sought to use the migration and 
colonial developments as an opportunity to carry out social experiments 
that were typically informed by cosmopolitan utopian visions (Gaimu- sho 
1953, 45). Yoshiyuki Kato, a leader of Burajiru Takushoku Kumiai (Coopera-
tiva de Colonização do Brasil; Society for Colonizers in Brazil), for instance, 
launched a movement in 1934 aimed at introducing Western- style collective 
farming and puritan moral values in the new settlements (Handa 1987, 454). 
With the motto of “loving the soil, settling permanently” (aido eijuu), the 
movement represented settlement as an expression of progressive thinking, 
contrary to the conservative desire to return.
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Imagined Remigration to New Territories of the Empire
The 1930s witnessed a decisive shift in the political landscape in Japan 
and in Brazil. After the Manchuria Incident in 1931, when Japan force-
fully annexed a large part of northeast China, the ultranationalist military 
took full control of the Japanese government. The Japanese public was con-
vinced as well that Japan’s imperialist expansion in Asia was justifiable and 
even benevolent. While politico- theoretical concepts such as the Greater 
East Asia Co- Prosperity Sphere, the Southern Expansion Doctrine (Nan-
shinron), and Hakko ichiu (the whole world under one roof) were mostly 
focused on the new imperialist order in Asia, the immigrant intellectuals 
in Brazil actively sought to interpret these theories in order to redefine 
their positions (Handa 1966, 114). The earlier dichotomies of to return or 
not to return, and of being Japanese or being a new Brazilian, were re-
placed by more complicated and varied concerns such as whether they 
should return to new Asian territories occupied by the Japanese empire.
This reorientation toward the expanding Japan instead of toward the 
host society of Brazil was reinforced in the late 1930s as Brazil’s nation- 
building efforts led to tougher restrictions on the immigrants’ lives. When 
Getúlio Vargas took over the presidency of Brazil in 1937, his Estado Novo 
(New State) regime implemented a series of policies aimed at national uni-
fication and imposed severe constraints on foreigners’ activities. Education 
and publications in the Japanese language, along with other languages, 
such as German and Italian, were strictly prohibited (see Comissão de 
Elaboração da História dos 80 Anos da Imigração Japonesa no Brasil 1992, 
160). Moreover, Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 led to the cancella-
tion of diplomatic relations between Japan and Brazil. This in turn resulted 
in the general repatriation of Japanese diplomats via the Swedish wartime 
civilian exchange ship and left the Japanese migrants in a state of great 
anxiety over fear of being abandoned and losing contact with the home-
land government. During these years, many were arrested for speaking 
Japanese in public. It was in this climate of great insecurity that Shungoro 
Wako made the remark about his painful decision to stay in Brazil, which 
I quoted in the beginning of this chapter. Despite Wako’s determination to 
stay, a survey in a rural São Paulo region that he conducted in 1938 showed 
that as many as 85 percent of the migrants there hoped to return to Japan 
(Wako 1938, 1). Despite such a rise in the desire for return, however, very 
few migrants could afford the costly trip to Japan (see figure 1.1).
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This anxiety about the new political situation of Brazil, the resumed 
desire for return, and the development of Japanese imperialism collec-
tively resulted in a new conception of return. Rokuro Koyama, the editor 
of Seisyu Shimpo (News of São Paulo, 1921–41), one of the leading Japanese 
newspapers in Brazil, argued that the Japanese in Brazil should remigrate 
to the Southeast Asia region that recently came under control of the Japa-
nese empire.1 According to Koyama, before Japan’s expansion to the Chi-
nese continent, the Japanese were forced to engage in what he called a “hy-
brid migration” (konko ijuu), wherein emigrants had to adopt the culture 
of the destination country. The new geopolitical condition, he argued, al-
lowed for an “ethnically pure migration” (minzoku- teki jun ijuu), in which 
the migrants were no longer required to assimilate and would thus remain 
“pure” Japanese.2 He insisted that the assimilative policy of Brazil was in-
consonant with the latter migration and that the Japanese people should 
now engage in nonassimilative migrations within the power zone of the 
Japanese empire. Seisyu Shimpo published a series of editorials in 1941 that 
Figure 1.1. A celebration for the repatriation of a shop owner (the third man in 
the front from the right) to Japan. Bastos, São Paulo, in 1935. (Courtesy of Museu 
Histórico da Imigração Japonesa no Brasil)
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advocated a “glorious retreat” (kouei aru taikyaku) from Latin America to 
Asia “under the Japanese flag” (Kawabata 1941; my translation).
Although some contending voices saw a retreat to the homeland as 
something that would undermine Japan’s expansion in the world (Kishi-
moto 1947, 169),3 this imperialist concept of return acquired strong cur-
rency in the migrant community. Ordinary migrants, whose life in Bra-
zil saw few signs of improvement but whose desire to return had been 
criticized and suppressed by immigrant intellectuals, embraced this new 
notion enthusiastically. Kiyoshi Ando, the editor of a literary journal in 
the late 1930s in São Paulo, recalled that “this feverish desire was so influ-
ential that the majority of the people expected to remigrate to the Greater 
East Asia Co- Prosperity Sphere even after Japan’s unconditional surren-
der” (1949, 311; my translation). Curiously, the migrants’ eagerness for im-
perial return or remigration was hardly appreciated by their homeland 
government, and the desire for migration from one colony to another was 
largely unrealized. The imagined collective return from Brazil to Japan’s 
Asian empire was the migrants’ cautious but desperate response to the 
dramatically changing political conditions, reflecting their predicament 
of being caught up between cosmopolitan ideals, imperialist ideology, and 
emotional pining for home.
The Cult of Return
After its defeat in the Second World War in 1945, Japan changed its role as 
an imperialist empire with expanding territory to that of a small nation- 
state. The empire suddenly ceased to exist when it lost former colonies, 
such as Korea, Taiwan, Manchuria, and many islands in the north and the 
south of the Japanese mainland. The glorious imperial ideologies evapo-
rated overnight. This radical change required another corresponding re-
vision of the subjectivities of its citizens, both in Japan and overseas. With 
regard to the Japanese community in Brazil, however, this process was 
slow and was marked by a series of reactionary incidents. Communication 
broke down during the war, and it took a few years for the migrants in rural 
plantations to be fully informed about the outcome of the war. Many Japa-
nese migrants in Brazil still believed that Japan had won, or was winning, 
even after August 1945. The “convictionists” (vitoristas or shinnen- ha), who 
believed in Japan’s victory and persistently rejected the news of Japan’s de-
feat, gained great popularity. When the “recognitionists” (esclarecidos or 
ninshiki- ha) organized campaigns to inform the community about Japan’s 
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defeat, militant members of the Shindo Renmei (League of the Ways of the 
Emperor’s Subjects), the central organization of the convictionist group, 
organized terrorist attacks and killed many recognitionist leaders (Miyao 
2003, 70–72).
It was against this background that various rumors about return 
emerged in São Paulo in the early 1950s. In order to exploit ordinary mi-
grants’ lingering desire to return, rumors were spread among the mi-
grants that the victorious Japanese government would soon come to res-
cue them from Brazil. Numerous tricksters swindled the migrants out of 
large amounts of money by persuading them to sell off their properties in a 
rush to be ready for “repatriation ships” that would arrive anytime to send 
them back to Japan (São Paulo Shimbun- sha 1960, 3–9).
In the midst of this turmoil and confusion, the Sakura- gumi Teishintai 
Figure 1.2. A street demonstration organized by the Sakura Volunteer Army 
in Praça da Sé, São Paulo, on February 3, 1955, demanding that the Japanese 
government repatriate them. The banners read “Ethnic Return” and “Complete 
Repatriation of 400,000 Compatriots.” (Courtesy of the Museum of the Japanese 
Immigration in Brazil, São Paulo)
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(Sakura Volunteer Army) was formed as a cult of return in 1953. Although 
the agenda of the group was fundamentally driven by a desperate desire to 
return to Japan, the members presented their proposals as critical engage-
ment with global political developments. The leaders urged the Japanese 
migrants to join the U.S.- led un forces in the Korean War, but at the same 
time to “fight alongside communists to liberate Taiwan.” The leaders advo-
cated “forced repatriation of all Japanese immigrants in Brazil” (São Paulo 
Shimbun- sha 1960, 10–11; Paulista Shimbun- sha 1977, 37). They organized 
street demonstrations and even a collective hunger strike to pressure the 
Japanese embassy to repatriate them, only to be scorned by the general 
public due to the group’s deeply controversial agendas and eccentric be-
haviors (figure 1.2). In 1955, frustrated members attacked the Japanese con-
sulate in São Paulo and injured several officials (O Estado de S. Paulo 1955).
The Japanese migrants’ desire to return finally faded away by the mid- 
1950s as they learned that their war- torn homeland could no longer wel-
come them. The new wave of migrants from Japan in the 1950s reinforced 
this perception. The new wave took place as part of a government program 
to counter an overpopulation problem after the war. The national popula-
tion increased by ten million in eight years from 1948 to 1956, which was 
partly due to the baby boom of the late 1940s, but more directly resulted 
from the surge of six million returnees (hikiage- sha) from former Japa-
nese colonies that consisted of soldiers and civilians (see Tamanoi, this 
volume).4 The government swiftly rebuilt the emigration apparatus, in-
cluding the nation- wide recruitment network, training centers for emi-
grants, a special loan agency, and an advisory committee in the cabinet. 
After the government resumed its overseas emigration program in 1953, 
about 51,000 people were sent to Brazil by 1975 (Kokusai Kyoryoku Jigyo- 
dan 1987, 36–39).
The postwar emigration policy was characterized by its general discour-
agement of return. As the emigration program primarily aimed to reduce 
the size of the population, the state obligated the applicants to avow that 
they would permanently live in their destination countries (Wakatsuki and 
Suzuki 1975, 110–13). For example, a 1955 agricultural youth- emigration 
program required all applicants to fill out a detailed questionnaire, in 
which they had to declare that they were physically fit and mentally deter-
mined to live in Brazil for the rest of their lives.5 While relentlessly empha-
sizing the glorious image of overseas emigration through a wide range of 
political instruments—such as official publications that were entirely de-
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voted to the promotion of emigration and that promulgated the popular 
motto of “kaigai yuhi” (bravely fly overseas)—the government did not put 
in place any substantial policies or organizations to address the migrants’ 
possible need to return to Japan. For this reason, the postwar immigrants 
to Brazil rarely saw themselves as temporary workers but understood their 
relocation from Japan to Brazil as a one- way journey.
On the other hand, the Japanese immigrants and the descendants in 
Brazil rapidly assimilated into the Brazilian society. Various institutions 
were built to reorganize the former overseas imperial subjects into a com-
munity with a distinct history and political demands. At the same time, 
memory of the state emigration program largely disappeared from the 
everyday concerns of the Japanese people as the standard of living rose 
dramatically after the war, and the public image of the Japanese migrants 
in Brazil greatly improved in the 1950s and 1960s as the group’s leaders suc-
ceeded in reconstructing its image as an important contributor to Brazil’s 
modernization project.
In this context, some Japanese politicians began to see the overseas 
Japanese emigrants in a new light. During the late 1950s and through the 
1960s, hundreds of Japanese politicians and business leaders in Japan orga-
nized conventions to celebrate the achievements of the Japanese emigrants 
and their descendants abroad. The Kaigai Nikkeijin Taikai (Convention of 
the Overseas Japanese and Their Descendants), convened by proemigra-
tion politicians, gave rise to a renewed popular interest in the emigrants 
(Kaigai Nikkeijin Renraku Kyokai 1960, 11). Once despised as an aban-
doned people (kimin), the migrants were now portrayed as pioneers in 
foreign lands, whose struggles and moral strength won praise and respect 
in their host countries. The convention was also one of the first occasions 
in which the term Nikkeijin—the Japanese emigrants overseas and their 
descendants—was used in public. Such reevaluations of the emigrants’ 
achievement were welcomed by the Japanese community in Brazil, and 
sympathetic politicians and business leaders in Japan provided rare chan-
nels for the migrants to engage with Japan. In 1964, the leaders of the Japa-
nese immigrant community held the 1º Congresso Latino- Americano de 
Colônias Japonesas (First Congress of the Nikkeijin in Latin America), 
gathering the representatives from the Japanese immigrants and their de-
scendants in South America. Representatives at this meeting raised vari-
ous concerns with regard to the Japanese government’s responsibility to 
the overseas community and, above all, demanded the extension of politi-
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cal rights, including the right to vote, to the Nikkeijin (São Paulo Shimbun- 
sha 1966, 57). In this way, Nikkeijin emerged as a new subject in both Japa-
nese domestic politics and international relations.
The Return of the Nikkeijin?
Postwar economic development and advancement in long- distance trans-
port and communication created new conditions for international mo-
bility. The Brazilian economic crisis in the 1980s and 1990s had meant that 
many Brazilian citizens were compelled to go abroad to look for work. 
The high inflation, which was at 110.2 percent in 1980, 224.4 percent in 
1985, and 1,764.9 percent in 1989 (“Índice Geral de Preços” [General Index 
of Prices] by Fundação Getúlio Vargas, cited in Mori 1995, 495), and the 
stagnant development of the lost decade (década perdida) in the 1980s 
continued to devastate the Brazilian economy in the 1990s. As a result, 
many Brazilians chose to work abroad and remained in the United States, 
Europe, and other Latin American countries. By the end of the 1990s, as 
many as 1.8 million Brazilian citizens resided abroad (Instituto Brasileiro 
de Geografia e Estatística 2003, 18), and the number rose to 4 million in 
2008 (Ministério do Trabalho e Emprego 2003, 9).
Meanwhile, Japan suffered from the shortage of unskilled labor, which 
caused many small- and mid- scale companies to go bankrupt (Chusho 
Kigyo- cho 1987). In response to the dire economic situation in Brazil and 
the labor shortage in the Japanese manufacturing industry, some of the 
prewar first- generation Japanese immigrants and the second- generation 
descendants in Brazil started visiting Japan and working in factories in 
the mid- 1980s. Some of them engaged in employment without proper 
documentation. In a bid to counter the growing numbers of illegal for-
eign workers in the country, the Japanese Ministry of Justice implemented 
a reformed Shutsu Nyu- Koku Oyobi Nanmin Ninteihou (Immigration 
Control and Refugee Recognition Act) in June 1990. The amendment in-
cluded the Nikkeijin up to the third generation and their spouses in a list 
of foreign populations who were eligible for “long- term- resident” status 
and a visa.6 The visa, granted by the Japanese minister of justice largely 
for humanitarian reasons, was also given to other foreign nationals such 
as non- Japanese children closely related to Japanese citizens and Asian 
refugees desiring to reside with their families in Japan. With few regula-
tions as to the economic activities of the visa holders, it was in a sense an 
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exceptional category in the Japanese immigration policy, which typically 
restricted foreigners from engaging in unskilled labor. The inclusion of 
Nikkeijin in this list was consistent with the earlier guideline set by the 
government’s Kaigai Ijuu Shingikai (Council for Overseas Emigration) in 
1979, which obliged the Japanese government to be responsible for the wel-
fare of the second- and third- generation overseas descendants.7
The minor amendment in visa regulations, however, led to an unex-
pected growth of migrant workers from Brazil. Residents of Brazilian na-
tionality in Japan, which numbered only about 2,000 in 1985, increased 
to about 148,000 in 1992, and to 316,000 in 2007 (Homu- sho Nyuukoku 
Kanrikyoku 2008)—over 20 percent of the total Nikkeijin population (1.4 
million) in Brazil (Centro de Estudos Nipo- Brasileiros 2002). The great 
majority of residents were from the states of São Paulo and Paraná and 
lived in Japanese provincial industrial cities such as Toyota in Aichi Pre-
fecture, Hamamatsu in Shizuoka, and Ota and Oizumi in Gunma. Many 
were recruited through the transnational networks between travel agencies 
(agências) in Brazil and temporary work agencies (empreiteiras) in Japan 
(see Higuchi 2005). In addition to introducing jobs, they also offered com-
prehensive packages that included housing, translation services, and daily 
commuting transport. But since the Nikkeijin visa did not tie the resi-
dents to particular employers, many were constantly in search of better 
jobs and often disappeared from their workplaces and officially registered 
addresses. Even the local governments, responsible for the services pro-
vided to the foreign citizens, frequently lost sight of the migrants and their 
children.
As some researchers have suggested,8 one may argue that there is a 
certain element of return in this movement in the sense that the migra-
tion started because of their ancestral connections. With the long- term- 
resident visa, Nikkeijin up to the third generation and their spouses could 
engage in any occupation of their choice without the state’s approval. In 
order to apply for the visa as a Nikkeijin, one must submit formal evidence 
to prove his or her blood connections to Japan. Essential evidence included 
copies of a family register issued in Japan or, in the case of the third gen-
eration, proof of grandparents’ identity and parents’ birth certificates and 
marriage certificates.
These new waves of reverse migration were some of the most impor-
tant developments for the Japanese community in Brazil. Newspapers of 
the migrant community featured every detail of the phenomenon and 
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debated its impacts on the development of the community. Community 
leaders established such groups as Centro de Informação e Apoio ao Tra-
balhador no Exterior (Center of Information and Support for the Workers 
Abroad), Instituto de Solidariedade Educacional e Cultural (Institute of 
Educational and Cultural Solidarity), and Comissão de Estudos Relaciona-
dos aos Dekassegui (Dekassegui Research Committee). The leaders urged 
both the Japanese and Brazilian governments to address the needs of the 
migrants. While the notion of “return” was rarely evoked explicitly, the 
migrants’ ancestral connections to Japan provided the grounds on which 
such demands were made.
Yet it can be misleading to label the migrants as returnees. In addition 
to the term’s deviation from the definition of “return migration” by the 
International Organization for Migration (International Organization for 
Migration 2004, 10), the great majority of the migrants did not consider 
their journey to be return. The term did not reflect their actual experiences. 
In fact, among those who migrated to Japan in the 1990s, only a handful 
were literal returnees—those who were born and had lived part of their 
lives in Japan before migrating to Brazil.9 Instead, the majority of Nikkei-
jin migrants to Japan were second- and third-generation descendants, for 
whom Japan was merely their ancestors’ homeland. Despite their physical 
resemblance to other Japanese nationals, the Portuguese- speaking Latin 
American migrants experienced immense linguistic and cultural barriers 
in Japan. Furthermore, they moved back and forth between Japan and Bra-
zil regularly, facilitated by travel agencies whose transnational operations 
straddled Brazil and the temporary work agencies in Japan. This pattern of 
migration is referred to as dekassegui, Japanese for “migrate to work,” as if 
to liken the pattern to their ancestors’ practice of temporary work in Brazil. 
For many Nikkeijin migrants, work in Japan was merely a temporary alter-
native to their economic lives in Brazil. In other words, their transnational 
migration was a consequence of a purely rational choice, which had little 
to do with the ethnic preference demonstrated by the new visa category.
The term return was absent in the Japanese government’s formal docu-
ments. From the very beginning, Japanese government officials had been 
reluctant to promote dekassegui migration from Latin American coun-
tries or to provide assistance to those who had already migrated to Japan. 
By distancing itself from the notion of “return,” the Japanese government 
could use its diaspora community in Latin America as a reserve of labor 
power with minimal political complications, welfare provisions, or moral 
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responsibility. In this sense, the Brazilian migrants, who obtained a rela-
tively privileged visa status due to their blood connection to Japan, never-
theless remained vulnerable to changes in the economic and political 
structures that demanded their labor and therefore presence.
The vulnerability of the Nikkeijin’s quasi- return status became particu-
larly evident in the wake of the global financial crisis in 2008–9. In late 
2008, in a bid to counter the general loss of sales due to the global financial 
crisis, the top Japanese manufacturers reduced their production, causing 
large- scale redundancies in the capacity of related suppliers. Most of the 
Brazilian migrants were working on temporary contracts brokered by tem-
porary work agencies, so they were the first to lose their jobs. This further 
damaged the very basis of the migrants’ lives in Japan, because they were 
dependent on these transnational agencies for detailed and comprehen-
sive support, including collective housing, language assistance, and trans-
portation. When the migrants lost their jobs, some became homeless and 
had to return to Brazil. Around 86,000 Brazilians left Japan between 2007 
and 2010, amounting to 27 percent of the registered Brazilian population 
in precrisis 2007.10
In response to the crisis, the Japanese Ministry of Health, Labor, and 
Welfare launched a program with the name Nikkeijin Rishokusha no Tame 
no Kikoku Shien Jigyo (Support for the Return of Unemployed Nikkei-
jin) between April 2009 and March 2010. The program provided a sub-
sidy of 100,000–300,000 yen (about USD 900–2,700) to Nikkeijin who 
wanted to return to their countries of origin. The government initially an-
nounced that it would only provide support on the condition that the per-
son would not reenter the country under the same type of visa, but later 
added that the person may reenter the country after three years. Between 
2009 and 2010, about twenty thousand Japanese Brazilians applied for the 
program and received the grant to fly back to Brazil.11 The program was 
to some extent designed to reduce the welfare costs incurred by Nikkeijin 
workers by cutting off their ties to Japan. In this sense, the ambiguity of 
the quasi- returnee status provided the state with extra room for maneuver, 
and quasi- return was eventually replaced by one- way “real” return.
Discussion
When Wako expressed his passionate determination to settle in Brazil, and 
when Koyama meticulously theorized his vision of remigration to Japa-
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nese Southeast Asia, “return or not to return” was a matter of vital impor-
tance. Return was seen as a direct expression of their subjectivity to the 
larger political project of the Japanese empire. During Japan’s imperial 
expansion, Japanese migrants in Brazil acutely followed the developments 
in their homeland and regarded themselves as subjects of the emerging 
Japanese empire. The question of return was thus deeply politicized and 
moralized. The postwar development of the cult of return in the case of 
Sakura- gumi Teishintai and the Japanese government’s nonreturn policy 
of emigration further illustrated how politically and ideologically sensitive 
the issue of return can be.
In contrast, at the beginning of the twenty- first century, it seems, con-
cerns about empire, nation, and collective political identity were all gone. 
The transnational migration of the Brazilian Nikkeijin was opened up by 
the state’s introduction of a legal status, but its fundamental driving force 
was the flexibility of the transnational labor- supply system. When the mi-
grants engaged in factory work, they heavily depended on the packaged 
lifestyle provided by the transnational temporary- work agencies. Unlike 
in the earlier regimes of migration, intense moral and political reasoning 
no longer seemed to define the meaning of the migrants’ mobility. Instead, 
personal experiences such as working conditions, lifestyle, and local re-
lations came to define people’s perceptions of migration. The question of 
whether or not to return was largely a matter of economic reasoning with 
regard to the constantly changing condition of work. This does not imply 
that the state no longer played a role in these transnational mobilities. Not 
only did the Japanese government introduce a privileged legal channel 
for the Nikkeijin primarily because of their ethnicity and their ancestral 
connection to Japan but it was also careful to maintain a distance from 
them. This ambiguity was an effective source of control that allowed the 
government to regulate the flow of migration and citizenship. It is pre-
cisely through such selective and partial relations that the Japanese state 
in the new millennium accommodates an increasingly transnational form 
of mobility into its notions of sovereignty, citizenship, and nationhood.
Notes
The complexity of the directionality of transnational migration and its perceptions by 
differently positioned actors renders it difficult to describe the subjects of this chapter 
in a single term. For example, the Japanese citizens who left for Brazil in the beginning 
of the twentieth century were perceived as emigrants by the Japanese government but 
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immigrants by the Brazilian public. When their descendants moved to Japan in the 
late twentieth century, they were immigrants from the Japanese point of view but emi-
grants from the Brazilian point of view. In order to avoid confusion, I will, wherever 
possible, use the generic term migrant to refer to the subjects of this chapter. However, 
I am also aware that the neutral term (i.e., migrant) may also give an impression of a 
mobile subject compared to the other variations (i.e., immigrant and emigrant) and is 
not quite suitable to describe those who lived in the host country for decades. In fact, 
the terms immigrant and emigrant, deliberately used by the subjects themselves or by 
the government, take on specific political effects by implicating where the subjects 
should ultimately belong. For this reason, I will also use the term immigrant and emi-
grant where it is more appropriate.
 1. Takashi Maeyama (1982) analyzes Koyama’s advocacy of remigration as part of 
the “revitalization movement” of the Japanese immigrants in Brazil.
 2. Koyama published a series of editorials in July 1941 under the pseudonym of Ko-
sonju. See Kosonju 1941a, 1941b, 1941c; my translations.
 3. Koichi Kishimoto, an educator and the founder of Gyosho Gakuen (Gyosho 
School System) in São Paulo closely analyzed the migrants’ opinions on the issue of 
remigration. Although he was attentive to the rise of his homeland, he argued that the 
Japanese immigrants should nonetheless stay in Brazil.
 4. In 1956 the first white paper of the Ministry of Health and Welfare expressed its 
grave concern for the consequences of the rapidly increasing population: “The post-
war development of the national economy was certainly remarkable. However, the 
growth of our population and the transformation of its structure have decelerated this 
development. It has impeded the improvement of the national living standard and 
distorted the lives of our people caused by the rapid modernization.” See Kosei- sho 
Daijin Kambo Kikakushitsu (1956, 1; my translation).
 5. From a brochure on the 1955 Cotia Sangyo Kumiai Tandoku Seinen Koyo Imin 
(Cotia Agricultural Cooperative’s Youth Employment Emigration) (Cotia Sangyo 
Kumiai 1956).
 6. The long- term- resident status is granted to “those who are authorized to reside 
in Japan with a period of stay designated by the minister of justice in consideration 
of special circumstances.” Shutsu Nyu- Koku Kanri Oyobi Nanmin Ninteiho, Beppyo 
Dai 2 (Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act, Annexed Table 2).
 7. “Kongo no kaigai iju to iju seisaku no arikata” [The guideline for overseas Emi-
gration and Migration Policy] was proposed by the Council for Overseas Emigration 
on January 31, 1979.
 8. See Yamanaka 1996; Tsuda 2003. Takeyuki Tsuda uses the concept of “ethnic re-
turn migration” to describe the migration of descendants to their ancestors’ homeland.
 9. In fact, these first- generation immigrants held Japanese citizenship and were 
absent from the immigration statistics published by the Japanese Ministry of Justice. 
It is commonly said among the Japanese community in Brazil that most of them defi-
nitely went back to Brazil—their original destination—by the late 1990s.
 10. Homu- sho Nyukoku Kanrikyoku (Immigration Bureau, Ministry of Justice), 
“Minato- betsu nyuukoku gaikokujin no kokuseki” [Nationalities of the foreigners 
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who entered by port] and “Minato- betsu shukkoku gaikokujin no kokuseki” [Na-
tionalities of the foreigners who departed by port], http://www.moj.go.jp/housei/tou 
kei/toukei_ichiran_nyukan.html (accessed February 11, 2012).
 11. Kosei Rodo- sho, Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare), “Nikkeijin Kikoku- 





War, Migration, and Delayed Return in Postwar Japan
MariKo asano TaManoi
The protagonist of Ernest Hemingway’s short story “Soldier’s Home” (pub-
lished in 1925) is a Methodist college student in Kansas, Harold Krebs, who 
“enlisted in the Marines in 1917 and did not return to the United States 
until the second division returned from the Rhine in the summer of 1919” 
(1996, 69). By the time of his delayed return, after “the greeting of heroes 
was over,” his town “had heard too many atrocity stories to be thrilled by 
actualities,” so “to be listened to at all he had to lie, and after he had done 
this twice he, too, had a reaction against the war and against talking about 
it” (69). Indeed, people in his town “seemed to think it was rather ridicu-
lous for Krebs to be getting back so late, years after the war was over” (69). 
Although Harold is a hero to his sisters and parents, who had waited for 
his return for many years, their attitudes toward him soon begin to change 
(70). The story thus ends when Harold is urged by his parents to get “a 
definite aim in life,” to which he is unable to amass energy to respond (75).
The passage of time, whether short or long, seems to do many things to 
the minds of people. The stories recounted by the victorious soldiers who 
returned immediately after the victory in the First World War created a 
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sense of national pride in their town. Yet the more atrocious stories that 
Harold had to make up “to be listened to at all” after his delayed return 
spawned “a reaction against the war and against talking about it,” not only 
among his town’s people but in his own mind as well (75). The passage of 
time, then, seems to relate in complex manners to ideas and practices of 
“return.”
The protagonists who appear in my story are the defeated soldiers of 
the Japanese Imperial Army, who had been left behind in Japan’s once vast 
empire and made returns many months, years, or decades after Japan’s 
unconditional surrender to the Allied Forces at the end of the Second 
World War.1 The reasons for their delayed returns vary. Some were kept 
as prisoners of war (poWs) or war criminals for longer than they had ex-
pected in the United States, the Soviet Union, and the People’s Republic 
of China (after 1949). Others, unsure of Japan’s defeat, continued to fight 
against “the enemy.” Some participated in the Chinese Civil War between 
the Nationalists and the Communists or in the anticolonial independent 
movements in India, the Philippines, and Indonesia. Others decided to 
make their living in the places where they heard the news of Japan’s capitu-
lation and married local women and postponed their return home. These 
ex- servicemen thus returned at various points between 1945 and 1974. I ex-
amine the changing relationship among these returning solders, the Japa-
nese public, and the Japanese state and ask how and why they returned, 
how postwar Japan accepted them, and what this manner of acceptance 
caused in the minds of returning soldiers. I also ask what kind of politi-
cal and cultural logics (that might have changed over time) were working 
behind Japan’s struggle with the last military conflict, or more specifically, 
the violence committed by the defeated soldiers, for the very purpose of 
reconstructing the nation. Time is an important component here to under-
stand these political and cultural logics. The meaning of patriotism, along 
with the meaning of nationalism, changed over the divide of 1945, and 
has further changed since then, long before scholars began discussing the 
connection between patriotism and globalization (see Anderson 1994; Ap-
padurai 1993).2
i  hope ThaT This  chapter will find a place in migration studies, for the 
legal machinery to address the issues of displaced person, forced migration, 
or refugees, the terms that contemporary scholars of migration routinely 
use, came about at the times of two world wars. Yet scholars of migration 
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seem to have neglected one particular aspect of migration that always ac-
companies a war, the migration of soldiers: soldiers move, often exten-
sively, from one country to another, and from one battlefield to another. 
Furthermore, while the study of soldiers’ migration may be part of the so- 
called war history, the subject does not always belong to the past for the 
simple reason that soldiers’ migration never ends with the war’s end. While 
some hope to return home after they are disarmed, others stay where they 
gave up combat and choose to move to other destinations years or even de-
cades after the end of war. In this respect, their returns may teach us many 
lessons not only about war but also about peace.
Closing the War and Forgetting It in Postwar Japan
Sengo is the Japanese term that literally means “after a war.” It is a generic 
term that points to the era after any warfare. Japan fought many wars from 
the onset of the Meiji era (1868–1912), so its modern history has had sev-
eral sengo. In contemporary Japan, then, “sengo” means after the end of 
the Second World War, which has been remembered among the Japanese 
by such names as the Greater East Asia War (Dai- tōa sensō), Pacific War 
(Taiheiyō sensō), Asia- Pacific War (Ajia- Taiheyô sensô), or Fifteen- Year 
War (Jūgonen sensō).3 Although the Japanese government declared the 
end of this sengo in 1956, the term is still in use by the very government 
that declared its end as well as the media and people, not only to remember 
the last war in which Japan fought but also to gauge the nation’s progress 
(or deterioration for some) since August 15, 1945. My story should thus 
properly begin on this day.
At noon on August 15, 1945, through a radio broadcast, the emperor 
announced to his subjects Japan’s unconditional surrender to the Allied 
Powers. Most, but not all, soldiers of the Japanese military, for whom the 
emperor had been the supreme commander- in- chief, immediately laid 
down their arms. Two weeks later, the victor, the U.S.- led Occupation 
Forces, landed in Japan to occupy the country. Yet in this radio broadcast, 
the emperor, speaking “in a manner that divorced him from any personal 
responsibility” for his country’s many years of aggression (Dower 1979, 
35), proceeded to “offer himself as the embodiment of the nation’s suffer-
ing, its ultimate victim, transforming the sacrifices of his people into his 
own agony with a classical turn of phrase . . . ‘my vital organs are torn 
asunder’” (36, emphasis added). Indeed, the country of Japan, in which 
more than sixty cities were flattened due to U.S. bombing, was in ruins. 
42 MariKo asano TaManoi
Approximately 1.74 million armed men were killed. An incalculable num-
ber of civilians, perhaps more than 2 million in Japan proper alone, died. 
In addition, about 6.5 million Japanese, of whom 3.5 million were soldiers, 
were left overseas after Japan’s capitulation, and their fates were unclear at 
the time of Japan’s defeat. Whether in Japan proper or overseas, those who 
had survived the war’s ordeal were suffering from hunger, malnutrition, 
epidemic diseases, and the loss of loved ones. Many survivors of the atomic 
bombs, war orphans, war widows, and disabled veterans became aban-
doned and homeless (see Dower 1986, 293–301, 1999, chapter 1). Through 
the emperor’s embodiment of the nation’s suffering in his speech, this de-
feated nation that lost its empire overnight seemed to have been able to 
forget the suffering of the victims of its aggression in China, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, and a handful of other countries in Asia and the 
Pacific. Thus, the fact that Japan was a perpetrator of millions of deaths in 
Asia was hardly recognized and continued to remain unacknowledged for 
several more decades in postwar Japan.
The oCCupaTion ForCes also had its share of this amnesia: it con-
structed the war as “a conspiracy of militarists and radical nationalists 
who were responsible for Japanese aggression,” and excluded the emperor 
from this conspiracy (Orr 2001, 15). Put another way, the words of both 
the emperor and the oCCupaTion ForCes acquitted the Japanese public 
of its complicity in the nation’s violence against the people of Asia. Note 
that, in this discourse of acquittal, Japanese soldiers occupied extremely 
precarious positions. They not only brought back their experiences of suf-
fering both during and after the war but also transported their experiences 
of violence back into postwar Japan. Nevertheless, unlike Krebs, these “de-
feated” soldiers rarely told stories of atrocities in public due to national 
pride. Rather, they had to “whisper” them, or the public had to sense such 
stories in the soldiers’ refusal to tell them, at least until the mid- 1970s. 
These soldiers’ experience of suffering in the aftermath of the war, then, 
became a “morally and methodologically difficult problem,” precisely be-
cause “the suffering that [Japanese soldiers] experienced was the direct 
consequence of the violence they had first committed” in the territories of 
others (Biess 2006, 6).4
The soldiers who had been left behind in Japan’s perished empire are 
called zanryū Nihonhei in Japanese. The Japanese Ministry of Health and 
Welfare (MhW), the institution that has been undertaking the repatriation 
of demilitarized soldiers and civilians since Japan’s defeat, defines this term 
as referring to “soldiers of the Japanese military who left their military 
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services without formally being demilitarized by the state’s order” (Kōsei- 
shō 1997, 13; my translation). Soon after Japan’s capitulation, the MhW ini-
tially categorized such soldiers as “the missing” (or “the fugitives,” in some 
cases). When the missing made delayed returns, the MhW demilitarized 
them on paper. As of 1959, approximately 31,000 former soldiers and civil-
ians were still missing. For the sake of the surviving family members of the 
missing soldiers who were still waiting for the soldiers’ returns and were 
therefore unable to receive compensations, the MhW changed the category 
of “the missing” to “the deceased” in their household registries. Those ex- 
soldiers and civilians who made delayed returns after 1959 were indeed 
the “ghosts” from a dark past. I historicize the experiences of the returned 
soldiers to postwar Japan and of the Japanese public who received them 
by dividing the first three decades of sengo into two groups: from 1946 to 
1959 and from 1960 to 1974.
Return of Japanese Soldiers to Postwar Japan: 1946–1959
Depending on how they returned and from where, the soldiers who made 
delayed returns to postwar Japan between 1946 and 1959 can further be 
divided into three groups. First are those who were detained as poWs by 
the Allied Forces—the U.S. military in this case. Second are the soldiers 
who were left behind in South and Southeast Asia at the end of the war, and 
third are those who were detained as poWs or war criminals by the Soviet 
Union or the People’s Republic of China after 1949.
poWs by The allied ForCes
Those who were detained as poWs by the Allied forces comprised about 
seventy thousand surrendered soldiers who helped the United States as 
laborers in the Philippines, Okinawa, and islands across the Pacific. These 
ex- servicemen made delayed returns some time in 1946. The repatriation 
of the majority of these soldiers was smooth as they were well protected 
by international treaties. Yet, once returned, they met with reproach from 
the public, who previously during wartime had enthusiastically celebrated 
their departure for battlefields with cheers and band music. One of those 
who returned was Noda Mitsuharu.
In July 1944, Japan and the United States were engaged in a fierce battle 
on the island of Saipan. In this conflict, which Noda later described as the 
battle “between tanks [that represented the United States] and bamboo 
spears [that represented Japan],” thousands of Japanese soldiers died for 
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the sake of dying (1976, 142). Noda, however, survived this battle because 
he was captured as a poW, transported to Hawaii, and then repatriated to 
Japan in January 1946. Yet his family had already been notified of his “hon-
orable” death. Hence, when he finally reached home, he was told that, as 
he was killed honorably well before Japan’s capitulation, as many as 750 
people came to his funeral. In January of 1946, those hundreds of people 
were nowhere to be found and the monk at his family temple looked con-
fused about how to greet him (Noda 1976, 138). Recall here that the people 
of the Kansas town in Hemingway’s story found the return of Krebs to 
be “ridiculous” years after the war was over (1996, 69). Whether it may 
have been ridiculous, awkward, or confusing, Noda’s feeling and his vil-
lage people’s feeling toward him turned him against the war and his home-
land. Recalling the time when he was captured and transported to the 
military hospital in Hawaii, he wrote: “[The U.S. military] transported me, 
an enemy soldier of no rank, to the military hospital by plane. At that mo-
ment, I was awakened to the importance of human life. I was ready to hate 
the Japanese military that had completely ignored my humanity” (142, my 
translation). But was Noda patriotic during wartime? If so, to what or to 
whom? What happened to his patriotism over the divide of 1945, the year 
of Japan’s capitulation? To answer these questions, I must rely on one of the 
works by E. Herbert Norman, Soldier and Peasant in Japan: The Origins of 
Conscription, published in 1943.5
According to Norman, the universal system of conscription was hastily 
decreed in 1873, only six years after the end of feudalism in 1867 and before 
the establishment of a constitution or any representative institutions. To 
shed light on this rushed action of the modern Japanese government, Nor-
man urges us to go back to the last decades of Japan’s feudal era, in which 
the arms- bearing ruling class of lords and warriors and the oppressed and 
disarmed class of peasants were still rigidly separated (1943, 52; see also 
Sansom 1943, xi). After the arrival of Western imperial powers to Japa-
nese shores, the feudal government saw the need for a radical change in 
its military power to be a bulwark against growing pressure from the West 
(Norman 1943, v). In addition, the martial quality of lords and warriors 
had already been blunted due to the long period of peace lasting from the 
beginning of the seventeenth century. In addition, the warriors’ swords-
manship was of no use against Western gunboats. In other words, the feu-
dal warriors were not the best candidates to be conscripted into a modern 
military. This led the Meiji government to “draw upon the deep, untapped 
reservoir of the peasantry” (Norman 1943, v). Here, Norman alerts us to 
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the meaning of mobilizing peasants into armies at this critical juncture of 
history: by so doing, the leaders of the Meiji government could suppress 
peasant rebellions that by then had spread into every corner of Japan. In 
other words, the reform of the military system was to check the movement 
toward emancipation among peasants (Norman 1943, 36). The universal 
conscription system was thus hastily decreed. Hence, the Japanese mod-
ern military, according to Norman, was not an institution consisting of 
“patriotic” soldiers. Rather, its members were the emperor’s subjects who 
were expected to defend the emperor. For this reason, soldiers were exon-
erated from protecting not only their compatriots, Japanese citizens, but 
also their comrades. Furthermore, they were not expected to value their 
own lives, for they were taught not to return home alive but to die for the 
sake of the emperor.
Yet for Noda the discovery of the nature of the Japanese military came 
too late. By the time of his delayed return, the Japanese public had already 
been “exposed to a steady flow of information concerning the shocking 
range of atrocities committed by the imperial forces in China, Southeast 
Asia, and the Philippines” (Dower 1999, 60). The defense of returned sol-
diers, that it was not them but the military cliques who were ultimately 
responsible for war and its conduct, was largely in vain. The historian 
John Dower offers us the reason why the public sentiments toward ex- 
servicemen changed so radically after Japan’s defeat: the returned soldiers 
were after all “losers,” and as such they quickly fell out of “proper” so-
cial categories in the immediate postwar era (1999, 61). While I agree with 
Dower, I add yet another reason for this change of public sentiments: the 
nature of the patriotism of these soldiers was now revealed in front of the 
public. These soldiers offered no contribution to the betterment of the na-
tion of Japan; instead, they committed violence overseas in the name of the 
emperor. Furthermore, they failed to protect the citizens of Japan overseas 
and at home. What emerged at this historical juncture was the ex- soldiers’ 
association with violence (they committed without the clear purpose of 
protecting their own compatriots), which made them “improper.”
soldiers leFT behind in souTh and souTheasT asia
The conditions in Southeast Asia and South Asia during the Second World 
War call for our special attention. In these areas, the defeat of Japan was 
already sealed months before Japan’s surrender (Kōsei- shō 2000a, 22–28). 
By the spring of 1945, most battalions stationed in Southeast and South 
Asia had lost a major part of their forces. Faced with starvation, those 
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surviving soldiers who had been fighting in, for example, Burma, fled in 
increasing numbers to other parts of Southeast Asia, such as Thailand, 
Indochina, or Malaysia, in search of food, not enemies. Instead of surren-
dering to the enemies, these soldiers hid themselves in jungles while fight-
ing starvation and disease (see Kōsei- shō 1997, 259–66). In Indonesia, an 
unknown number of Japanese soldiers, perhaps ranging from one to two 
thousand, participated in the war of the country’s independence against its 
former colonial powers—the Dutch forces. These soldiers left the Japanese 
Imperial Army’s order, became fugitives (tōbō- hei ), and fought a guer-
rilla war (see E. Hayashi 2007, 2009). Indeed, more than half of the deaths 
among the soldiers stationed in Southeast and South Asia occurred in the 
last year of the war as the result of malnutrition, epidemics, and guerrilla 
war. In such conditions, the order of demilitarization and repatriation to 
Japan after August 1945 was slow to reach soldiers who had barely sur-
vived, which in turn delayed the return of some soldiers until the 1970s. 
Let me focus on the case of one individual soldier who returned to Japan 
in 1946 from colonial Indonesia. What delayed his return, however, was 
not starvation, epidemics, or guerrilla war: it was his relationship with a 
local woman.
Yamazaki Kenji was born to a relatively wealthy landowning family in 
Shizuoka in 1902. As a young man growing up in the era of Taishō democ-
racy, he was introduced to the idea of socialism and ran successfully for 
a seat from the Social Mass Party (Shakai Taishū tō) at the local assembly 
several times beginning in 1931.6 He then won the seat of the House of Rep-
resentatives of the Imperial Diet (Teikoku Gikai) in 1936, albeit in 1942 he 
was no longer able to run for reelection due to the state’s increasingly harsh 
persecution of the members of liberal political parties.7 Having been de-
prived of the opportunity, he chose to run away to Japan’s overseas empire 
to fulfill his dream to be on the side of workers and peasants. He thus en-
listed himself into the Japanese Imperial Army, left for Borneo, and asked 
the army to appoint him as a governor of one of its prefectures. Yamazaki 
Toyoko (2008a, 2008b), on whose works I base my discussion, writes that, 
during wartime, high- ranking military officers such as Kenji were able to 
employ what they called “personal maids,” who were in reality temporary 
wives, regardless of the officers’ marital status. Though Kenji was married, 
he employed a local woman and eventually had two children with her. 
When Japan surrendered, he had two options: to remain in Borneo or to 
return home. He chose the latter and in 1946 returned to Japan with this 
woman and their two children without notifying his wife, Michiko.
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Michiko, who had been waiting for his return in Japan, was not an ordi-
nary woman: she was a liberal political activist during wartime, and after 
women obtained suffrage in the immediate postwar Japan, she success-
fully ran for the seat at the House of Representatives of the Imperial Diet. 
Shortly after Kenji’s return in March 1946, Michiko exercised another right 
that Japanese women newly obtained—divorce. Kenji, now a husband of 
a woman from Borneo, tried to revive his career as a politician, but it was 
in vain. Having failed in every endeavor, he migrated to Brazil in 1953 to 
try to become famous there, a choice rather similar to the one he took 
when he decided to leave for Borneo. However, he soon died of illness in 
1958. According to Yamazaki’s articles (2008a, 2008b), after Kenji’s death, 
Michiko helped Kenji’s new legal wife to return to Japan and restored her 
life there. Like Kenji, Michiko too took responsibility for the welfare of this 
woman from Borneo.
Kenji’s return was far more ridiculous: it was scandalous for he was 
a public man and a former high- ranking military officer. Furthermore, 
Michiko was also a public figure and the action she took toward Kenji’s 
wife from Borneo made Kenji’s delayed return more scandalous. I note 
here that most Japanese soldiers who maintained quasi- marital life with 
local women in such places as Indonesia and the Philippines either aban-
doned them and returned home alone (which in the postwar era had cre-
ated the problem of their stateless children left in their mothers’ countries) 
or stayed with them to raise families in lieu of returning.8
poWs by The sovieT union
Another group of soldiers who made delayed returns before 1960 were 
those who were detained as poWs or war criminals by the Soviet Union. Ap-
proximately 575,000 of them were sent to labor camps in Siberia and other 
parts of the Soviet Union. By the Japanese government’s estimate, about 
55,000 of them died due to brutal working conditions. Most of the sur-
vivors were repatriated to Japan around 1949. This group of ex- servicemen 
who returned around this time also included those who were mobilized by 
the Communist forces to fight in the Chinese Civil War against the Nation-
alist forces. In addition, in 1950, about one thousand soldiers who had been 
detained in Siberia were extradited to China, where they joined approxi-
mately one hundred Japanese war criminals who had been banished there 
for fighting on the Nationalist side in China’s civil war. These soldiers did 
not return to Japan until 1956, with some even having their returns delayed 
until 1964 (Kōsei- shō 1997, 257).
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Like those returning soldiers from other regions, soldiers returning 
from the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China were seen by the 
public as “improper people” and were met with the same opprobrium that 
their compatriots did. The following passage from a Japanese government 
report clearly indicates the reason why they became “improper people” in 
the society’s perception.
The ex- poWs under the Stalin regime participated in the so- called 
movement for democracy [minshu undō] at the labor camps under 
such slogans as “let us crash the anti- Soviet and anti- Communist 
demagogues,” “it is the reactionary forces of Japan and the United 
States that prevent us from returning home,” “the Red Army is the 
real army for ordinary people,” “all the roads lead to Communism,” 
or “there is no democracy [in Japan] without crushing the Emperor 
system.” . . . Even though these former poWs were detained force-
fully for as long as four years and were exploited for their labor with-
out any legal protection, they hardly felt any grudge against the 
Soviet authority. On the contrary, many of them identified with the 
Soviet Union as their home country. This kind of phenomenon is 
unheard of in the history of humankind. We have to explore the rea-
sons as to why they felt this way and must come up with the state- 
level policies to re- rehabilitate them. (Kōsei- shō 2000b, 30–31; my 
translation)
This notion that returning soldiers from the Soviet Union and the People’s 
Republic of China were brainwashed by Communists and therefore posed 
a threat to the integrity of postwar Japan seems to have been widely shared 
among the Japanese populace.
Whether they were truly “communists” or not does not concern me 
here. What was more striking was that the postwar Japanese state’s “re- 
rehabilitation” of the so- called red repatriates neither changed societal per-
ceptions of them nor promised them a better life. For example, Inokuma 
Tokurō, a former Soviet poW who returned to Japan in 1947, writes:
Since I was mobilized at the age of sixteen, I had no skills to sur-
vive [in postwar Japan]. I therefore returned to my school. There, 
my school principal, who saw me off with cheers [when I joined the 
army], looked so confused and told me, “since I will issue a certifi-
cate of graduation, go somewhere else [to continue your studies].” 
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He also told me not to mention that I returned from Siberia to any-
one from now on. (Takahashi, Kaneko, and Inokuma 2008, 302; my 
translation)
Indeed, Inokuma had to change his workplace thirteen times after he re-
turned to Japan, all because he was a red repatriate.9
despiTe The hardships  endured by the former soldiers of the Japa-
nese Imperial Army, the official publication of the MhW occasionally de-
picted scenes of state officials (who enlisted local women near the port of 
entry) extending a warm welcome to the repatriated soldiers:
Those who welcomed [ex- soldiers] were not only state officials but 
also local young women volunteers, including the students of Hiji-
yama High School. Upon seeing these young women, the soldiers 
still on board took off their hats and waved at them. They then tried 
to calm themselves, yet, clearly failing to do so, came down cheer-
fully ashore. “Hello, I will carry your backpack,” one young woman 
said. “Oh, no, this is very light,” one ex- soldier murmured. “Oh, no, 
I will, please let me carry it,” said the woman. These women made 
such a commotion. Those who had succeeded in getting backpacks 
from ex- servicemen carried them cheerfully, though their appear-
ance clearly suggested otherwise, as soldiers’ backpacks were indeed 
quite heavy. Those women who failed to get backpacks evidently 
looked disappointed. (Kōsei- shō 2000a, 45; my translation)
At the same time, these reports also suggested that the state officials’ devo-
tion to the welfare of repatriated soldiers hardly went beyond the ports of 
entry. As noted earlier, both the state and the public had not been very 
accommodating toward these ex- soldiers who failed to fall into “proper” 
social categories in larger society, as was the case with many of them. An-
other category of people in a similar predicament in postwar Japan were 
war orphans (sensō koji). Being homeless, they were forced to beg for or 
steal food on the street. Commenting on the indifference of the Japanese 
public toward the war orphans, the celebrated wartime writer Hayashi 
Fumiko writes: “Japan, which failed to prepare any facility for these kids, 
can hardly be called ‘a cultured nation’ (bunka kokka).”10 She also laments 
that, even the temples and shrines, which stood on spacious grounds, 
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“failed to provide shelters to homeless children” (1988, 31, 32). Nonetheless, 
Hayashi makes no comments on the fates of homeless ex- servicemen due 
in part, I believe, to their association with violence, which she despised.
Return of Japanese Soldiers to Postwar Japan: 1960–1974 and Beyond
The end of the U.S. occupation of Japan in 1952 seemed to change the lives 
of the soldiers who had already been repatriated by then, at least in terms 
of their material gains. To discuss this, I must momentarily go back in time 
to the war period. Repatriated and retired soldiers received more than ade-
quate benefits and pensions from the Japanese state. After Japan’s defeat,
the Occupation Forces reassessed the privileges offered to soldiers during 
the nation’s militarism, issued a law named “Pension and Benefits,” and 
ordered the Japanese government to terminate pensions and benefits for 
the veterans and surviving families of fallen soldiers by February 1, 1946.11 
Once the U.S. occupation was over in 1952, however, the Japanese state 
revived the pensions and benefits for the ex- servicemen, while civilian 
victims of atom bombs, aerial bombing, and the war in Okinawa were 
left to suffer in hardship and poverty without any compensation. Further-
more, in 1957, together with the surviving families of fallen soldiers, the 
ex- servicemen founded the Nihon Izoku- kai (Japan Bereaved Families As-
sociation). Due to this association’s close ties with the conservative gov-
ernment of the Liberal Democratic Party, the group grew into a powerful 
lobby, which constantly demanded more and better benefits and compen-
sations throughout the 1950s and 1960s.
As Tanaka Nobumasa and others have correctly pointed out, it was the 
soldiers’ “special relation to the Japanese state,” as well as their “suffer-
ing” upon return, that had transformed the “improper” losers into “power-
ful” lobbyists by the late 1950s (Tanaka, Tanaka, and Hata 1995, 106; my 
translation).12 This does not necessarily mean that the material gains of 
ex- servicemen through the 1950s and 1960s made the society’s contempt 
toward them entirely disappear. What it means, however, is that the suf-
fering of ex- soldiers after the war abroad and in Japan was officially recog-
nized, and it is in this context that several soldiers returned to Japan from 
Southeast Asia in the 1960s and 1970s. Among these soldiers who returned 
from the Philippines, Indonesia, and Guam, I focus on two individuals, Yo-
koi Shōichi and Onoda Hiroo, for each of them was considered to be “the 
last soldier” to be returned from the past.
On January 25, 1972, a short article was published in the morning edi-
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tion of the Asahi Shinbun (Asahi newspaper) (and in practically every 
other newspaper nationally circulated) with the following headline: 
“Moto Nihonhei o Hakken ka” (An Ex- soldier of the Japanese Army Is 
Rumored to Have Been Discovered). This was followed by another article 
on the front page of its evening edition on the same day with this headline: 
“Kiseki no Moto Nihonhei: 28nen buri Hakken” (A Miracle Happened, 
an Ex- soldier of the Japanese Army Found in the Jungle of the Island of 
Guam after Twenty- Eight Years of Hiding). This ex- serviceman was Yokoi 
Shōichi.13 When two local men found him while he was fishing, Yokoi was 
still armed, yet he followed them to their house for food. When they real-
ized that Yokoi was a former soldier of the Japanese army, they brought 
him to the village headman. Yokoi was then transferred to the hospital. The 
Japanese consulate in Guam acted quickly and summoned a team of doc-
tors from Tokyo to treat Yokoi, so that he would successfully reintegrate 
back into “civilization” when he returned home. Notably, Yokoi had to be 
discovered before he made a return to postwar Japan.
Between the day when Yokoi was found and the day of his return to 
Japan on February 2, 1972, an increasing number of Japanese journalists 
traveled to Guam from Japan to interview him, to the point where the hos-
pital authority, considering Yokoi’s psychological state, had to turn them 
away. Yokoi’s narratives published in national newspapers sounded frag-
mented at best, even though they must have been heavily edited. Included 
were statements such as: “I feel as if I were still dreaming. I just do not 
understand what is going on now in my life”; “I would like to return to 
Japan, but I am also aware how shameful it is to return home alive”; “I was 
told again and again [during the time he served in the army] that I must 
return home dead”; “If I am able to return, I will first go to the temple in my 
village and console the spirits of all the dead soldiers”; and “To His Majesty 
the Emperor, I would like to convey at least the following, that I fought for 
the sake of the emperor, that I believed in you, and that I survived believ-
ing in the strength of Yamato spirits.”14
It was not only the voice of Yokoi that was printed in national dailies. 
Commentaries of professionals, including those of writers, historians, an-
thropologists, psychologists, linguists, and medical doctors, who saw Yo-
koi as an object of research in their respective professions, were also pub-
lished in the newspapers. Some quotes from these articles include: “[The 
return of Yokoi] reminds us, in the most miserable manner, that the last 
war is not yet over” (by a historian); “On the island of Guam, he had no 
shortage of proteins, the key to his survival, yet I wonder what substituted 
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‘green leafy vegetables’ in his diet” (by a medical doctor); “I am so happy 
to know that he has survived this long ordeal. He must be an extremely 
strong man equipped with every technique we can think of for survival. 
With his surprising return, all the surviving families of the missing, who 
have already given up on their loved ones, can rekindle their hope [of 
discovering them]” (by an anthropologist); “[The return of Yokoi] amply 
demonstrates the lesson we received during wartime, a soldier who does 
not surrender alive is by no means dead” (by a writer); and “I know no 
example like this. After twenty- eight years of solitude, he still remembers 
Japanese language” (by a linguist).15
The print media also featured the voices of ordinary people who sent 
in letters and called the press. Interestingly, these voices were more or less 
unanimous in criticizing the Japanese state. For example, one man wrote, 
“The Japanese government should not waste our tax money for trivial busi-
nesses of this and that but use it to search for such people as Mr. Yokoi 
who may still be living [in remote parts of Asia].”16 Another wrote, “I am 
angry over the small amount of compensation Yokoi will possibly receive. 
Can the government do anything? Each member of the Parliament should 
contribute at least 10,000 yen [about usd 100] to him.”17 These voices were 
also unequivocal in criticizing the attitude of the Japanese emperor toward 
repatriated soldiers. For example, one man wrote, “The emperor [of Japan] 
must extend his apology to Mr. Yokoi for his suffering.”18 Another woman 
wrote, “His Majesty the Emperor, please see your soldier when he returns, 
and act like his father.”19
Some of these letter writers felt that social problems facing Japan in 
the early 1970s, such as consumerism and environmental problems, were 
symptomatic of the wider, lamentable condition of Japanese society. One 
man wrote, “I am ashamed to show this country to Mr. Yokoi, for it has 
been plagued with all sorts of environmental disruption and political cor-
ruption.”20 Another man wrote, “I wear nice clothes, eat good food, and 
play around with girls, but I am now dismayed by myself. What have I been 
doing for these twenty- eight years?”21 Some of these writers seemed to be 
jealous of Yokoi, who, in the words of one letter writer, “lived like Robinson 
Crusoe.”22 Another man also wrote, “The media claims that Mr. Yokoi has 
now regained his humanity. But what is the meaning of this ‘humanity’? Is 
it ‘we’ who have already lost it?”23 Two of these letter writers were former 
comrades of Yokoi’s in Guam, but they returned to Japan in 1960. After 
they had visited him in Guam by invitation of a certain publisher who had 
planned to print their encounters with Yokoi, they were reported to have 
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said the following: “When we returned [to Japan in 1960], the government 
official told us that we should just be grateful for the fact of being able to 
return home alive, and gave each of us as little as 10,000 yen [about usd 
30 in 1960], train fare to go home, and another little sum of money to buy 
lunch.”24
In fact, the government’s payment accorded to Yokoi, calculated right 
after his return, amounted only to about 50,000 yen: while this was equiva-
lent to the total salary he received for his twenty- eight years of service to 
the military from 1945 to 1972, the government apparently used his war-
time rank and salary scale, which were quite low, in the calculations.25 
Since the benefits that Yokoi (who returned in 1972) and his comrades 
(who returned in 1960) received were not radically different, what made 
his former comrades compare their situations with Yokoi’s had less to do 
with monetary compensation than with the media spotlight that Yokoi 
alone received. Nevertheless, in 1972, while some viewed Yokoi as a “primi-
tive man” who knew nothing of modern civilization, most still admired his 
extraordinary skills of survival and his determination to abide by the em-
peror’s order to not go home alive. He was indeed “a true Japanese,” who 
could no longer be “found” in a Japan plagued with all the ills of modern 
society. In addition, Yokoi’s return led the Japanese people to criticize their 
own government and the emperor, who, in their view, had been uncaring 
toward his soldiers.
The Yokoi fever, however, lasted for only a few months after his return 
to Japan. The reasons for the short- lived euphoria were several, but the 
most important one was the anger directed at Yokoi by ex- servicemen who 
had already returned to Japan. Although they had been receiving pensions 
and benefits since 1952, they were still critical of the use of a large sum of 
taxpayer money for treating Yokoi in a luxurious hospital room and trans-
porting him from Guam to Japan by a chartered plane. Those who were 
particularly critical of the Yokoi fever were the families of fallen soldiers. In 
their view, Yokoi was by no means gunshin, an archaic word meaning “the 
god of soldiers” who kept his loyalty to the emperor beyond Japan’s defeat. 
The god of soldiers should have killed himself when the emperor surren-
dered, so for the ex- servicemen, Yokoi was nothing but a traitor (koku-
zoku). Here, we understand that the nature of patriotism did not radically 
change even in the 1970s but remained devoted to “emperor- ism.” While 
Yokoi was able to build a spacious house because of the donations he re-
ceived from the public (during the Yokoi fever), he was unable to build a 
career for the rest of his life. Instead, he named himself “the expert of sur-
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vival” (sabaibaru hyōronka),26 and in this capacity mounted a national cir-
cuit of lectures. Yet the survival techniques he used in the remote jungles 
of Guam sounded outdated to the modern audience, who were already ac-
customed to the fruits of Japan’s rapid economic progress. While at least 
five biographies of Yokoi have been published, they were all written in 1972, 
the year of his return (Asahi Shinbun Tokuhakisha- dan 1972; Itō 1972; Mai-
nichi Shinbun- sha Henshû- bu 1972; Sankei Shinbun- sha Henshû- bu 1972; 
Shimamura 1972). After all, the public was only interested in Yokoi’s life in 
Guam from 1945 to 1972, not in his postrepatriation life in Japan, and with 
the return of another soldier in 1974 from the jungles of the Philippines, 
Yokoi’s popularity was rapidly eclipsed.
In the spring of 1974, news of yet another Japanese soldier, who was 
discovered in the jungles of Lubang Island in the Philippines, spread like 
wildfire in Japan. Unlike Yokoi, this former soldier, Onoda Hiroo, did not 
hide himself in a cave to shut out communication with local people: he 
continued to fight against “America,” as personified in local policemen 
and soldiers. Indeed, Onoda and his two comrades (who died in Lubang 
before 1974) assaulted and injured more than thirty local people. Further-
more, when he was discovered and rescued by Japanese tourists, he did not 
ask them for help, nor did he surrender to the order of the Japanese gov-
ernment. Instead, he made it clear to state officials in Japan that he was to 
accept the order of demilitarization only from his former superior of the 
Japanese army. Luckily (for both the Japanese and the Philippine govern-
ments), this man was alive and traveled all the way from Japan to the island 
to order to disarm Onoda. Only then did Onoda agree to accept the protec-
tion of the Japanese government. The government, however, had to nego-
tiate with the president of the Philippines, Ferdinand Marcos, to have him 
pardon Onoda of his crimes committed after Japan’s capitulation. Marcos 
agreed (largely due to his country’s reliance on Japan’s economic assis-
tance), and on March 12, 1974, Onoda finally made his return to Japan.
In the following passage from his autobiography, which he published 
in 1982, Onoda wrote of his thoughts at the moment of return at Haneda 
International Airport:
I was utterly dismayed and did not know what to do or say. I was 
nothing but a former soldier who was defeated in the battle, surren-
dered to the enemy, and returned to Japan. I was quite aware that I 
made a delayed return, but this is because I had adhered to the order 
given to me. . . . I lost two comrades of mine [in the Philippines] 
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who had continued to fight with me believing in the victory of our 
country. Had I been able to protect them from the enemy, we could 
have returned to Japan together. As a lieutenant who was entrusted 
two soldiers by His Majesty the Emperor, I wanted to return them to 
their parents alive. Nonetheless, I alone was standing on the glitter-
ing stage. (1982, 43, my translation)
Indeed, on this glittering stage where Onoda stood, he heard the sound of 
fanfare and the cheers of thousands of people waving the national flag for 
him. But Onoda was angry not only with the crowd, which was “agitated by 
[his] mere presence without thinking of what had happened to millions of 
fallen [Japanese] soldiers” (1982, 55), but also about the way he was treated 
at the hospital in Tokyo because the doctors acted as if he was a victim of 
starvation. They were not aware of the fact that, on Lubang Island, he had 
been “daily walking around carrying a backpack that weighed more than 
thirty kilograms [about seventy pounds] while eating an adequate amount 
of food to do so” (46). He was also angry about postwar Japan, which in 
his opinion was built on the idea of “the end of war” (shūsen) instead of 
“the defeat in war” (haisen), because in his view Japan had never faced up 
to the fate of fallen Japanese soldiers (46). Unlike Yokoi, then, Onoda had 
been fighting with the enemy until the moment of his return. For all these 
reasons, Onoda was quick to free himself from his “home,” and only after 
about a year of stay in Japan, he left for Brazil on April 6, 1975, with the 
dream of becoming the owner of a large- scale cattle farm.
In his autobiography, Onoda lists several reasons why he chose to immi-
grate to Brazil. First, Brazil’s climate is similar to that of Lubang. Second, 
during those thirty years on the island, he lived on beef as the main source 
of protein. Third, on Lubang he learned skills that might be useful for his 
life in Brazil. Fourth, while growing up in Japan, he often visited his ma-
ternal grandparents, who raised dairy cows. Fifth, one of his brothers, to 
whom Onoda felt closest, was already in Brazil; he was an ex- serviceman 
repatriated from China in 1946 and had migrated to Brazil several years 
later. Last but most important, Onoda no longer wanted to deal with 
“people”: he badly wanted to work with “nature” (Onoda 1982, 70).
Onoda eventually fulfilled his dream. In his 1982 autobiography, he 
vividly describes his daily life as the owner of a herd of more than a thou-
sand cattle in the State of Mato Grosso in Brazil. Onoda, however, did not 
sever his relationship with Japan. After all, he built his farm among a com-
munity of Japanese immigrants to Brazil, and became the head of the Japa-
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nese Brazilian association in Mato Grosso. Furthermore, due to the success 
of his autobiographies in Japan (Onoda 1974, 1982; Onoda and Sakamaki 
1977; see also Onoda 1995a, 1995b), he frequently “returned” to Japan. Since 
the mid- 1980s, he has been working with Japanese youths, teaching them 
the importance of preserving nature. In this sense, he has not abandoned 
Japan, yet he definitively established his home in Brazil, where he still lives 
today.27 In other words, Onoda turned his delayed return into a proper 
one; to do so though, he had to leave Japan. It is his return from Brazil to 
Japan that has become more or less normal for both Onoda and the Japa-
nese public.
War, Migration, and “Ridiculously” Delayed Returns
I have dealt with three main agents—the Japanese state, Japanese society, 
and Japanese soldiers who made delayed returns to postwar Japan between 
1946 and 1974. These agents were put in relation to central questions: what 
kinds of political and cultural logics were working behind Japan’s struggles 
with the last military conflict in the course of the nation’s reconstruction, 
and how did these logics relate to the changing meanings and practices of 
return from the fallen Japanese empire? What is clear is that the passage 
of time did many things to the minds of Japanese soldiers, the society, and 
the state. Depending on when, how, and from where they returned, the 
soldiers’ delayed returns became ridiculous, confusing, awkward, scandal-
ous, threatening, or normal. Generally speaking and at the risk of greatly 
simplifying complex stories, postwar Japan did not extend sympathy to ex- 
servicemen and their suffering during and after the war until at least the 
late 1950s. Instead, the Japanese society had, for the most part, despised 
the ex- servicemen, which added to their suffering. My discussion of the 
Japanese soldiers who returned between 1945 and 1959 relies on the idea of 
violence (as defined by the Japanese public), violence that they committed 
during wartime. However, it is not only the violence that made their de-
layed returns ridiculous, confusing, awkward, scandalous, or threatening. 
Rather, it is the combination of violence with its varying consequences. For 
some it was the realization of the nature of patriotism in prewar Japan. For 
others it was the stark difference in military power between Japan and the 
United States or the effects of brainwashing by Soviet Communism. For yet 
others it was the soldiers’ relationships with local women overseas.
By the late 1950s, when Japan began to see the fruits of rapid economic 
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progress, the repatriated soldiers amassed a certain political power with 
adequate compensations coming from the conservative government. The 
society, however, still anxiously waited for the return of the “last” soldier 
from the perished empire. When Yokoi and Onoda finally returned, both 
created a fever in Japan, but their sensationalism was short- lived. The pub-
lic admired these two men for their suffering after the war’s end and their 
extraordinary skills in overcoming the difficult conditions of survival in 
the jungles of Guam and Lubang Island. Onoda’s claim that the Japanese 
society remembered “the end of the war,” but not “Japan’s defeat” is note-
worthy, for it illuminates a key logic that postwar Japan relied on in the 
1970s to face its past. Now that the last soldier had returned, the war really 
ended, and because it ended completely, both Yokoi and Onoda were 
soon forgotten. The return of Yokoi and Onoda, however, caused a differ-
ent reaction among the families of fallen soldiers and those soldiers who 
had been repatriated to Japan before Yokoi and Onoda: Yokoi and Onoda 
should have committed suicide for the sake of all the soldiers who died for 
the emperor. To the families of fallen soldiers and the ex- servicemen, Yo-
koi and Onoda brought home only shame.
Throughout the first three decades of the postwar era, the violence com-
mitted by Japanese soldiers in Asia, and the complicity of the Japanese 
people in the violence, were largely forgotten. Indeed, this amnesia—that 
is, the attempt to push the dark times of war into the past and to sever its re-
lationship with the living reality of the nation’s economic reconstruction—
seems to have been sealed since the time the emperor uttered those words 
of unconditional surrender to the Allied Forces on August 15, 1945. This is 
why, even as early as January 1946, the sudden return of Noda reminded 
the people of his home village of the period they desperately wanted to 
leave behind. Noda’s reappearance brought back the memory of the vil-
lagers’ complicity in the war. Their participation in Noda’s funeral as the 
emperor’s martyr even before the war ended was only telling of the experi-
ences that they were so eager to forget.
This amnesia about the past was also related to another cultural strategy 
that postwar Japan engendered while dealing with the history of the war: 
the discourse of suffering. According to this strategy, the Japanese people, 
save for a handful of high- ranking military officers and politicians who had 
either passed away or been executed, were all victims of the war. Indeed, 
even the emperor presented himself as one such sufferer, for he claimed 
that he suffered most because of the suffering of his subjects. However, 
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the question posed to Japanese society, and later to the returned soldiers 
themselves, was how to fit ex- servicemen into the discourse of suffering. 
Eventually, it was their suffering after Japan’s defeat that mattered. Japanese 
society thus condoned the handsome pensions handed out to former sol-
diers by the government, and soldiers themselves began emphasizing their 
contributions, not to the war that Japan waged and lost, but to Japan’s post-
war economic recovery. Put in another way, the perpetrators of violence 
soon became so- called victims of discrimination in their own society, and 
later they became powerful lobbyists with the conservative government. 
In this way, society ceased to question the millions of deaths among Japan’s 
former enemies.
When, then, did the former soldiers of the Japanese Imperial Army 
begin openly recounting what Hemingway called “atrocious stories”? 
Not until the early 1990s. In this fairly late development, the so- called 
red repatriates played a major role. For example, about 1,100 of those ex- 
servicemen, who were once poWs and war criminals in the Soviet Union 
and China, formed an organization called Chūgoku kikansha renraku kai 
(or Chū- ki- ren, the Network of the Returnees from China) in 1957. Al-
though it was disbanded at the time of China’s Cultural Revolution in 
1966, due in part to the worsening relations between the Chinese and the 
Japanese Communist Parties, it was revived in 1986 and survived until 
2002. Two others were Nic- Chū yūkō moto gunjin no kai (the Japan- China 
Friendship Society of Former Soldiers), founded in 1961, and Fusen heishi 
no kai (the Association of Soldiers Who Shall Never Fight) established in 
1988. In the late 1980s and 1990s, members of these three organizations 
devoted much of their time to speaking out about the violence that they 
had committed against the people of Asia. But in 2008, when the leaders 
of these groups were invited for an interview by the editors of a progressive 
journal, Sekai (The world), they all lamented that there were decreasing 
opportunities to do so in Japan (Takahashi, Kaneko, and Inokuma 2008).
I do not argue, however, that their efforts were in vain. Since the late 
1980s, their voices have certainly diversified the opinions of Japanese so-
ciety, including those among state leaders. In 1995, Japan’s prime minister 
then went so far as to make an official apology to the “neighboring coun-
tries of Asia,” using such words as “During a certain period in the not too 
distant past, Japan, following a mistaken national policy, advanced along 
the road to war, only to ensnare the Japanese people in a fateful crisis, and, 
through its colonial rule and aggression, caused tremendous damage and 
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suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian 
nations.”28 Nonetheless, this apology has since been radically shortened 
and become an apology solely for “tremendous damage and suffering to 
the people of many countries, particularly those of Asian nations.” Such a 
standardized text used by every succeeding prime minister since 1995 has 
little to do with history in terms of clarifying what happened to whom, 
when, and where. As Alexis Dudden has persuasively argued, it seems to 
have been co- opted by state leaders in order to make national apologizing 
work toward strengthening the state. Furthermore, the official apology has 
merely helped generate and spark an unstable presence in East Asia (Dud-
den 2008, chapter 2). After all, this official apology is today associated with 
a significant number of high- ranking politicians, bureaucrats, and conser-
vative intellectuals who otherwise refuse to acknowledge Japan’s perpetra-
tion of violence during the war. Of course, apologies, whether offered by 
emperors, prime ministers, or ordinary citizens of Japan, should not have 
so easily placated victims of the war. This idea gets further complicated 
when the perpetrators of violence insist on their own victimhood.
Does this mean, then, that there is a better time to apologize? Did the 
Japanese political leaders apologize to the victims of Japan’s aggression in 
Asia at the right time? In the same manner, is there the right time for a 
Japanese soldier to return home? Is that time over or is it still to come? I 
have no answers to these questions. Yet by examining the history of delayed 
returns among former Japanese servicemen, we can understand much 
about the changing meanings and practices of patriotism and nationalism 
in postwar Japan. This process not only dates back to the time of Japan’s 
surrender, when these soldiers, officially at least, began to return home, but 
also continues to this day.
Notes
 1. The chapter is not able to deal with all the soldiers in Japan’s Imperial Army. As 
the people of the Japanese empire were also considered to be the Japanese emperor’s 
subjects during wartime, some of them were forced to join the Japanese military. This 
included a large number of Korean and Chinese (including Taiwanese) soldiers. After 
Japan’s defeat, they too tried to return home but encountered difficulties due to the 
postwar political conditions in Asia. They often ended up returning not to their homes 
but somewhere else in the Far East such as Sakhalin. In addition, their returns were 
almost always delayed for months and years.
 2. I note, however, that Arjun Appadurai, as a prelude to his discussion on the glob-
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alization of patriotism, writes about the change in meaning of the term over the divide 
of 1945, two years before India’s independence from Britain. Before 1945, his father 
served an expatriate of the Indian nationalist Subhas Chandra Bose, who split with 
Gandhi and Nehru and gained support from the Japanese military. Appadurai’s father 
was a “patriot,” yet when he returned to India after Japan’s defeat, he became noth-
ing but a “pariah patriot” due to Bose’s position against the nonviolence advocated by 
Gandhi and the Fabian Anglophilia of Nehru (1993, 413).
 3. The “fifteen- year” of the Fifteen- Year War refers to the period between the Man-
churian Incident of 1931 and Japan’s defeat against the Allied Forces in 1945.
 4. Here, by citing a passage from the book by Frank Biess, Homecomings: Returning 
pows and the Legacies of Defeat in Postwar Germany (2006), I made an analogy be-
tween the Japanese and the German soldiers in the postwar era.
 5. E. Herbert Norman was born in Japan to Canadian Methodist missionaries and 
studied at Victoria College of the University of Toronto, Cambridge University, and 
Harvard University, from which he received a doctorate in 1940. Except for the three 
years between 1942 and 1945 when Canada entered the war against Japan, Norman 
lived in Japan as a Canadian diplomat while continuing to pursue his academic inter-
ests in modern Japanese history. In the 1950s, however, he became one of the unlikely 
suspects of McCarthyism in the United States. This eventually led to his virtual diplo-
matic exile in New Zealand and Egypt and his death by suicide in Cairo in April of 
1957. See Norman’s biography posted by the University of Victoria at http://web.uvic 
.ca/ehnorman/Pages/Biography.html (accessed January 25, 2013).
 6. “Taishō democracy” refers to the period between the two world wars. This was a 
period when (male) citizens, energized by the post–First World War economic boom, 
were allowed to express their political views to a certain extent. John Dower describes 
Taishō democracy as a period in which “deviance was tested against the polestars of 
respect for the emperor and for private property” (1979, 306).
 7. The Imperial Diet, established in 1890, is the direct predecessor of the present Diet 
in postwar Japan. Like the present Diet, the Imperial Diet was also a bicameral insti-
tution that consisted of a House of Peers and a House of Representatives. Unlike the 
present Diet, however, the power of legislation was vested in the emperor because the 
cabinet was responsible to the emperor rather than to the Imperial Diet (see Baerwald 
1983, 94).
 8. Among the Japanese citizens who tried to settle in northeast China (Manchuria) 
as farmers, a story such as Kenji’s was not uncommon. However, those who recounted 
such stories were not male but female Japanese citizens. Of the total of about 388,000 
Japanese farmers who migrated to Manchuria after 1932, when Japan built its puppet 
state of Manchukuo, the men among them became targets of the Japanese army’s mo-
bilization toward the end of the war. For this reason, their wives and children were left 
to themselves, and many of them married local men to survive the Soviet invasion of 
Manchuria and the end of Japanese empire. These women were called Chūgoku zanryū 
fujin (the women who had been left behind in China) in postwar Japan. After the 
normalization of diplomatic ties between Japan and the People’s Republic of China in 
1972, these women began to return home with their Chinese husbands. By then, their 
Japanese husbands had already remarried (see Tamanoi 2009). While these women 
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were noncombatants, their stories, like Kenji’s, were the product of war and migration. 
These events had transformed the allegiance of the returnees toward their home, often 
to the point of losing, usually by force, their faithfulness to their partners.
 9. According to the survey conducted in Hiroshima in 1949, only thirty- four among 
the group of one hundred red repatriates led more or less stable lives (with small but 
regular income), while twenty- seven of the same group received state welfare; thirty- 
five of these one hundred repatriates were unemployed because they were viewed as 
Communists, and the bottom ten on the income scale relied on the wages of their 
wives, who worked as day laborers or domestic maids (Kōsei- shō 2000b, 45). The 
source of their hardship is obvious: the societal perception of them as carriers of im-
proper ideology.
 10. Hayashi Fumiko was a poet and writer who was best known for being the au-
thor of Hōrōki [Journal of a vagabond] (1935), her first novel. A wanderer since her 
childhood, she continually traveled after her fame had been established and visited 
Europe, China, Manchuria, and Southeast Asia as a reporter. In her numerous works, 
Hayashi “repeatedly and compassionately [captured] the dark misery of war, of root-
less women, or of couples tortured by stale marriages” (Selden 1983, 116).
 11. A notable exception was the so- called shōi gunjin (the crippled and maimed 
veterans). They were included in the category of “the disabled (due to nonmilitary 
reasons)” and continued to receive benefits for treatment of their physical conditions 
and for maintenance of their daily lives.
 12. On the notion of victims, Jean- François Lyotard argues, “It is in the nature of a 
victim not to be able to prove that one has been done a wrong. A plaintiff is someone 
who has incurred damages and who disposes of the means to prove it. One becomes 
a victim if one loses these means” (Lyotard 1988, 8; see also Das 1995, 174). In other 
words, the former soldiers of Japan’s army became plaintiffs and ceased to be the vic-
tims.
 13. The evening edition of Asahi Shinbun (Asahi Newspaper), published on Janu-
ary 25, 1972, reported that in 1944 the Japanese Imperial Army reported to Yokoi’s 
family that he died in the battle against the United States on September 30 of that year.
 14. See Asahi Shinbun (Asahi Newspaper), evening edition, January 25, 1972; morn-
ing edition, January 26, 1972; morning edition, January 27, 1972; and morning edition, 
January 29, 1972; my translations.
 15. See Asahi Shinbun (Asahi Newspaper), evening edition, January 25, 1972; morn-
ing edition, January 26, 1972; and evening edition, January 26, 1972; my translations.
 16. See Asahi Shinbun (Asahi Newspaper), morning edition, January 25, 1972, my 
translation.
 17. See Asahi Shinbun (Asahi Newspaper), morning edition, January 27, 1972, my 
translation. This letter writer seems to believe that because of the lateness of his return, 
he would receive far less compensation from the government in comparison to those 
who returned to Japan immediately after Japan’s capitulation.
 18. See Asahi Shinbun (Asahi Newspaper), evening edition, January 27, 1972; my 
translation.




 21. See Asahi Shinbun (Asahi Newspaper), morning edition, January 27, 1972; my 
translation.
 22. See Asahi Shinbun (Asahi Newspaper), morning edition, January 26, 1972; my 
translation.
 23. See Asahi Shinbun (Asahi Newspaper), morning edition, January 27, 1972; my 
translation.
 24. See Asahi Shinbun (Asahi Newspaper), evening edition, January 25, 1972; my 
translation.
 25. Ibid.
 26. This term, sabaibaru hyôronka, has appeared on numeous internet sites on Yokoi 
Shōichi since 1972. While many such sites are no longer available, the two sites that I 
could access recently are: “guambeach.com” at http://guambeach.com/history-3.html 
(accessed January 27, 2013) and “musinan” at http://geocities.jp/urbanivjp/musinan 
.html (accessed January 27, 2013).
 27. Toward the end of 1974, another soldier was discovered in Indonesia. This ex- 
soldier, whose Japanese name was Nakamura Teruo, was from Taiwan: he served the 
Japanese army as a civilian employee due to his status as a colonial subject. In his case, 
the Japanese government returned him to Taiwan, not Japan, without drawing any 
attention from the Japanese media (see Kawasaki 2003).
 28. Quoted from “Statement by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama ‘On the occa-
sion of the 50th anniversary of the war’s end’ 15 August 1995” at http://www.mofa 
.go.jp/announce/press/pm/murayama/9508.html (accessed January 25, 2013). Trans-
lated by the office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.
ChApter three
Guiqiao as Political Subjects in the  
Making of the People’s Republic of China, 1949–1979
Wang Cangbai
The 1979 movie Haiwai chizi (Red sons overseas) was one of the first in 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to include returnees from overseas, 
a hitherto marginal political subject, in representations of nationalism in 
popular arts.1 The protagonist, Huang Sihua (in Chinese, si means “miss-
ing” and hua refers simultaneously to Chinese “nation”, “culture”, and “an-
cestral origin”), is the China- born daughter of patriotic parents working 
and living in one of the Overseas Chinese farms (huaqiao nongchang) 
established by the PRC government exclusively for post- 1949 returnees.2 
Sihua passes the examinations for admission to a cultural troupe of the 
People’s Liberation Army (pla) with outstanding scores,3 but she is re-
jected because of the overseas connections of her family as noted in her 
personnel dossier (dan’gan).4 A party cadre, Han Shan, is sent to the farm to 
conduct a political investigation (zhengzhi shencha) of her family.5 It tran-
spires that both her parents, Huang Dechen and Lin Biyun, were born in 
Southeast Asia.6 They had met during a fundraising campaign for China’s 
anti- Japanese war effort, when Dechen saved Biyun from attempted rape 
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by Western sailors (rather obviously symbolizing the Chinese standing up 
to the humiliation of the motherland by Western imperialist powers). With 
the news of the PRC’s founding, Dechen and Biyun left for China with-
out any hesitation, leaving their baby son Siguo (again, si is “missing,” and 
guo could be interpreted as “homeland,” “territory,” and “nation”) behind 
with relatives. Although Dechen and Biyun worked hard in the huaqiao 
farm, where Sihua was born, and devoted themselves wholeheartedly to 
the socialist project, their overseas background subjected them to suspi-
cion and discrimination. In the late 1970s, when the PRC loosened its con-
trols over the exit of returnees and visits of Overseas Chinese, Siguo, their 
now grown- up son, comes to visit and asks his sister to join him overseas 
so that she might get a better education and have a better life. But Sihua 
turns down his offer because of her undiminished love for China. Happily, 
all wrongdoings against returnees are rectified after the Cultural Revolu-
tion (1966–76). Sihua becomes a professional singer and the film comes 
to a rousing close with her passionate stage performance of “I Love You, 
China.”
The film’s depiction of how Overseas Chinese returnees were perceived 
and categorized in the period conventionally called Mao’s era (1949–79) 
highlights the complex relations between ethnicity, culture, territory, and 
politics in the socialist nation- building process. Without presuming Euro-
pean inspirations, the dynamics and complicities in making the modern 
Chinese nation (and nationalism) have been variously traced to the cohe-
sions as well as cleavages between political nationalism, Han chauvinism, a 
(historical) Chinese ethnic identity, and sentiments of cultural superiority 
rooted in narratives of an uninterrupted and undivided Chinese civiliza-
tion (Townsend 1996, 28). As Prasenjit Duara proposed, Chinese national 
identity should be viewed “as founded upon fluid relationships; it thus 
both resembles and is interchangeable with other political identities. . . . 
What we call nationalism is more appropriately a relationship between a 
constantly changing Self and Other, rather than a pristine subject gather-
ing self- awareness in a manner similar to the evolution of a species” (1996, 
31, 39).
Along a similar line, John Fitzgerald (1996, 57) rightly identifies disjunc-
ture in the “distinctive and often competing definitions of the nation” in 
successive twentieth- century Chinese state formations, advocated respec-
tively by Confucian reformers, liberal republicans, Nationalist revolution-
aries, and then Communists, which exclusively associated the national self 
with a distinctive Chinese civilization, a body of citizens, a Chinese race 
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(zu or minzu),7 and social class. Therefore, in modern Chinese national-
ism, Fitzgerald argues, “nation is an essentially- contested concept in the 
political discourse concerned with the assertion of state unity, sovereignty 
and independence within the international state system,” which invites 
close investigation of the “process of representation, or nation- defining, in 
state- building” (58, 59). Thus, in understanding the PRC’s nation- building 
process, we need to move away from the predominant conceptualization 
that sees the nation- state as a territorialized entity autonomously emerging 
from modernization. We should instead pay special attention to the fluid 
and complex interactions between multilayered, historically formed social 
forces both within and beyond the Chinese border (Duara 1995, 2008), and 
the decisive role that the state played in making a nation from above. Mi-
gration and return, driven by various motivations and assigned different 
meanings, as metaphorized by the highly symbolic and ambiguous names 
of the protagonists of Haiwai chizi, provide a critical lens for discerning 
the multifaceted social and political processes of making the new political 
order in the mid- twentieth century.
Bearing these historical and theoretical concerns in mind, this chap-
ter explores how Overseas Chinese returnees were mobilized, categorized, 
supervised, and controlled by the party- state for nation- building purposes 
in the period from 1949 to 1979. In the constant political struggle to define 
the socialist nation and the criteria for membership in the category of 
renmin (the people), Overseas Chinese returnees were constituted as a 
political Other. Central to this were the routine practices of state power 
in defining the constituents of the nation. As Thomas Hansen and Finn 
Stepputat point out, sovereignty “needs to be performed and reiterated 
on a daily basis in order to be effective and to form the basic referent of 
the state,” and the performance of sovereign power “can be spectacular 
and public, secret and menacing, and also can appear as scientific/tech-
nical rationalities of management and punishment of bodies” (2005, 7, 3). 
Specifically, I focus on the invention of the policy category guiqiao, which 
refers to returnees who were born and had resided overseas, in the poli-
tics of making a class- based rather than race- based Chinese nation. Even 
though the PRC remains a party- state, state policies in the post- 1979 re-
form era no longer ideologically discriminate between renmin as the fun-
dament of the nation and contemporary waves of educated returnees, 
mostly from the West. In a seeming historical reversal, the returnees are 
accepted as returning nationals within a more “cultural” definition of be-
longing to the Chinese nation. Return migration to China in the period 
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under this study, however, took place in politically and ideologically vola-
tile contexts that had no historical precedence.
This chapter is based on extensive studies of governmental documents, 
official publications on Overseas Chinese affairs, and newspaper and jour-
nal articles on Chinese returnees published in both mainland China and 
Hong Kong. Archival sources are complemented by oral history interviews 
with returnees, who returned to China from Indonesia in the 1950s and 
1960s but moved to Hong Kong in the 1970s and 1980s. I conducted these 
interviews from 1999 to 2003 as part of a larger project on the identities of 
Indonesian Chinese in Hong Kong (see Wang C. 2006; Wang and Wong 
2007).
Return Migration and Nationalism in Historical Context
Guiqiao comprised but one of the many streams of return migration in 
modern Chinese history, each of which resulted from a complex combina-
tion of pull and push factors in a specific context. From a pull- factor per-
spective, the return of Overseas Chinese in different periods was closely 
related to the ways China was imagined and defined in that particular his-
torical context. During much of the imperial Manchu Qing dynasty, par-
ticularly between 1680 and the 1840s, the Chinese polity was positioned 
within the concept of tianxia (all under heaven), “a globalistic idea of how 
to structure the world” (Meissner 2003, 205), which assumed the superi-
ority of Chinese culture over the cultures of outside population. With this 
culturalist cosmology, the idea of racial difference, though traceable to an 
ancient China according to some scholars (e.g., Dikotter 1990), was sub-
sumed by cultural affiliation. The Manchu leaders, with a barbarian origin 
in the eyes of Ming loyalists, legitimated their rule through emphasizing 
Confucianism as the ruling principle and established a unified multiethnic 
empire referred to as both Da Qing Guo (Qing empire) and Zhongguo 
(Central State) (Barabantseva 2011, 20). Until the mid- nineteenth century, 
migrating abroad was seen as an unforgivable betrayal to the heavenly im-
perial authority—the representative of superior Chinese civilization—and 
thus prohibited by the Qing court; emigration was difficult and returning 
was fraught with the danger of a death sentence (Zhuang 1989).
After the defeat in the Opium Wars, the Qing court was forced to allow 
subjects to travel to the European colonies in Southeast Asia to meet the 
increasing demand of labor, mostly in mines and cash- crop plantations, 
as a result of European expansion (Wang G. 1992, 25). This marked the be-
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ginning of large- scale outflow of Chinese and catalyzed constant waves of 
out- migration and return migration. More importantly, Western penetra-
tion gave rise to a modern, racially based conception of the nation- state, 
which redefined the relation between China and Overseas Chinese and 
gave new meanings to return. In confronting Western imperialist oppres-
sion in the wake of the 1840 Opium War, Chinese intellectuals developed 
the concept of minzu, from the Japanese term minzoku, created by the 
Meiji- era Japanese modernizers to refer to “nation” in Western works (Li Y. 
1971, 97). However, the term minzu in Chinese could simultaneously refer 
to people, clan, and race. Thus the term zhonghua minzu (Chinese nation) 
was initially defined by Sun Yat- sen, the founder of the Republic of China, 
to construct a single unified race comprising the majority Han centered 
in north China since the Xia dynasty (c. 2100–1600 bCe).8 By this defi-
nition, “Hua, Xia, or Han could be used interchangeably to mean China 
the nation- state, Chinese the race (or tribe), and China the geographic 
location” (Wu 1991, 161). This ambiguous, all- embracing notion aimed 
at breaking entrenched linguistic and regional divisions was deliberately 
created by Sun in his move to overthrow the barbarian (non- Han) Qing 
ruler.9 “The overriding purpose of the rhetoric is clear: a call for the unity 
of the Chinese nation based on a common charter of descent” in oppo-
sition to insignificant minorities and Western invasions (Gladney 1998, 
116). Thus, from its inception, modern Chinese nationalism “displayed a 
strong ethnic, even xenophobic, strain in opposing imperialism and Man-
chu rule” (Townsend 1996, 16).
This racially defined and deterritorialized conception of the nation natu-
rally included the Overseas Chinese. Compelled by a racialized notion of 
the Chinese nation and the need to resist humiliation by Western imperial-
ism, Overseas Chinese became actively involved in China’s anti- imperialist 
movements beginning in the late nineteenth century. They were the back-
bone of the anti- Qing military rebellions led by Sun, who hailed Overseas 
Chinese as “the mother of the (republic) revolution” (Hong 1989, 147) and 
of the later 1911 revolution. The Japanese invasion in the early 1930s and 
especially in 1937 dramatically aggravated the broadly based, geographi-
cally dispersed but China- centric sense of Chinese solidarity. More than 
forty thousand Overseas Chinese returned, mostly from Southeast Asia, 
during the anti- Japanese war. They were found in the Communist head-
quarters (Yan’an) and the Nationalist capital (Chongqing), as well as battle-
fronts across China. The Overseas Chinese worked as translators, engi-
neers, doctors, and nurses behind the enemy lines, or as battle plane pilots, 
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ground army soldiers, and guerrillas fighting alongside their local compa-
triots (Huang, Zhao, and Cong 1995).
The founding of the PRC in 1949 marked the climax of the century- 
long return migration of Overseas Chinese. In the early years of the PRC 
when it was still in the presocialist stage of New Democracy, the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCp) employed moderate and flexible policies to mobi-
lize various forces with diverse social, economic, and ethnic affiliations to 
consolidate the new regime. Under this circumstance, Overseas Chinese 
were seen as a much- needed source of manpower and capital for restor-
ing and rebuilding the war- torn national economy and a unique force in 
building friendly relations between the new republic and their host coun-
tries. Representatives of Overseas Chinese were invited to attend the first 
National People’s Political Consultative Conference, held in 1949, and the 
first National People’s Congress (npC), held in 1954. In addition, the first 
constitution of the PRC issued in 1954 claimed, in the ninth chapter, re-
garding citizens’ rights and duties, that the PRC government would protect 
the proper rights and interests of Overseas Chinese. Clearly, the Commu- 
nists steadily followed the ethno- nationalist principle as defined and prac-
ticed by the previous Republican leadership, and through a set of poli-
cies termed by Elena Barabantseva (2011, 46) as “ethnic internationalism” 
claimed an extraterritorial commitment of Overseas Chinese to Socialist 
China. Many of my returnee interviewees revealed that their migration to 
China had been heavily influenced, though indirectly, by the call of the 
underground CCp.10 This policy continued up to the mid- 1950s, when it 
became obvious that further attempts of mobilization could possibly harm 
China’s diplomatic relationship with Southeast Asian countries, where the 
majority of Overseas Chinese resided, and endanger international recog-
nition of the new China. In 1952 the CCp canceled its overseas extension 
and recalled overseas party members (Zheng 2005, 295). Three years later, 
the Chinese government officially discarded the policy of dual citizenship 
in Indonesia and then in all foreign countries, which encouraged Over-
seas Chinese to settle down where they were and be naturalized to host 
societies. However, the leftists remained dominant in Chinese embassies 
and the influence of the CCp in Overseas Chinese communities continued 
to the early 1960s (Zheng 2005, 289–97). The high- rising nationalist sen-
timent was vividly demonstrated in a poem titled “Beijing de shengyin” 
(Voice of Beijing) published in a Jakarta- based Chinese newspaper Zhong-
cheng Bao (Loyalty Newspaper) (May 10, 1964; my translation):
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Sitting by the radio,
from where comes the voice of Beijing.
My heart throbs with joy, and
light flashes in front of my eyes.
I hear the bugle calling for battle, and
acclaim of victory.
The storm of revolution encourages me, and
the trend of the times propels me to forge ahead.
Following the “calling for battle” and the “storm of revolution,” about 
250,000 Chinese from Southeast Asia, mostly students and teachers, mi-
grated to the PRC in the early and mid- 1950s (Godley 1989). At the same 
time, some 2,500 Chinese scholars and students, together with their fami-
lies, returned from the West and Japan to the new China (Li T. 2000). The 
return migration from Southeast Asia continued after the mid- 1950s, but 
for more complicated reasons. While nationalist sentiments continued to 
be a major force behind the return of young students, many others, includ-
ing shopkeepers, traders, and laborers, were forced to join the waves of re-
turn, usually with their entire families, due to the intensified racial tensions 
and riots in some Southeast Asian countries, especially Indonesia.11 In the 
period between 1960 and 1966, around 200,000 Chinese, many of whom 
were received by the Chinese government as refugees, returned from Indo-
nesia and some other Southeast Asian countries (see Coppel 1983; Mackie 
1976). In the late 1970s, a further wave of about 160,000 Chinese refugees 
from Vietnam moved to China at the end of U.S. war in Vietnam, driven 
by the persecution and expulsion policies of the Vietnam government 
(Huang X. 2005, 56).
It is estimated that about one million Overseas Chinese returned to 
Mao’s China in different periods, of which those from Indonesia consti-
tuted the largest group.12 These returnees ended up in different places in 
China. Initially, the majority settled in the coastal provinces in southern 
China, including Guangdong, Fujian, and Guangxi, which were the tradi-
tional sending areas and thus preferred by returnees and the government.13 
The continuous and large influx of return migration in the 1960s forced 
the government to turn to a more centralized way of settlement. Except 
for a small percentage of returnees who were wealthy enough to invest in 
China, or who had the required skills or tertiary qualifications and were 
settled in cities, the rest were centrally allocated to designated rural areas.
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The experience of returnees in the post- 1949 China was qualitatively 
different from any before or since. Except for the early years of the PRC, 
Mao’s China was essentially imagined as a “class nation” and membership 
was defined exclusively by class status (J. Fitzgerald 1996, 59). As James 
Townsend points out: “Class- based definitions of the ‘people’ and recur-
ring movements of class struggle divided the Chinese nation up to 1979, 
in effect revoking the citizenship of millions of its members by labeling 
them as enemy classes, devoid of political rights” (1996, 19). Because of the 
PRC’s primary concern with class relations in its nation- building project, 
returnees—once unquestionably “one of us”—were now a classed Other. 
As the radicalization of the politics within the PRC and the deepening of 
the Cold War cut off China from the outside world and put a halt to vol-
untary return migration and out- migration, state policy decisively shifted 
toward transforming or rehabilitating returnees into acceptable political 
subjects within the revolutionary party- state.
The Invention of Guiqiao as a Classed Other
Whereas Sun Yat- sen had propounded the notion of the Han as the subject 
of national salvation from Manchu degradation and Western encroach-
ment (Gladney 1998, 117–18), Mao Zedong’s continuation of the national-
ist project employed the concept renmin (the people) to mobilize differ-
ent linguistic and regional groups into an overarching whole, standing in 
opposition to Western imperialists as well as domestic antirevolutionary 
classes. The constituents of renmin were not fixed but dependent on which 
social classes the Communist Party wanted (or needed) to rally. By the late 
1950s, when CCp announced that the transformation from New Democ-
racy to Socialism had been completed in China and the dictatorship of 
the proletariat had replaced democratic dictatorship, the so- called exploit-
ative social classes (landlords, urban petty bourgeoisie, national bourgeoi-
sie, and bureaucrat bourgeoisie), once tolerated under the democratic dic-
tatorship, were eliminated. Thereafter renmin referred strictly to peasants 
and workers, the majority working classes. To maintain the purity of ren-
min and strengthen the solidity of the people’s republic, continuous class 
struggle against surviving reactionary elements became an imperative. It 
fell on the party to identify, supervise, and control suspicious or enemy 
elements within the Chinese population, which in practical terms was tan-
tamount to disenfranchising them of political rights.
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It was in this context that realizing a purified class- based nationhood 
soon became the central mission of the special policy domain qiaowu 
(Overseas Chinese affairs) that was created shortly after the founding of 
the PRC. As the Cold War had put a freeze on direct dealings with popu-
lations overseas, it was their relatives and dependents residing in China 
and the returnees—the “domestic Overseas Chinese” (S. Fitzgerald 1972, 
52)—who were the core subjects of these policies during the Mao era. 
The two major pillars of qiaowu, the Zhongyang Qiaowei (State Com-
mission of Overseas Chinese Affairs; hereafter State Commission), estab-
lished in 1949, and the Zhongguo Qiaolian (All- China Federation of Re-
turned Overseas Chinese; hereafter All- China Federation), established in 
1956, both set up branches at the provincial and municipal levels.14 The 
State Commission’s flagship propaganda newsletter, Qiaowu Bao (Qiaowu 
News; hereafter qwb), launched in 1956 and disseminated party- state poli-
cies concerning returnees.15
Under preceding Chinese imperial and Republican administrations, 
return migrants and Chinese populations overseas had been lumped 
together generally as huaqiao or qiaomin, both terms simply meaning 
“Overseas Chinese”; there had been no official distinction between the re-
turned and nonreturned Overseas Chinese. Even in the early years after 
the establishment of the PRC in 1949, the term guiqiao (returned Overseas 
Chinese) was not an officially defined category differentiated from hua-
qiao (Overseas Chinese). This can be seen from the naming of the repre-
sentatives of the first National People’s Political Consultative Conference, 
in which Overseas Chinese (including both returned and nonreturned 
Overseas Chinese) were counted as one of the participating units, which 
was named “overseas huaqiao democratic personages” (later changed into 
“foreign democratic personages”) (Zhonguo Renmin Zhengzhi Xieshang 
Huiyi Quanguo Weiyuan Hui Wenshi Ziliao Yanjiu Weiyuanhui 1994). 
Similarly, in the first npC, the term huaqiao was still applied to categorize 
representatives of Overseas Chinese if they had returned for residence or 
still lived abroad (Quanguo Renda Changweihui Bangongshi 1987; Quan-
guo Renda Neiwu Sifa Weiyuanhui Bangongshi 1992). This occurred for 
the first time when, to further the establishment of the qiaowu system, the 
party- state of the PRC invented a separate category for returnees. The term 
guiqiao, referring to any Overseas Chinese who had returned to China, 
first appeared in a 1957 document titled “Guanyu huaqiao, qiaojuan, gui-
qiao and guiqiao xuesheng de shenfen jieshi” (Explanations for the statuses 
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of Overseas Chinese, dependents of Overseas Chinese, returned Overseas 
Chinese and returned Overseas Chinese Students),16 issued by the State 
Commission to distinguish between different categories of Overseas Chi-
nese for policy purposes (Lu and Quan 2001, 2).
The semantics of the term are pertinent. In Chinese, the word gui (re-
turn) has meanings beyond spatial movements, signifying a renewing or 
conversion of allegiance after departing or deviating from orthodoxy.17 The 
word qiao (sojourner) was never a neutral term in official discourse but 
had connotations of being outcast or exiled, commonly referring to dis-
senters and potential threats to stability and authority. In a nutshell, gui-
qiao as a category was created by the party- state to aid its nation- building 
purpose by emphasizing the returning of Overseas Chinese to a pledge of 
allegiance and obedience to the new party- state sovereignty (regardless 
of whether the guiqiao had even been to China before). As such, given a 
tainted past in Western capitalist and colonial societies, Overseas Chinese 
could not be considered members of renmin; instead they were were sub-
jects for transformation.
The labeling and identification as guiqiao, once confirmed through 
various registration processes (shenfen rending), was a lifelong political 
marker recorded in returnees’ personnel dossiers (dan’gan) and continu-
ally referred to by work- unit officials to investigate the political life of indi-
viduals; some provinces issued certificates (guiqiao zheng) to register and 
keep tabs on the returnees under their control (Lu and Quan 2001, 5). The 
party- state’s justification for institutionalized policing of Overseas Chi-
nese returnees (guiqiao), and their dependents (qiaojuan) in China, was 
spelled out in a 1958 qwb editorial:
Considering the fact that most guiqiao come from capitalist coun-
tries and were influenced by bourgeois ideology, they must go 
through transformation. As many qiaojuan have been living on 
remittances and have never engaged in manual labor, they must be 
remolded into working people living on their own labor; as they 
have relatives overseas, they must be under the continuous influ-
ence of capitalist thoughts. Therefore, the transformation of guiqiao 
and qiaojuan is long lasting and arduous. (Benkan Bianjibu 1958; my 
translation)
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Transforming Guiqiao into “New Socialist Persons”
The policy matrix put in place for transforming the guiqiao into national-
ist renmin consisted of both hard and soft and negative and positive mea-
sures. Hard measures included participation in organized political studies 
and campaigns and institutional arrangements that determined their ma-
terial lives. Soft measures referred to some privileges in daily lives and 
politicized leisure activities, such as the specially organized film receptions 
or celebration parties for the returnees and their families during major 
public holidays, hosted by the national and provincial chapters of the All- 
China Federation. Incentives aimed at eliciting the returnees’ loyalties in-
cluded the awarding of privileges and honors, while negative sanctions 
were meted out to those deemed to be hanging on to bourgeois outlooks. 
A recurring political task effected through qiaowu institutions was to train 
cadres to understand “how to balance privilege against participation, free-
dom against control, and persuasion against force” (S. Fitzgerald 1972, 
20). Acquiescence to party- state controls was reinforced through constant 
oscillation in the application of these measures.
honors and privileges
In the 1950s, when the newly founded PRC was in urgent need of skilled 
manpower and remittances from Overseas Chinese, the return of Overseas 
Chinese was actively encouraged and honored. Returning to the home-
land was regarded as exemplary patriotic behavior. Numerous articles 
with such titles as “Warm Welcome to Motherland’s Great Children” and 
“Motherland Is a Big Warm Family” in mainstream newspapers reported 
on the devotion of Overseas Chinese returning to the motherland (see 
Benkan Bianjibu 1966; Chen G. 1960). As a way of honoring Overseas Chi-
nese, elites and respectable representatives selected from Overseas Chi-
nese communities were appointed to leading positions within qiaowu in-
stitutions. For example, Tan Kah Kee, a Fujian- born Chinese tycoon from 
Singapore, was appointed the first chairman of the All- China Federation, 
and Zhuang Xiquan, a guiqiao elite from Malaya, was appointed vice chair-
man. Other elite figures were politically honored as renda daibiao (repre-
sentatives of the People’s Congress) or as zhengxie weiyuan (members of 
Political Consultative Conferences) at the national or local level.
During the 1950s and early 1960s, the returnees as a whole benefited 
from a qiaowu policy that was briefly summarized as “Yishi tongren, shi-
dang zhaogu” (to treat equally but make appropriate preferential arrange-
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ments). This policy, seeming to contain a “non- antagonistic contradiction” 
(S. Fitzgerald 1972, 54), meant that returnees were asked to participate in 
Socialist construction together with the renmin in the common pursuit of 
a class- based new Chinese nation, but, at the same time, returnees were 
granted exemptions from participating in political and social movements 
and permitted a number of daily- life privileges, including receiving remit-
tances, which brought precious foreign currency into the economy when 
the PRC was cut off from the outside world. In return, guiqiao were al-
lotted extra rations (qiaohui quan) for daily goods, such as certain amounts 
of sugar and butter, and even luxury items, such as bicycles and watches 
at special shops. In the 1950s, guiqiao were also encouraged to establish 
private businesses, build their own houses, and purchase private prop-
erties. So- called huaqiao cun (Overseas Chinese villages) in Guangzhou, 
Xiamen, and Beijing were districts congregated with quality private apart-
ments and houses of wealthy returnees or guiqiao elites allowed to live 
there. They were thus privileged suspects. Such preferential treatment, os-
tensibly to help guiqiao adjust to their new lives in China, served the party- 
state agenda. A qwb editorial clarifies this: “It is incorrect to break away 
from the general principle of socialist construction and the whole Chinese 
people to emphasize the preferential treatments toward guiqiao and qiao-
juan. . . . To give them preferential treatments was for the purpose of fully 
mobilizing their initiatives” (Benkan Bianjibu 1958; my translation).
Huaqiao FarMs as poliTiCal spaCe
Returnees to the PRC before 1979 did not expect that they would have 
little choice in where and how to live. Official policy guidelines were “anji 
anzhi” (to settle the returnees in their places of origin, my translation).18 
However, for the considerable numbers who had lost connections with 
home and ancestral villages, particularly those from families settled over-
seas for a few generations, “place of origin” might as well be anywhere that 
the government decided. As a result, except for returning students who ar-
rived in the 1950s and were lucky enough to find jobs in cities after gradua-
tion from university, the large majority of guiqiao, particularly those who 
arrived in the 1960s and 1970s, were placed in the specially established 
huaqiao farms, mostly located in remote mountain areas of Guangdong, 
Fujian, and Guangxi provinces, which were sparsely populated because of 
barren land and inconvenient transportation.
Before 1960 there were only eight huaqiao farms settled by 11,112 re-
turnees, excluding those returnees who settled with their relatives in their 
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hometowns (Benkan Bianjibu 1959). The sudden influx of Chinese immi-
grants from Indonesia in 1960 and after 1966 prompted the government to 
centralize all new settlements in farms. In 1960 alone, between sixty thou-
sand and seventy thousand returnees, out of more than ninety thousand 
nationwide, were assigned to huaqiao farms. The number of huaqiao farms 
increased to thirty- two within a year (Benkan Bianjibu 1962; Fang 1961). 
It was not uncommon for a whole ship of returnees to be allocated to the 
same farm, regardless of their putative places of origin. By 1978 there were 
forty- one huaqiao farms, and an additional forty were built to receive the 
influx of returnees from Vietnam after 1978. According to an official figure, 
there were eighty- six huaqiao farms inhabited by about 210,000 returnees 
in 1985 (Huang X. 2005, 69).
The huaqiao farms were more than places for living and working; they 
were also invented space for “settling, educating, transforming and orga-
nizing guiqiao for their participation in socialist construction.” It was thus 
“not just an economic task to manage the farms well”; it was also “a po-
litical undertaking” (Fang and Feng 2001, 255).19 Initially, the farms were 
under the State Commission’s charge, with daily management overseen by 
the provincial- level offices and county governments where the farms were 
located. With their rapidly increasing numbers, however, the central gov-
ernment transferred the responsibilities of local authorities to a specially 
created Farm Management Department within the State Commission in 
1963. To ensure the success of its political agenda, the government pledged 
enormous investments to the infrastructure and agricultural productivity 
of huaqiao farms, together with provisions of financial subsidies, tax re-
ductions, and exemptions in agricultural production. Working as de facto 
state employees, returnees received monthly salaries (albeit meager) and 
enjoyed welfare benefits that were not available to most rural populations, 
such as health care, children’s education assistance, and pensions. Stand-
ing apart from the formal urban- rural structure, huaqiao farm settlements 
were administratively, socially, and politically separate from their neigh-
boring villages (Li M. 2005, 165–71). But the strict control, bureaucratic 
misconduct, and frictions with local governments also created many prob-
lems. From the returnees’ point of view, the farms were places where they 
suffered from social isolation, excessive political control, and material im-
poverishment during the Mao era (Li M. 2005; Naicang 2010).
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preparaTory sChools
Education was another policy domain where returnees were kept apart 
from the mainstream renmin, at once a privilege and a means of surveil-
lance. Parallel to policies of concentrated settlement, the Chinese gov-
ernment determined that returnee students should be “received in a cen-
tralized manner, sent to different schools, and admitted with preference” 
( jizhong jiedai, fensan ruxue, youxian luqu) (Huang X. 2005, 49; my trans-
lation). Between 1950 and 1953, offices in Guangzhou that were specially set 
up registered an estimated nineteen thousand returned Overseas Chinese 
students and sent them to special Huaqiao xuesheng buxi xuexiao (Re-
turned Overseas Chinese preparatory schools) managed by the State Com-
mission (Huang X. 2005, 49). These schools were first set up in Beijing, 
Jimei, and Guangzhou (in 1950, 1953, and 1954, respectively). In 1960 there 
were as many as 3,500 students in the Beijing Huaqiao xuesheng buxi xue-
xiao (Beijing preparatory school for returned Overseas Chinese students); 
over the period 1950–66, 22,250 students had spent varying lengths of time 
studying there (Beijing Huawen Jiaoyu Zhongxin 2000, 29). To cope with 
the influx of Indonesian Chinese students in 1960, four more preparatory 
schools were set up in that year; they were in Shantou, Kunming, Nanning, 
and Wuhan (Zhou 1999, 100–101).
Returned students usually attended the preparatory schools for one to 
two years before being admitted to ordinary state universities or colleges. 
Those who did not pass the entrance examinations were allocated work in 
factories or farms. The preparatory- school curriculum included Chinese 
language and culture but was primarily aimed at the indoctrination of 
Marxist- Leninist theories and Mao’s thoughts and at encouraging moral 
cultivation through pedagogy for the making of socialist new persons. In 
the radicalized politics of the Anti- rightist Movement (1957), the Great 
Leap Forward (1958), and the subsequent “Three Difficulties Years” (1959–
61),20 returned students spent most of their time attending political cam-
paigns or farming in the rural areas. To accommodate the growing num-
bers of Overseas Chinese university- level students, the PRC government 
reopened Amoy University (1957) and Jinan University (1958) in Fujian 
and Guangdong, and in 1960 set up Huaiqao University in Quanzhou, 
Fujian.21 These universities were administered directly by the State Com-
mission and, along with the preparatory schools, served as a special edu-
cational channel for Overseas Chinese students.
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sTigMaTizaTion and punishMenT
Toward the late 1960s when China’s domestic politics became increasingly 
radical, qiaowu policy turned harsh and preferential treatment was re-
placed by discrimination and even persecution during the Cultural Revo-
lution (1966–76). Even in the 1950s, when the returnees and their relatives 
were generally treated favorably, returnees were often victims of politi-
cal campaigns. In the land reform (1950–52) and Socialist transforma-
tion period (1953–56), for example, some were classified as huaqiao dizhu 
(Overseas Chinese landlords) and their lands and houses were confiscated. 
During the Anti- rightist Movement, many were labeled “rightist elements” 
and sent to labor camps in remote areas.22 More broadly, these returnees’ 
overseas connections became a political stigma that meant relegation to 
inferior sociopolitical positions and that precluded recruitment into key 
sections in the party- state apparatus, and into the ranks of the CCp and 
pla (Gao 1956; Lu X. 1956).
Whenever domestic politics became radicalized, especially during the 
purifications of the Cultural Revolution, the returnees were frequently cast 
as the class enemies within and subjected to intense personal suspicion, 
denunciation, and persecution. Many people I interviewed recalled how 
their everyday habits, such as dressing and diet, were taken as evidence of 
their capitalist leanings and of being worshippers of things foreign. Their 
houses, remittances, and other private properties were confiscated, and 
mundane communications from relatives overseas became a liability and 
sometimes were regarded as a danger. The deputy head of the Zhongyang 
Wenge Xiaozu (Cultural Revolution Group), Chen Boda, went so far as to 
label the party- state- controlled huaqiao farms and villages as “the United 
Nations of enemy agents” (quoted in Godley 1989, 348). One of my inter-
viewees put it in this way: “We guiqiao were the unwritten seventh bad ele-
ment, after the landlords, rich peasants, criminals, counterrevolutionaries, 
rightists, and capital roaders.”23
No accurate figures are available on how many returnees and their 
families were persecuted or imprisoned as spies or counterrevolution-
aries during the Cultural Revolution. However, according to an official re-
port by the director of the Office of Overseas Chinese Affairs of the State 
Council, Liao Hui (1982–1992), “in the Cultural Revolution, there were 
over 64,500 cases of ‘wrongful accusation’ against guiqiao and qiaojuan in 
China, 25,000,000 square meters of guiqiao and qiaojuan’s residences were 
taken, and 650,000 of guiqiao and qiaojuan’s dossiers had discrimination 
78 Wang Cangbai
records” (Liao 1989; my translation).This hints at the type of persecution 
returnees endured, though the reality could have been far starker.
Overt state control, imposed segregation, discrimination, and persecu-
tion made returnees feel like “orphans at home” (hainei guer), as a returnee 
author described the guiqiao’s experience during the Cultural Revolution 
(Bai 1983, 22; my translation). In order to protect themselves, many re-
turnees maintained distance from the mainstream society, and instead re-
treated to small circles of trusted friends and relatives who were often fel-
low guiqiao. The strong shared sense of alienation can be discerned from 
the high rate of marriages within the group. A survey of 359 returnees 
from Indonesia residing in Beijing found that about 50.4 percent of the 
respondents were married to other returnees (Huang J. 1999, 50). My own 
interviews revealed that a significant number of returnees also married 
mainlanders from similarly politically questionable or stigmatized back-
grounds, such as landlord or urban bourgeois families.
What was most hurtful for the returnees was the discrimination faced 
by their descendants. A returnee from Indonesia in the early 1950s, who 
now lives in Hong Kong, recalled how miserable he felt on discovering that 
his China- born son was refused membership of Shaoxiandui (the League 
of Young Pioneers) at primary school because of his overseas connections. 
Another returnee from Indonesia in 1960, now a retired civil servant in 
Beijing, described his sadness when a friend, another Indonesian returnee 
from a Peranakan family and a renowned doctor at Beijing Tongren Hospi-
tal, decided to leave China in 1973 to spare his children any further political 
persecution after they had all been sent to the countryside when they were 
in middle school. Beginning in the early 1970s, when the Chinese govern-
ment relaxed exit controls, large numbers of returnees began to leave for 
this very reason—to safeguard the future of the next generations—as well 
as their own welfare. In a decade from the mid- 1970s to mid- 1980s, some 
250,000 returnees and their families left for Hong Kong and Macau (God-
ley 1989). According to an official source, about 60 percent of the return-
ees in Beijing left in the period between 1972 and 1980 (Benkan Bianjibu 
1980). Among the returnees from Indonesia in Beijing, mostly the once 
patriotic students who returned in the 1950s after responding to the call 
of motherland and who supposedly enjoyed much better treatment than 
their counterparts assigned to remote huaqiao farms, more than 11 per-
cent admitted that they regretted returning to China, and about 30 percent 
stated that they would opt to stay in Indonesia if they could choose again 
(Huang J. 1999, 52).
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A New Generation of Returnees in the Reform Era
This chapter has explored how guiqiao, a special political category, was 
created in the Mao era, both discursively and in practice, as part of the 
class- based nation- building project. It reveals that the CCp’s qiaowu policy 
“veered from left to right, and alternated between severity and leniency” 
throughout the Mao era in accordance to shifting definitions of who con-
stituted renmin in the PRC (S. Fitzgerald 1972, 54). Returning to the ances-
tral or assumed cultural homeland of the Chinese nation, where distinction 
between classes was replacing the notion of the monolithic Chinese race 
or culture as the basis for defining the nation, the returnees found them-
selves excluded from the category of renmin because of their past connec-
tions with the colonial and capitalist world. The returnees were subjects to 
be re- educated and transformed and were regulated, discriminated against, 
and even persecuted. Their return journey coincided with a major histori-
cal shift in what the Chinese nation and subsequently what being Chinese 
meant. The returnees’ experiences cast in sharp light how the party- state 
exercised its power through selective and differential subjectification.
Toward the end of the 1970s, as China opened up to the outside world, 
Deng Xiaoping and other Chinese leaders declared that “overseas connec-
tion is a good thing” (quoted in Guowuyuan Qiaoban ji Zhongyang Wen-
xian Yanjiushi 2000, 6; my translation). All of a sudden guiqiao became 
a positive category again and a new policy area (Wang G. 1985). Guiqiao 
are now seen as a strategic bridge to help establish linkages with Hong 
Kong, Macau, Southeast Asia, and, increasingly, Western countries. Mov-
ing away from the class- based definition of the nation- state, the Commu-
nist party- state has enthusiastically promoted the imaginary global China 
that is based on the common Chinese race, Chinese language and culture, 
and Chinese roots (tong zhong, tong wen, tong gen). High- profile initiatives 
to this end include the annual commemoration ceremony of the legendary 
Yan and Huang emperors, the establishment of the Confucius Institutes 
aimed at promoting Chinese language and culture worldwide, and the 
hosting of the World Chinese Entrepreneurs Convention in 2001, among 
many others. Overseas Chinese, defined in racial and cultural terms, are 
counted on for their contributions to economic development, to territo-
rial reunification (with Taiwan), and to what the former Chinese president 
Jiang Zemin (2001) called the “great revitalization of the Chinese nation.” 
A new generation of returnees has emerged since the 1990s in the context 
of the new round of globalization. Dubbed haigui, they are mostly China- 
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born students or scholars who return from overseas to take advantage of 
the opportunities afforded by China’s rapidly expanding economy (see 
Li C. 2005; Wang, Wong, and Sun 2006; Zweig, Chen, and Rosen 2004).
Many China observers have noted the revival of the sometimes trium-
phalist Overseas Chinese nationalism (Liu 2005; Nyíri and Breidenbach 
2005; Wang G. 1996). However, unlike the sentiments prevalent among 
the Overseas Chinese in the 1950s and 1960s, present- day emigrants seem 
to have more diverse perceptions about China and are more circumspect 
in their attitudes toward the state. On the part of the party- state, its move 
away from class politics to a culturalist interpretation of the nation by no 
means implies the replacement of the politics of differentiation with one 
of unity. For example, the party- state’s emphasis on individuals’ economic 
success and professional capability, which underlies the official discourse 
about the haigui returnees, introduced a new mode of differential subjecti-
fication (see Xiang 2011; Xiang and Shen 2009). It is still too early to assess 
how relations between contemporary returnees, the party- state, and the 
larger society may evolve. In any case, as the guiqiao episode demonstrates, 
returnees’ fate may serve as a sensitive window in revealing how Chinese 
politics change in relation to the outside world.
Notes
 1. The English title of the film was officially rendered as A Loyal Overseas Chinese 
Family or as Hearts for the Motherland. It was one of most popular films in mainland 
China at that time and was awarded the Outstanding Movie Prize by the Ministry of 
Culture.
 2. The term huaqiao first appeared in the late nineteenth century and became a 
popular term with a political flavor after the 1911 revolution, referring to Chinese na-
tionals residing abroad. Its equivalent in English is Overseas Chinese. See Wang G. 
1992. These two terms are used interchangeably throughout this chapter.
 3. pla art troupes came under the leadership of major departments of the Central 
Military Commission and served to indoctrinate pla soldiers through creating and 
performing works celebrating and exhorting loyalty to the Chinese Communist Party.
 4. Dang’an is a confidential file that is created and updated by schools or work-
ing units. The file contains information about a student’s or employee’s family back-
ground, political attitude, education, employment history, performance in work and 
political campaigns, and so on.
 5. Political investigation was an essential part of the recruitment and promotion 
process in the Mao era. Its main purpose was to double- check the candidates’ political 
backgrounds and to ensure that they and their families did not have exploitive class 
backgrounds or dubious overseas connections.
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 6. Both Huang and Lin are typical surnames of the Overseas Chinese from Guang-
dong and Fujian, the two major emigration provinces of China.
 7. As a modern Chinese political conception, race was imagined to be biologically 
determined and defined by blood ties. Sun Yat- sen argued that all Chinese people 
shared the same ancestral origin and thus belonged to a single race that was dis-
tinct from all other races in the world. Based on this racialist conceptualization of the 
nation, Sun maintained that to save the nation was to fight for racial survival among 
races in the modern world.
 8. Later Sun extended the content of zhonghua minzu to include four major non- 
Han peoples—the Man (Manchus), Meng (Mongolians), Hui (a term for Chinese 
Muslims), and Zang (Tibetan)—who were viewed as subbranches of a single race and 
had to be incorporated into a broader notion of the Chinese nation by the core Chi-
nese, the Han. See Barabantseva 2011, 31–32.
 9. Sun’s racial interpretation of nationalism was categorically evidenced by his slo-
gan “quchu dalu, huifu zhonghua” (expel barbarians, restore China), with dalu refer-
ring to the barbarians from northern China, here particularly the Manchu monarchy, 
and zhonghua being Han China.
 10. It is hard to establish the full picture of the history of return due to the lack of 
information, but it is perhaps safe to say that Communist Party members had a cer-
tain influence on students and inspired them to go to China. For example, one of my 
interviewees, now a retired government official, was an underground party member 
in Indonesia. He disclosed to me that there were about eight underground party mem-
bers in his city in the 1950s, most of whom were workers, clerks, and teachers. They 
organized “study groups” among workers and students to read Lenin and Mao Ze-
dong. However, the role of the underground CCp in motivating students to go to China 
should not be overestimated. According to the same interviewee, the party members 
neither motivated students to go to China nor subsidized their trips (interview, Bei-
jing, August 10, 2002, in Chinese). I found no direct organizational links between the 
underground CCp and return migration.
 11. With the rise of indigenous nationalism starting in the late 1940s, ethnic Chi-
nese became targets of attacks due to their perceived economic dominance in some 
fields and privileged status given by the colonial authorities in the past. The tension 
was particularly high in Indonesia. Various discriminatory legislations against ethnic 
Chinese were introduced, accompanied by racial riots, after the implementation of the 
dual- nationality agreement in June 1955. The ban of alien- owned small or retail stores 
in rural areas after January 1960 led to a new exodus of Chinese. All Chinese schools 
were closed down and massive repatriation of Chinese refugees occurred after the 
incident on September 30, 1965. See Coppel 1983, 52–72; Mackie 1976, 77–138.
 12. Estimates of the number of returnees vary according to different sources. An 
official estimation made in the mid- 1990s suggests that there are 1,135,065 returned 
Overseas Chinese (excluding their families) in China, and among them, about half are 
from Indonesia. See Lu and Quan 2001, 284–85.
 It is noteworthy that most returnees were from families who left China relatively re-
cently (known as totok or singkeh in Indonesia), who spoke Mandarin or Chinese dia-
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lects, and who maintained some connections with China. In contrast, Peranakans, de-
scendants of early Chinese immigrants who married indigenous women, more often 
considered themselves natives or were more Dutch East Indies–oriented, and they 
were thus prone to stay in Indonesia or move to Western Europe. However, because 
of the re- Sinicization process triggered by the influx of China- born immigrants and 
the rise of Chinese nationalism inspired by Sun Yat- sen, a substantial number of Pera-
nakans became China- oriented and returned to China as well. For detailed accounts 
of social and political transformation of Chinese communities in Indonesia in the first 
half of the twentieth century, see Skinner 1963; Suryadinata 1978a, 1978b; Willmott 
1961.
 13. See Zhongguo Qiaolian 1996, 73–101.
 14. The State Commission fell directly under the leadership of the central govern-
ment while the All- China Federation was nominally a voluntary body of returnees and 
dependants of Overseas Chinese. During the chaotic years of the Cultural Revolution, 
the State Commission was shut down, restored, and renamed in 1978 as Guowuyuan 
Qiaowu Bangongshi (Office of Overseas Chinese Affairs of the State Council).
 15. Qiaowu Bao was closed down in December 1966 during the Cultural Revolution. 
The Office of Overseas Chinese Affairs of the State Council set up Qiaowu Gongzuo 
Yanjiu (Research of Overseas Chinese Affairs) in 1985 as the new flagship magazine 
to propagandize the party- state’s qiaowu policies.
 16. Apart from huaqiao and the newly coined term of guiqiao, this document also 
defined the categories of qiaojuan (dependants of Overseas Chinese, usually includ-
ing grandparents, parents, siblings, spouse, children, and their spouses and grandchil-
dren) and huaqiao xuesheng (returned students who had studied in Chinese- medium 
secondary schools overseas and hoped to continue their education in China).
 17. For example, guixiang means to surrender, and guishun, guiyi, and guifu all mean 
to pledge allegiance to the authorities.
 18. For the details of this policy, see Mao and Lin 1993, 213.
 19. After the State Commission was abolished in 1969, the management of huaqiao 
farms was temporarily taken over by the provincial government until the commission 
was revived in 1978 as the Office of Overseas Chinese Affairs of the State Council.
 20. This is called Three Years of Natural Disasters, which refers to the period from 
1959 to 1961, when the PRC experienced a severe famine due to both natural disasters 
and implementation of the wrong economic policies.
 21. Amoy University was originally established in 1921 by Tan Kah Kee. Jinan Uni-
versity was developed on the basis of Jinan Xuetang (Jinan College) that was estab-
lished in 1906.
 22. For example, in this period, thousands of returnees were sent from coastal China 
to Inner Mongolia for re- education in labor camps. They were forced to stay on the re-
form farms afterward. There were still 2,356 returnees living in different parts of Inner 
Mongolia in 2004. See Huang X. 2005, 250.
 23. Interview, Hong Kong, March 20, 2002, in Chinese; my translation.
ChApter Four
Transnational Encapsulation
Compulsory Return as a Labor- Migration Control in East Asia
Xiang biao
Tanimura Shinji, the owner of a garment factory in Kobe, Japan, who is also 
the president of the local association of small garment factories, has em-
ployed about ten female Chinese workers at any point of time since 1996. 
One of the most difficult aspects of the management of foreign workers 
is seeing them off at the airport. Not because this involves sad farewells 
but because ensuring that the workers leave Japan to return home when 
their contracts expire or are terminated is, Tanimura said, like “fighting a 
battle.” To send off two workers, he had to enlist five association members 
(other garment factory owners in Kobe). At the airport the Japanese team 
holds hands to form a human cordon encircling the women and, step by 
step, move them across the departure hall, through the throng, toward the 
immigration checkpoint.
At the checkpoint, Tanimura hands each worker a neatly wrapped pack-
age containing the air ticket, passport—which Tanimura (as most other 
employers) has retained since the worker’s arrival—and the unpaid salary 
accumulated over the past year or two. It is a standard practice for em-
84 Xiang biao
ployers in Japan (and other countries, such as Canada and Australia) to 
pay migrant workers a monthly living allowance of between 10 and 50 per-
cent of their wages, and pay the rest immediately before their actual de-
parture. Since the amount of cash is so large, the women normally place 
it in pockets purposefully sewn onto their underwear for safekeeping. It 
is awkward, Tanimura admits, to see them do so in the midst of the busy 
airport. He is also genuinely concerned that their families in China stand 
to lose everything in case of an air crash, but he cannot remit the money 
directly to them, an option he has obviously thought through: “If we re-
mit the money after [workers] return, they won’t agree. They are worried 
that we won’t remit. But if we remit the money before they go home . . . 
workers will insist that they leave only after receiving the confirmation [of 
receipt] from their family. During that time, they can plan to run away and 
overstay.”1 Such an obsession about guaranteeing the return of unskilled 
labor migrants on termination or expiry of their contracts is not unwar-
ranted, because employers and recruitment agencies in Japan (as in South 
Korea and Singapore) will be fined or banned from bringing in more mi-
grant workers in the future if their workers go missing or overstay. Hence 
the nightmare that workers might abscond as a group, even at the airport. 
From both the sending and receiving states’ regulatory perspectives, com-
pulsory return brings the migratory journey to a definite end. This chapter 
turns this end point of policy into the starting point of an inquiry about 
how compulsory return serves as a linchpin for controlling unskilled labor 
migration in the East Asian states of Japan, Korea, and Singapore.
The institutionalized practice of compulsory return leads to a phe-
nomenon of “transnational encapsulation,” whereby migrants are isolated 
from broader social relations and access to social resources even though 
they physically move across national borders. Transnational encapsula-
tion has two aspects, international rupture and transnational policing. By 
rupture I mean that compulsory return decisively and abruptly removes 
migrants from a milieu in which they have been working and living, cuts 
them off from their social networks, and tears down the solidarity that they 
develop with other workers and local society in time. Crucially, the rupture 
is international because it is implemented by drawing on authority from 
state sovereignty (for instance, visa regulations), and furthermore the rup-
ture is aimed at subjugating migrants to strict border control and discrete 
state regulations. For example, since legal systems are exclusively tied to 
nation- states, compulsory return effectively deprives the migrants of the 
possibilities of redressing any injustice that they had suffered in the host 
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country by physically moving them back across the border. This interna-
tional rupture, however, does not contradict the general trend of intensi-
fying transnational connections and networks. Temporary labor migration 
to Japan, South Korea, and Singapore, including the compulsory return, 
is managed transnationally in accordance with terms set out in various 
bilateral agreements.2 Furthermore, recruitment agents and employers 
work closely across state boundaries, effectively creating a transnational 
space of surveillance and policing. Thus, despite their physical mobility, 
unskilled migrant workers remain local and at a disadvantage in relation 
to the transnational reach of recruiting and employer institutions. In sum, 
compulsory return is an instance of international rupture made possible 
through transnational policing.
Compulsory return is not just an action, nor merely a result of par-
ticular policies, but is implemented by a spectrum of actors (state agen-
cies, recruitment agents, employers, and so on) located at different levels 
(transnational, national, and local) through various means (see Lindquist, 
this volume). Return is a legal obligation of the migrants given their visa 
status, and also a contractual agreement, but the actual return is enforced 
by both contractual and extracontractual means. As we have seen in Tani-
mura’s case, the combination of legal, extralegal, and illegal methods is 
crucial. Thus, international rupture is different from Catherine Nolin’s 
(2006) “transnational rupture” that denotes the experiences of separation 
and displacement of Guatemalan refugees in Canada and Arjun Appadu-
rai’s (1996) emphasis on the “disjunctures” in the globalization effects of 
media and migration that create potentially destabilizing gaps between 
flow of ideas and movement of people. International rupture is essential 
for the perpetuation of a tightly integrated regulatory system. Compulsory 
return provides a critical means that enables the nation- states to reassert 
their status as the ultimate authority in maintaining public order in the 
face of increasing mobility.
This chapter forms part of my larger project on labor migration from 
China to Japan, South Korea, and Singapore for which I have interviewed 
more than two hundred informants in the four countries over four years 
(July 2004 to November 2007). In Japan and Korea, Chinese made up the 
largest nationality group among unskilled and semiskilled foreign workers 
(nearly 70 percent and more than 40 percent, respectively); in Singapore, 
Chinese were one of the four largest groups, probably second after workers 
from Malaysia (ChinCa 2004, 16–17, 40–48). Apart from being numeri-
cally representative, the experiences of these migrant Chinese workers 
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are reflective of general state practices (except for migrant workers from 
Malaysia in Singapore, who can come and go more freely).
I first situate compulsory return as a central concern in regulating un-
skilled labor- migration flows in Japan, South Korea, and Singapore (not-
withstanding differences in their labor policies), notably to respond to eco-
nomic fluctuations, to minimize welfare responsibilities, and as a quick 
fix to defuse tensions. I then demonstrate how employers (whether in the 
private or public sector), private repatriation companies, and particularly 
recruitment agents operate a transnational policing to ensure return. This 
is followed by a discussion of three strategies adopted by migrant workers 
to thwart such tight controls. Finally, I highlight the characteristics of com-
pulsory return and contemporary East Asian labor migration in the larger 
global and historical context.
Return as International Rupture
Compulsory return has been built into the design of labor- migration poli-
cies in East Asia. Japan, for example, admits Chinese workers as “indus-
trial trainees” rather than employees, a categorization that neatly evades 
labor regulations for minimum wages, unemployment insurance, and so 
on. Moreover, “trainees,” ostensibly permanent employees of an enterprise 
in China sent to Japan, clearly must, by definition, return when their con-
tracted “training period” is up (Tsuda 2005, 40; see also He 1994, 108–9).3 
Singapore adopts a more liberal labor- migration policy. In theory anyone 
in possession of an employment contract is allowed entry. However, em-
ployers deposit a security bond of sgd 5,000 (usd 3,500) with the govern-
ment for each unskilled worker, which will be forfeited if workers are not 
sent home within seven days of termination or contract expiry.4 Further-
more, according to my informants, companies with more than one worker 
missing for more than a year risk being banned from recruiting foreign 
workers altogether. South Korea’s Employment Permit System combines 
elements of the Japanese and Singaporean models: employers who fail to 
ensure that their workers exit Korea within a stipulated period will not 
qualify for replacement quotas to bring in new workers.
It is to be expected that governments of receiving countries would at-
tempt to treat unskilled migrant labor flows as controlled and dispensable, 
especially in times of economic uncertainty. But why does return have to 
be enforced within a strictly defined time frame if, by definition, the status 
of temporary migrant prevents permanent settlement anyway? The answer 
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given by my informants was simple: if migrant workers were not forced 
to return within a given time, they may never return and may somehow 
find a refuge locally. Compulsory return is aimed at rupturing migrants’ 
ties within the local social milieu. A telling example of this rationale can 
be adduced in the cases of both South Korea and Japan, which, until re-
cently, banned former migrant workers from reentering the country for 
work, fearing that those with previous experience in the country may be 
savvy enough to complicate the project of compulsory return. Since March 
2003, the South Korean government has launched periodic crackdowns to 
round up and deport overstayers: those overstaying for less than a year are 
given a grace period to exit voluntarily without punishment; those who 
overstay longer than this are detained, fined, and deported immediately. 
In effect, those who have proved themselves to be more employable and 
better integrated into Korean society are targets of punishment and pri-
oritized for return.
It is precisely for the purposes of cutting off social relations and mini-
mizing social responsibilities that the sick or pregnant migrant bodies be-
come prime subjects of deportation, because receiving medical treatment 
and giving birth may have complicated social repercussions. It is a com-
mon clause in job contracts that the worker has to return if he or she be-
comes unable to work, and must be deported immediately in case of in-
fectious diseases, especially sexually transmitted diseases. In Singapore, 
all unskilled female migrant workers undergo a compulsory pregnancy 
check every six months, and those found to be pregnant have to return. 
One of the most difficult moments emotionally in my five- year research 
was when Zhang Song, a migrant worker from northeast China in Singa-
pore, called me for urgent advice after he found out he had impregnated 
his wife, Li Na, also working in Singapore. Li’s contracts with the recruit-
ment agent in China and the employer in Singapore clearly stated that in 
cases of pregnancy, workers would be deported at their own cost and the 
bond deposited with the agent would be forfeited (Li paid rMb 20,000, 
or usd 3,000, before leaving China). Li had to go for an abortion before 
the next pregnancy check but did not dare go to a hospital as Zhang said 
this would be like “throwing oneself into a trap” (zitou luowang). Accord-
ing to their understanding, even if the authorities or employer found out 
about her pregnancy after the abortion, Li would be deported as a measure 
not only aimed at preventing unwanted births, but also as punishment for 
having sexual intercourse. I was referred to two clinics that did not require 
proof of patients’ identities but charged a fee of usd 300, which they could 
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not afford. In the end Li’s family in China bribed a nurse to buy an aborti-
facient (mifepristone) that Li had taken before, and sent it to her through 
another migrant worker. Li bled for three days, and both she and Zhang 
were relieved.
Return serves as a convenient means of dealing with disputes for em-
ployers since, in Japan, South Korea, and Singapore, workers’ visas can be 
canceled anytime. As immigration law supersedes employment and other 
legislations, migrant workers without visas cannot pursue justice and have 
to leave unconditionally. Once they return, however, they are effectively 
deprived of their basic capacity to seek legal redress because of differences 
in national legal systems, and the territory- bound legal and social respon-
sibilities (particularly of agents and employers). Everything depends on 
the work permit, so the cancelation of work permits is seen as a magically 
quick fix, if also a violent act, which Chinese workers in Singapore called 
ga, a colloquialism to describe cutting heavy metal plates by guillotine.
The anxiety to repatriate workers at the earliest sign of trouble is also 
fueled by employers’ concerns about keeping a “clean record”: “trouble-
some” workers might seek help from ngos, engage lawyers, or lodge com-
plaints with government agencies.The deputy manager of a repatriation 
company in Singapore told me: “We [the Singaporean society] have a very 
strict merit system. If these kinds of things [workers complaining to the 
government] happen, people will ask what is your security system? Where 
is your safety measure [to prevent workers from causing trouble]? What 
is your reputation then? People don’t want to do business with a com-
pany that has a bad name.” In other words, the worry is not only about 
being taken to task over wrongdoings; it is equally about being questioned 
about failing to cover up wrongdoings! Because of their preoccupation 
with maintaining a clean record, Singapore employers sometimes convince 
the Ministry of Manpower to blacklist particular workers after their depar-
ture, which will prevent them from reentering Singapore for a number of 
years and thus ensuring that no past misconduct will surface.
Under pressure from civil society and from migrant workers them-
selves, state agencies in the three countries also crack down on abusive 
employers and recruitment institutions; ironically enough, the most com-
mon penalty involves forced repatriation of affected workers. In Japan, for 
example, if an employer or employers’ recruitment association is found to 
violate rules, the so- called foreign trainees have to be sent home and the 
cases are thereafter often regarded as solved. Out of sight, out of mind. For 
this reason, between 2003 and 2006, Chinese authorities also identified the 
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large- scale deportation of Chinese trainees by the Japanese government on 
account of irregularities in conduct of employers or their associations as a 
major concern in Chinese labor migration to Japan (Pang 2006).
Forced return is arguably violently disruptive to migrants’ lives. Inter-
national labor migration is not only expensive (the minimum agent’s fee 
in northeast China for work in Singapore, Japan, and South Korea was 
usd 5,000 in 2007) but also a highly emotionally charged investment that 
is expected to change one’s fate once and for all. Premature return turns 
this dream into a nightmare. While Li’s abortion allowed her to escape 
this, her husband, Zhang, decided not to see his contract through because 
the work regime was harsh and the wages were too low to even cover his 
agent’s fee. I attempted to comfort them with the prospect of seeing their 
one- year- old daughter soon, but Zhang gave me a weary smile. He would 
not even be able to let their families know of his return: “Our parents won’t 
be able to take it [his early return, after shelling out nearly usd 10,000]. It 
is so difficult for us already; this will be too much for them.” Zhang would 
not be able to return to his home district where some of his friends were 
still waiting to hear from him about Singapore, because if they saw him 
back so suddenly it would create, as Zhang put it, “a bad influence” on his 
reputation (yingxiang buhao, a term used in official documents to describe 
actions with undesirable public impact). The couple was deciding which 
friend’s home Zhang should stay at until he got a partial refund from the 
agent in China. In another case, Yan Lei, a twenty- one- year- old Chinese 
worker, broke down in tears when I met him through an ngo in Singapore 
just before he was forced to return home early, after a dispute with the em-
ployer. He condemned himself again and again for letting his parents down 
(duibuqi) because of this, and for bringing them so much shame that they 
would not be able to “go outside [of the home]” after his return.
The fear of arbitrary forced return severely undermines migrant work-
ers’ bargaining position. This is clearly evidenced in how nine Chinese 
women reacted to the discovery of a hidden camera installed by their em-
ployer in their changing room in Tokushima, Japan, in 2004. When this 
was reported in the Chinese media, it triggered a huge national outcry. 
The government of Liaoning province, where the nine workers came from, 
sent a delegation to Japan to investigate the incident. However, despite the 
extremely rare public attention and political support that they as migrant 
workers attracted, they decided not to bring the case to court because, if 
the employer was convicted, the factory would be closed down and all the 
workers would have to return to China.5 The threat of forced return also 
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undermines solidarity among workers. In another exceptional case, three 
female trainees in their last year in Aomori, Japan, demanded that the em-
ployer compensate them for poor working conditions. They had left the 
factory one night and stayed in a hostel, and they faxed their demand to 
the employer, at the same time contacting an ngo in Osaka. They did so 
partly to avoid opposition from fellow Chinese trainees in their first and 
second years who would expect to be sent home because the employer 
might either dismiss all the Chinese workers as punishment (which had 
happened before) or, if the compensation demands were satisfied, simply 
declare the factory bankrupt.6 In sum, forced return—or even the pos-
sibility of forced return—effectively ruptures migrants’ accumulation of 
social resources.
Transnational Policing and Encapsulation
Compulsory return aims not only to end a migration project but also to 
define a series of social relations between the migrant and the host so-
ciety. Furthermore, the enforcement of return relies on collaborations—
not always explicit—between employers, business associations, recruit-
ment agents, and private security companies. Thus, return entails socially 
complicated and institutionally embedded processes. Preemptive arrange-
ments for compulsory return affect migrants’ living and working condi-
tions and place them in tight social encapsulation throughout their em-
ployment contracts.
At the frontline of enforcing compulsory return are employers. In all 
three countries, although bilateral governmental agreements allow mi-
grants to work up to two or three years consecutively, most employers 
issue one- year (renewable) contracts in order to be able to terminate the 
contract quickly when deemed necessary. Most contracts stipulate that 
workers face deportation if they participate in strike action—in Singa-
pore this is defined as a situation where “two or more persons stop work-
ing without employer’s agreement.” In Japan, a workers’ “promise letter,” 
drawn up by an Osaka garment factory association (the Japanese govern-
ment requires companies to hire foreign workers through their associa-
tions, and associations are designated as the “primary sponsors”), explains 
the trainees’ agreement to meet the costs of their own return if they:
 1. participate in assembly, strike, and collective complaining in any 
circumstance;
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 2. work for other organizations or people, regardless of whether the 
work is paid or unpaid;
 3. terminate the contract unilaterally or leave the company;
 4. repeatedly sleep in a different room other than [that] designated 
without permission;
 5. report [internal disputes] to any Japanese organization or 
individual, or entrust other parties to handle the disputes.7
But employment contracts are not seen as powerful enough to guaran-
tee compulsory return, and this often necessitates the physical removal 
of bodies. In Japan this task is taken up by the primary sponsors—the 
respective employers’ associations. Tano Takashi is the full- time chief ex-
ecutive of an association of scaffolding companies in Kobe. The first thing 
he said to me, when he arrived for dinner at a Chinese restaurant in Osaka 
at my invitation for an interview, was that the job was “life shortening.” 
His wife, through whom I secured the interview, said that she wanted him 
to meet me because she thought it would be good for his health to have 
someone with whom to talk these things through. Sending trainees back 
home before their contracts expired was an important part of his work. 
Tano emphasized that he had to move very fast to “put the worker in the 
airplane before he or she woke up from the shock.” One particularly diffi-
cult battle—Tano used exactly the same word as Tanimura—arose when 
the association decided to send more than thirty workers, hired by dif-
ferent member companies, back to China before the termination of their 
contracts after five or six workers had absconded. The association was con-
cerned that more would follow suit and immediately mobilized more than 
sixty men who formed different teams that stormed into the workers’ dor-
mitories across Osaka at 6 a.m. sharp. Most workers were shocked, some 
fought back strongly, but nevertheless they were dragged into cars and sent 
off to the airport. In such difficult circumstances, Tano said, he and his fel-
low members must rely on their “will and determination” to win the battle.
In Singapore, since the 1980s, the recurrent need for the physical re-
moval, and sometimes the tracking down, of workers after their work per-
mits are canceled has given rise to a new business: repatriation services. 
There were probably six such companies in Singapore that specialized in 
repatriating migrant workers in 2007,8 all small, staffed with “tough guys,” 
and registered as transport companies to circumvent the complex regu-
lations that applied to operating private security companies. The price 
for secure repatriation is fairly standardized. In 2007 companies charged 
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usd 300 for the capture of an absconded worker when information on the 
worker’s whereabouts was available, and usd 350–700 when there was no 
information. Companies house workers for usd 100–150 each per night 
and escort them to the airport for usd 300 each. When being housed prior 
to repatriation, workers are not allowed to step out of the door or get near 
to the windows because once their permits have been canceled, they have 
nothing to lose and can be particularly “unruly,” as a deputy manager of 
one of the largest repatriation companies put it. Such companies also pro-
vide “offshore solutions”—to escort workers all the way home—for which 
prices are negotiated on a case- by- case basis.
The most important actors in enforcing compulsory return and indeed 
in regulating, if not policing, the entire migration process are recruitment 
agents, particularly those based in China, who operate transnationally. 
Employers in all three receiving countries are required to recruit Chi-
nese workers through a number of designated nationally based recruit-
ment agencies, which in the case of Japan and South Korea only deal 
with designated sending companies in China. All three receiving coun-
tries also blacklist designated sending companies if a certain number of 
their workers abscond or overstay. Under government pressure to keep 
migrant workers in line, recruitment agents in the receiving countries also 
outsource the cost of this responsibility. For each worker overstaying, an 
Osaka- based enterprises’ association, for example, imposes a compensa-
tion of usd 50,000 on its designated counterpart in China. For the same 
purpose, recruitment agents in Singapore require a security bond of sgd 
5,000 (usd 4,000) per worker from their counterparts in China, refund-
able only after the worker’s timely return to China.
Bearing the onus of such punitive costs, agents in China habitually em-
ploy all manner of safeguards in their recruitment selections. For example, 
agents conduct detailed interviews with would- be migrants and reject any-
one who has relatives or friends overseas, or who betrays some knowl-
edge of the destination country, or any other reason that suggests that they 
could be emboldened to step out of the cage of legality. Most agents ban 
related candidates (for example brothers) from going to Japan together. 
Golden Stage Ltd., a recruitment agent in rural Hebei province in north 
China, pays village heads nearly usd 100 for detailed information on each 
candidate they recruit. In one instance, a woman chosen for a job in Japan 
was immediately dumped after the village head reported that she was in the 
throes of a divorce. Jin Wan, the general manager of Golden Stage, declared 
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with some satisfaction: “The woman may be mentally and psychologically 
unstable when divorcing, and may create problems overseas!”
Since the early 1990s, sending agents have exacted sureties from mi-
grants—about usd 3,500 for going to Japan and usd 5,000 for South Korea 
in 2006—for their timely return and guarantee of not having violated any 
state law or rules in the workplace. Migrants’ own property certificates are 
often surrendered as an additional surety. But even these measures are not 
regarded as sufficient deterrents and, beginning in the late 1990s, it became 
compulsory for would- be migrants to name one or two civil servants as 
guarantors who would be held financially accountable to the agent for any 
wrongdoings overseas. Civil servants are usually the most influential fig-
ures in extended family or friend circles, and pressure from them is more 
powerful than the threat of financial loss in ensuring compliant behavior. 
Some agents also require migrants to take a vow never to break laws and 
Figure 4.1. Two Chinese migrants in Singapore waiting to be repatriated the next 
day. After having paid more than usd 5,000 to recruitment agents and having been 
in Singapore for only two months, they were both dismissed by their employers due 
to a dispute over salary. Their forced return hence entailed a huge financial loss for 
them. (Courtesy of the author [2007])
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contracts: this ritual of xuanshi in China is almost exclusively associated 
with joining the Communist Party or its youth league, where one faces 
the hammer and sickle flag, right fist raised, and loudly recites the vow of 
readiness to sacrifice everything for the liberation of the world proletariat.
Apart from predeparture preventive measures, agents in China are also 
proactive in repatriating migrants. The manager of a state- owned recruit-
ment company in Shenyang in northeast China told me: “We need to make 
preemptive strikes [xianfa zhiren]. If we observe that someone may create 
problems, we will bring the worker back to China before the contract runs 
out.” Thus, Tanimura’s collaborator in China, a state- owned labor recruit-
ment company, had dispatched staff all the way to Kobe to escort workers 
home in 2005 and 2007 after the Japanese government had tightened regu-
lations for foreign trainees. The Chinese company, like Tanimura, was wor-
ried that the Japanese human cage might not be effective enough in pre-
venting workers from escaping at the airport.
Of course the system of compulsory return serves the agents’ commer-
cial interest: “How can we make money if they all stay on overseas and for-
eign companies don’t need new people?” asked a manager of a large labor 
sending company in China. Recruiters whom I interviewed in China often 
justified compulsory return by citing the principle of reciprocity. As one 
informant put it, “you qu you hui, zai qu bunan” (you go and you come 
back, more people can go), a modification of the proverbial wisdom that 
is held up as a universal moral principle, “you jie you huan, zai jie bunan” 
(you borrow and you repay, you can borrow again).
Refusal to Return!
Following the groundbreaking work by E. P. Thompson (1971, 1975, 76–136) 
and James Scott (1976, 1985, 1990), and informed by Michel Foucault, re-
cent research on power and resistance has moved away from antagonistic 
binary frameworks to focus on how economic exploitation and political 
oppressions necessarily take place in a social milieu imbued with customs, 
symbols, and traditions. The processes of mediation often open new spaces 
for everyday actions of resistance, negotiation, and appropriation, par-
ticularly for the traditionally disadvantaged. For similar reasons, Sherry 
Ortner (1995) criticizes the “ethnographic refusal” in studies on resistance 
to recognize complex political and cultural dynamics in the resisters’ own 
world. Yet international rupture and transnational policing create a special 
subject by reducing migrants to almost empty lives with minimal social 
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networks and resources of their own world. The power and policing over 
the purchase of their labor is indeed crude, and the control over their lives 
is nearly total.
Are there possible strategies to avoid forced return? Among the mi-
nority who managed to fight back, three strategies of resistance can be 
discerned: to cry out, to clash, and to run away. To cry out entails seek-
ing support from civil society or taking employers or agents to court. For 
example, in 2002 a group of Chinese workers in Chiba, Japan, brought 
their employer to court immediately before their return to demand com-
pensation for salary deductions, and also because their sending company 
in China had failed to refund the security bonds of trainees who had re-
turned on schedule. This group of workers intentionally set out to attract 
international attention and hedge against further losses upon their return 
to China (Zha 2002, 146). They were crying out transnationally. But such 
actions are rare because most migrant workers have limited access to the 
larger society beyond their workplaces.
The clash strategy is when workers use their bodies as weapons to con-
front or overcome the coercion of forced return. This was the experience 
of Tan Mei, a twenty- five- year- old woman from Shandong, east China, 
who worked in Japan between 2002 and 2004. After a year of working she 
discovered that her employer had been deducting a sum from her salary 
and transferring it monthly to the sending agent in China in violation 
of government rules. When questioned about this, her employer called 
the Chinese company and, on the spot, it was decided that Tan should be 
fired and deported. Two days later, the director of the employers’ associa-
tion led two men to Tan’s dormitory room to take her away. Tan ran to the 
workshop and clung to a machine, but, after a struggle in which she was 
injured, she was eventually carted off to Kansai International Airport. At 
the airport Tan cried out for help in a female toilet—the only safe space 
she could find—and a flight attendant called the airport police. The police 
told Tan that she had to return to China since she had no legal grounds to 
stay on in Japan because the employer had fired her and escorted her to 
the immigration checkpoint. Tan refused to go through the channel, the 
flight took off and the police returned her to the employers’ association 
team but, screaming, Tan made a run for it and the three men finally gave 
up and abandoned her in the airport. Illegal but now free, Tan contacted 
a local Chinese newspaper and, subsequently, an ngo and a trade union. 
She was finally reimbursed the deducted wages owed to her and returned 
to China voluntarily.9
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Tan’s strategy of clash is reminiscent of that of the suicide bomber ana-
lyzed by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2004, 54); the strategy rep-
resents the “ontological limit” to the new hi- tech biopower aimed at a 
death- free state of permanent war. While states attempt to minimize (and 
legitimize) casualties in military operations, suicide bombers blow them-
selves up to call into question the very legitimation of violence itself. Simi-
larly, in the case of international labor migration, states attempt to con-
trol temporary migrants through complicated rules and regulations rather 
than mete out physical punishments (now seen as ineffective and back-
ward), while migrants turn their bodies into weapons of resistance against 
officials, employers, and, most importantly, the logic governing the current 
temporary labor regime. Peter Lee, the manager of a repatriation company 
in Singapore, told me that they would not repatriate pregnant women, but 
instead charged usd 400 per night, four times the average, to house female 
workers because women were considered too “troublesome and danger-
ous.” When I asked what he meant by dangerous, his company staffers 
playing mahjong in the office piped up: “Women are insidious [yinxian], 
and “they can hurt themselves and then finger you for injuring them.” In 
general, female migrant workers are more likely than men to succeed in 
refusing return, simply because the female body is regarded as more vul-
nerable and thus can be used more effectively to destabilize the so- called 
civilized mode of governance.
The most common strategy in refusing return is to run away—to go 
underground. Running away and escaping is obviously different from the 
strategy of exit or voting with your feet within a sanctioned system. Albert 
Hirschman’s (1970) analysis of exit was concerned with how lapses in the 
market economy can be corrected at the right time so that the system as 
a whole sustains itself, but the migrants’ strategy of running away aims 
to escape from and disrupt the dominant system itself as the tight con-
trols render changes from within unworkable. Absconding workers man-
age to survive underground because, being illegal and therefore freed from 
tight social encapsulation, they are able to develop social networks and re-
sources. In Japan, for example, there are numerous labor agents in indus-
trial cities (such as Hamamatsu and Toyota City) that find jobs for both 
legal and illegal migrants. The working conditions can be highly exploit-
ative, but the workers are free to change jobs. In Singapore, despite the 
small size of the city- state and the very tight government control, ille-
gal migrants still manage to carve out spaces of survival. Huang Ji, origi-
nally a trader from China and now a permanent resident, knows a few 
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migrant workers from Fujian province who have overstayed but get by (in 
the majority- Chinese Singapore) “because they have been around for so 
long, people see them as local.” But refusing to return leads to the eventual 
difficulty of voluntary return (as an illegal) and is not a solution in itself. 
Huang Ji said,
The problem is that they can’t go home. Not to mention that the Sin-
gapore authorities will punish them [when apprehended at the air-
port], they have no face to go home. People at home are doing better 
than you. This is an awkward situation of Chinese migrants. If you 
are doing well and your country stays behind, it is okay; but what if 
your country is improving so fast and you stay behind and are ille-
gal? You can’t go home.10
Discussion
Government- initiated and - enforced return is not a new method of man-
aging flows of temporary labor migrants. The guest- workers program cru-
cial for postwar European reconstruction, particularly in Germany and 
France, was predicated on the idea that the workers would eventually re-
turn, which European governments enforced during the economic reces-
sion in the early 1970s (King 1986, 3). France introduced the aide- au- retour 
program, which offered cash to foreign workers who planned to return 
(Lawless 1986, 218; Rogers 1997, 152). W. R. Bohning (1979) estimates that 1.5 
million migrant workers returned home from Western Europe in the mid- 
1970s. Forty years later, Spain and Japan offered similar incentive packages 
during the 2008 economic crisis (for the Japanese case, see Sasaki, this 
volume). Nor is it new in academic literature to use return migration as 
a lens to examine international labor relations. Bohning (1979, especially 
404), for example, points out that return migration served as a mechanism 
whereby rich and powerful countries shifted burdens in economic down-
turn to the poor states. Samir Amin (1974) argues that in the absence of 
structural change, return migration perpetuates rather than ameliorates 
the economic dependence on work migration in sending places. Moreover, 
Claude Meillassoux’s seminal work (1981) confirms that return transfers 
the costs of social reproduction, such as everyday caregiving for the young, 
old, and infirm, to peripheralized migrant places of origin. In Meillassoux’s 
model, return serves as a critical link in the international articulation of 
the capitalist mode of production in the core (Europe) and in the precapi-
98 Xiang biao
talist mode of reproduction at the periphery (Africa), thus enabling capi-
tal accumulation based on international exploitation. Such articulation of 
modes of (re)production is partially responsible for the partition of life 
and the selective subjectification of migrants as discussed in the introduc-
tion (Xiang, this volume).
While all these insights remain highly relevant, contemporary condi-
tions differ from historical precedents in various respects and require a 
more nuanced theorization. First, in the current regime of labor migration 
in East Asia, compulsory return is no longer a reactive, post hoc solution, 
but is a primary concern that overshadows entire migration programs. 
Compulsory return is not only about how a migration project ends; it also 
determines how the migration journey starts. Second, compulsory return 
aims not only at maximizing capital accumulation but also at ensuring 
social control and the disciplining of individual migrant bodies. It is thus 
necessary for regulations to penetrate the fabric of everyday migrant life. 
This in turn uncovers a third characteristic, namely the societalization of 
compulsory return programs. That is, states either directly delegate au-
thority to, or indirectly work with, a wide range of institutions in enforc-
ing return. Multiple actors are closely involved in forming a system of 
transnational surveillance that exceeds the capacity of state agencies. These 
conditions, which I captured with the notion “transnational encapsula-
tion,” suggest that we are facing a somewhat different and much more 
complicated institutional infrastructure governing labor mobility in East 
Asia. The main issue is not whether temporary migrants workers should 
or should not return (very few migrants regard it as their entitlement to 
stay indefinitely in the receiving country); what is more important is how 
compulsory return is enmeshed with other arrangements, including re-
cruitment, contract agreement, wage payments, and living conditions, and 
how forced return is used as a threat to impose unacceptable controls and 
varying degrees of exploitation.
Notes
 1. Interview with Tanimura Shinji in his Kobe factory, Japan, April 3, 2006. Inter-
viewed in Japanese and English, translated by Mika Toyota. All the names of the mi-
grants, employers, and recruiters in the chapter are pseudonyms.
 2. In cases of turnkey projects whereby Chinese companies hire workers in China 
and dispatch them overseas, especially to countries in Africa, the Caribbean, and 
Southeast Asia, to carry out the projects, the workers have to return once the projects 
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are completed. But since project- tied migrations take place collectively and the 
workers are directly hired by Chinese companies, return is much easier to enforce.
 3. South Korea changed its trainee system in 2003 and then again in 2007; in Japan 
there have been debates about whether the system should be reformed since 2008. But 
they have not significantly changed the recruitment practices in China.
 4. In order to encourage employers to act swiftly in cases where a migrant worker 
absconds, the Singapore government refunds the employer half of the security bond 
if the employer provides proof that reasonable efforts have been made to locate the 
worker, such as a missing persons report from the police.
 5. See various reports by Cong Zhongxiao in Guanxi huawen shibao (Kansai Chi-
nese Times) from May to August 2004 (for instance, Cong 2004). This event attracted 
so much attention that Sina.com, the largest portal in China as well as in the world, 
created a special website dedicated to this “peeping incident.” See http://news.sina 
.com.cn/temp/z/watchgirl/index.shtml (accessed May 19, 2012).
 6. Interview with Hayazaki Naomi, May 30, 2007, Osaka. Hayazaki, as the represen-
tative of the ngo Rights of Immigrants Network in Kansai (rinK) in Osaka, was the 
central resource person supporting the workers. Interviewed in Japanese and English, 
translated by Mika Toyota.
 7. I obtained the Chinese version of the agreement from Rights of Immigrants Net-
work in Kansai (rinK), an Osaka- based ngo. The document was signed by workers 
but not by the employers’ associations or individual employers. It is unclear whether 
such agreements existed in Japanese.
 8. Interview with a founding manager of one of the oldest repatriation companies in 
Singapore that specializes in migrant workers, August 18, 2007, Singapore. Interview 
with Mr. Jolovan Wham, August 12, 2007, Singapore. Wham is an ngo activist for mi-
grant workers’ rights in Singapore.
 9. Interview with Sakai Kysosuke, May 28, 2007, Osaka, in English. Sakai, an officer 
at Rengo Osaka, a trade union that provides special support for migrant workers, over-
saw the case of Tan Mei throughout and documented the development meticulously.
 10. This phenomenon seems more common in large cities in countries with more 
liberal immigration policies such as New York and London. My brief fieldwork in 
Chinatowns in the two cities suggests that migrants with professional backgrounds 
may feel more constrained by the dilemma of return.
ChApter FIve
Cambodians Go “Home”
Forced Returns and Redisplacement  
Thirty Years after the American War in Indochina
sylvia r. CoWan
Between June 2002 and late 2011, more than 310 permanent residents in 
the United States with Cambodian citizenship were repatriated to Cambo-
dia after having served prison sentences, for mostly minor offenses (U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security 2011).1 The majority of these return-
ees were male, were under forty, and had left Cambodia as young chil-
dren with their families in the mid- 1970s or the early 1980s (first with the 
evacuation of U.S. troops from Indochina immediately after the fall of 
both the U.S.- backed Cambodian and South Vietnamese regimes, and later 
after the overthrow of the Khmer Rouge).2 After spending years in refugee 
camps in Thailand and sometimes also in the Philippines, the returnees 
were resettled in the United States, mostly in low- income inner- city neigh-
borhoods dominated by other marginalized minorities, where a number 
of them became involved in street gangs.
The deportation of such “undesirable” noncitizens has been explicitly 
justified by the United States as being in the interests of public safety and 
homeland security, and implicitly rationalized by the notion of a natural 
return to the deportees’ homeland. But, for most of these former refugees, 
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Cambodia is at best a vague childhood memory; in fact, for one in seven 
of those born in refugee camps and repatriated before 2007, Cambodia was 
a completely imaginary place where they had never before set foot (Stokes 
2007, 57). The forced returns, then, certainly do not put people back “in 
place” but instead engender their redisplacement. While these expulsions 
provide U.S. politicians a seemingly quick fix to inner- city problems—
even though they are complex, entrenched, and even trace to previous U.S. 
foreign policies—for the returnees the expulsions mean permanent sepa-
ration from families, including their own young children. For the Cam-
bodians, this repeats the cycle of traumatic family separations and break-
downs that many had already once suffered under Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge 
regime. This practice of deportation continues, as a large number of Cam-
bodians in the United States remain queued up on the “deportable” list 
after serving prison sentences (Stokes 2007, 57).3
The stories of forced returnees expose deeply rooted paradoxes in 
America’s self- professed claim to provide refuge to persons fleeing violent 
and oppressive conditions. Historically, American society has been inured 
to fear internal, sometimes invisible, enemies: paranoia about commu-
nism, and, currently, anxieties about so- called terrorism. These ideological 
specters and the interests they serve not only have justified America’s right 
to resort to aggressive external interventions but also have simultaneously 
shaped U.S. immigration policies, particularly those pertaining to exclu-
sions and deportation.
The paradox is clear: a global reach in policing has invited or material-
ized those same threats to American interests and has left behind an un-
raveling trail of political and economic fragility. Militarized intervention 
in Vietnam was in part sustained by a deep fear about a worldwide spread 
of communism. The intervention also involved illegal bombardments of 
eastern Cambodia, which directly resulted in large- scale internal and ex-
ternal displacements of Cambodian populations (along with Vietnamese 
and Lao). Economic challenges resulted from years of war. The ongoing 
deportations of some of those who arrived as refugees (another external 
solution of sorts) are again supported by America’s unresolved fear of its 
internal “aliens.” This interplay of fear and violent external interventions 
has defining implications for homeland security and contemporary global 
(dis)order. Deportation, in this case, serves as a means to redefine the 
relationship between displaced individuals and the nation- states of both 
America and Cambodia.
The issue of forced returns of former Cambodian child refugees has 
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engaged me since 2000, when I began to research the Cambodian com-
munity that settled in Lowell, Massachusetts (my current home), which 
has the second- largest concentration of Cambodians in the United States 
(see Pho, Gerson, and Cowan 2008).4 This chapter uses various documen-
tary media sources and the results of my interviews and observations. It 
includes interviews obtained during my visits to Cambodia in 2006 and 
2008.5 This material provides a collective story of Cambodians who were 
involuntarily displaced from their birthplaces during successive phases of 
the American war in Southeast Asia and the ensuing civil wars, relocated 
as refugees in the United States, and have been forced to return. It is thus 
a history of multiple displacements.
In telling their collective story, I begin by framing their experiences 
historically in the context of how deportation—the forced removal of 
Others—has played a key (although often invisible) role in the making 
of the American homeland. Continuing from this larger context, I trace 
their multiple displacements, with the initial displacement ensuing from 
U.S. military actions across Indochina. The aftermath resulted in their dis-
placements to refugee camps and then refugee settlement in the United 
States. This process of multiple displacements does not end with sudden 
expulsion back to Cambodia, but, as the final section describes, the process 
continues as those who were returned are once again socially displaced, or 
they inhabit spaces of exclusion from mainstream Cambodian society. I 
conclude by revisiting the multiple displacements through these people’s 
life histories, and the likelihood of such collective experiences being re-
peated through the global reach of American policies and politics.
Systemic Exclusions and Summary  
Deportations in “the Nation of Immigrants”
The recent deportations of Cambodians, like the deportations of other 
legal nationals residing in the United States, were triggered more than a de-
cade ago by changes in laws and the attacks on September 11, 2001. Just one 
month after September 11, amid elevated fear about so- called outsiders, the 
U.S. Patriot Act signed into law provisions for enhanced powers of officials 
to detain and deport immigrants perceived as threats to national security 
(section 411).6 In March 2002, the U.S government and the Cambodian 
government signed a repatriation agreement for Cambodia to accept back 
Cambodian citizens who had served their sentences for crimes committed 
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in the United States (Deeherd 2003).7 The agreement allowed for the de-
portation of no more than ten people per month, and the United States 
provided usd 100 toward processing each deportee in Cambodia but no 
funding for their resettlement (Paddock 2003).
These deportations were part of a pattern of U.S. government actions 
that emphasized regulatory and legal systems as a central means of main-
taining social order. We can observe a history of expulsion that had been 
progressively strengthened since the beginning of the last century. The 
numbers of the deported in the first half of the 1990s averaged 41,007 an-
nually, which jumped to 135,510 between 1996 and 1999, before escalating 
to a 280,960 average in the years from 2000 to 2011 (U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security 2011, 102).
Deportation therefore has a long history in the United States, in direct 
contrast with the nationally stated ideals of America as a haven of free-
dom that has always been welcoming to those who resemble mainstream 
citizens. These ideals are written in the U.S. Constitution, engraved on the 
Statue of Liberty, and taught to American schoolchildren. David Haines 
(2010) questions the idea of America as a “safe haven” and notes the coun-
try’s practice over time of both providing and refusing refuge. Some events 
in U.S. history illustrate this pattern. Indigenous communities that origi-
nally lived in the territory that has become the United States were deci-
mated. The country’s economy in its early years relied on the oppression of 
trafficked slaves from Africa. These are examples of aggressive and racial-
ized policies of discrimination and fear that entered into the U.S. history of 
inclusions and exclusions and deportation. Recent changes in immigration 
legislation, such as those targeting racially profiled “terrorists” and “aliens,” 
are similarly embedded in U.S. foreign policy and nationalistic attitudes 
(Kanstroom 2007).
From the country’s earliest formation, the ideal of America as an asy-
lum adhered to the notion that the new nation must exclude those “whose 
moral or social characteristics would introduce in America the decadence 
and corruption of Europe” (Marilyn Baseler, quoted in Kanstroom 2007, 
30). Even while opening the country to refugees to be morally just, the 
question of how self- reliant the new entrants would be, as well as how they 
would fit in, has been a major concern. The idea of expulsion has been in-
tegral to this need to distinguish “them” from “us.” In the 1790s, when the 
immigrant American society was fairly open to those who were similar to 
dominant power groups, the criteria for exclusion or expulsion were based 
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on religion, ideology, economic conditions, health, and morality (Kanst-
room 2007, 30–33). The Alien Act of 1798 empowered the president to de-
port all noncitizens deemed “dangerous.” Carl Bon Tempo (2008, 75) notes 
the “feverish efforts to reassure Americans” in the 1950s that Hungarian 
refugees were “like them” and would be “good Americans.” The present- 
day system for deportation took shape in the early twentieth century, with 
the centralization of immigration controls and the passing of various de-
portation laws (Kanstroom 2007, 161).
Three underlying concerns can be discerned in the extension of de-
portation programs since the late nineteenth century. First is the concern 
about race, for which the 1891 Immigration Act systematized a function of 
separating desirable and undesirable immigrants “by physical and moral 
qualities” (Kanstroom 2007, 115). Race was paramount in the treatment of 
Chinese migrants in the late 1800s; race was “perhaps the critical factor in 
the development of the modern deportation system” (Kanstroom 2007, 
98). Racial exclusion became a central part of twentieth- century immigra-
tion, naturalization, and deportation law, and was increasingly manifest in 
the deportation of Others.
Second, during the First World War, as political loyalty to the state be-
came a major concern, and especially in the wake of Russia’s Bolshevik 
Revolution, U.S. deportations extended to political dissidents and labor 
organizers (Kanstroom 2007, 139). In the Cold War paranoia about com-
munism, politicized fear had an even more pronounced influence on im-
migration and deportation policies. McCarran’s Internal Security Act of 
1950 required members of the U.S. Communist Party to be officially regis-
tered and authorized; the retroactive deportation ousted Communists or 
members of other groups considered to be dangerous to public safety; and, 
in 1952, the McCarran- Walter Act outlined politically based criteria for de-
portation and laid the groundwork for contemporary immigration law.8 
These strengthened exclusion laws maintained the quota systems of the 
1920s that were based on national origin and eliminated statutes of limita-
tion. More pertinent, these laws permitted deportation without hearings 
or judicial review.
Third, deportation had also been driven by concerns about employment 
opportunities. For example, the active recruitment of Mexicans as farm 
laborers (known as braceros under this program) between 1917 and 1921 
gave currency to the trope that foreigners would steal too many jobs and 
resulted in over 92,000 Mexicans being deported during the period 1921–
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29.9 As Daniel Kanstroom (2007, 224) notes, “The remarkably symmetri-
cal relationship between labor recruitment and the deportation system is 
illustrated by the fact that, up to 1964, the number of braceros, nearly 5 mil-
lion, was almost exactly the same as the number of deportees.” This sym-
biosis between employers and state interests and the expulsions of labor 
migrants bear remarkable resemblance to the pattern of labor flows in 
the contemporary world (see Lindquist, this volume; Xiang, this volume).
Since the passing of the 1980 Refugee Act, the situation has become 
more complicated. On one hand, there is the extension of civil rights and 
granting of political asylum to tens of thousands of otherwise deport-
able noncitizens (Kanstroom 2007, 226). Under the 1986 Immigration Re-
form and Control Act, some three million undocumented migrants were 
granted amnesty. On the other hand, deportation laws have become more 
rigid and harsher. Events such as the bombings of the World Trade Center 
in New York in February 1993 and the Murrah Federal Building in Okla-
homa City in April 1995 have heightened and reinforced the reality of ter-
rorism at home (R. Martin 1999). Immigration controls were tightened 
and deportations were accelerated.
In 1996 two laws—the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act—
introduced major changes to U.S. immigration policy. Deportation was 
made mandatory for all permanent residents who were sentenced to at 
least a year (or whose infraction could have resulted in a one- year sen-
tence, even if it was not applied) for “aggravated felonies,” “moral turpi-
tude,” or use of controlled substances (U.S. Senate 1996). Deportations 
of noncitizens were expedited and became increasingly frequent, because 
more minor criminal offenses resulted in automatic deportation (e.g., be-
ginning in 1998, driving while intoxicated). Furthermore, these legisla-
tions eliminated a judge’s discretion to consider relief from deportation 
on a case- by- case basis for permanent residents. In the twenty years prior, 
judges had been able to consider factors such as the individual’s prison ex-
perience, attitude, behavior, family support, rehabilitation, ties to family, 
and length of time as a resident in the United States (Hing 2005, 268). Sig-
nificantly, in addition to immigrants not having the right to legal counsel 
in immigration courts (since these are civil rather than criminal charges), 
deportation laws were considered to have extraconstitutional status. Thus, 
many rights and protections afforded by the U.S. Constitution were ren-
dered inapplicable to those deemed deportable (Kanstroom 2007, 228, 
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229). In short, noncitizens convicted of deportable offenses became vul-
nerable to retroactively applied deportation, and their convictions led to 
their permanent exile from the United States (Gania 2006).
Multiple Displacements: From Refugee  
to “Product of the American System”
In June 2002, the first group of Cambodian deportees from the United 
States arrived in Phnom Penh International Airport, handcuffed and 
shackled. There they were held in the Cambodian detention center for fif-
teen days before being allowed to leave, and only after a relative or friend 
(mostly people whom they had never met) vouched for them. Those with 
no identifiable family sponsor were taken in by the Returnee Assistance 
Program (rap). rap was a privately funded and individual initiative 
founded purposely, only days before the Cambodian returnees’ arrival, to 
respond to the situation. The founder, Bill Herod, was a longtime Ameri-
can resident of Phnom Penh (Stokes 2007, 57).
How did these returnees come to be uprooted in the first place? Cam-
bodia, as well as Vietnam and Laos, was turned into a bloody battle-
ground in the 1960s and 1970s when the United States attempted to quell 
the communist- inspired nationalist movements that had risen up against 
French colonial rule in Southeast Asia. Contrasting ideologies material-
ized in combat zones in what the United States called “the Vietnam War” 
and in what was known in Indochina as “the American War.” In Cambodia 
the United States supported an anticommunist military coup (Chandler 
1993), which ousted the royalist Sihanouk regime. In an effort to postpone 
the victory of the communist nationalists, the United States dropped more 
than one thousand tons of bombs over Cambodia in 1973 (Chandler 1993, 
207). While estimates of war dead vary, around 1.7 million people are said 
to have been killed between 1965 and 1973, and many more people were 
displaced (White 2005).10 Throughout the region numerous internally 
displaced refugees were created by these bombardments and indiscrimi-
nate use of defoliants (Hein 1995). The U.S. efforts to help those displaced 
were hardly sufficient and were sometimes misguided. Back in the United 
States, many citizens protested the government’s handling of the war.
The bombing and material support by the United States in installing, 
then propping up, illegitimate regimes did not stop the eventual overthrow 
of these regimes by nationalist communist forces. In fact, it is generally ac-
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knowledged that U.S. actions in Cambodia helped prepare the ground for 
the mobilizations of the Beijing- backed Khmer Rouge headed by Pol Pot 
(Chandler 1993), who ruled under the name Democratic Kampuchea from 
April 1975 to early 1979. Having inherited a desperate food crisis after years 
of war, the Khmer Rouge sought to establish a “pure” society that favored 
the rural poor—denoted as “the people” in socialist rhetoric—by liter-
ally eradicating educated and urban elite and turning the whole country 
into an agricultural work camp (Hing 2005). Under this regime, men and 
women were housed separately and families were broken up. More than 
1.5 million people were killed or died of starvation, propelling those who 
dared, or were able, to escape. When the regime was overthrown by Viet-
namese troops in January 1979, multitudes fled across mountains that were 
heavily mined, crossing into Thailand where they remained vulnerable to 
Vietnamese attack under ambivalent Thai protection and eventually spent 
from one to nine years in sanctioned refugee camps along the border in 
Thailand or in the Philippines (Smith- Hefner 1998).
More than 145,000 of these Cambodian refugees were resettled in the 
United States between 1975 and 1999 (Hing 2005),11 comprising a signifi-
cant proportion of the approximately 206,000 people of Cambodian de-
scent accounted for in the 2000 U.S. Census.12 Many were farmers and 
were from rural areas.13 They were mostly relocated to urban settings 
where they competed for scarce resources with other minority or disen-
franchised groups (Ly 2010).
The largest communities of Cambodian refugees are located in Long 
Beach, California, and in Lowell, Massachusetts.14 These cities share some 
attributes: both are ethnically diverse, have median family incomes at or 
below the national average, and have a younger population than the na-
tional average; a number of these youths have also become involved in 
disreputable street- gang activities.15 Long Beach is home to at least ten en-
trenched Asian street gangs and is located in Los Angeles County, which 
has a long association with gang violence in the United States.16 These 
inner- city spaces of exclusion and crime became home to many of the vic-
tims of America’s international military interventions in Indochina and 
what followed.
For most refugee families from Cambodia, the harrowing journey across 
mined terrain to find domicile in a new country was only the beginning 
of a difficult transition. Many went from a predominantly agrarian way 
of life to a world of tough inner- city locales. For some parents and elders, 
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already marked by the traumas of surviving the brutalities of the Khmer 
Rouge and the anxiety of years in limbo in refugee camps, the responsi-
bility of raising and supporting a family in the midst of totally unfamiliar 
urban environments (with different language, customs, and employment 
skill sets) was overwhelming and literally drove many elders into deep de-
pression and chronic illness (Lee, Lei, and Sue 2001; Nou 2008; Sack, Him, 
and Dickason 1999). Others who had been farmers in Cambodia aspired 
for white- collar jobs in government agencies and to become a member of 
the middle class (Smith- Hefner 2010). Yet on arrival in the United States, 
many Cambodians were too busy “just trying to stay alive” to think of the 
future, or grieve the past (Jonathan Lee 2010, 349). Furthermore, parents 
and elders were often bewildered by the particular American youth culture 
they encountered (Mallozzi 2004). Generation gaps often divided parents 
and children (Ly 2010). Traditional structures of support, such as Bud-
dhist temples and monks, were displaced in the everyday lives of refugees 
in America. Even though “Khmer are all Buddhist” and that was a familiar 
identity, the wat’s role in community life had become compartmentalized 
or marginalized among the demands of survival, work, and fast- paced life 
in the United States (Smith- Hefner 1998, 32).17
Taunted and ridiculed at school, these children struggled, often alone, 
to figure out their places among the diverse groups of the American inner- 
city underclass. Young Cambodian child refugees soon discovered that 
they were the newest kids at the bottom of the pile in crowded, down-
wardly mobile urban neighborhoods. Many parents had to work two 
or three minimum- wage jobs to support the family, leaving them hard 
pressed for time to supervise or counsel their children. George Ellis, an 
American psychologist who managed the Returnee Integration Support 
Program (risp) in Phnom Penh, succinctly summed up the returnees’ pre-
dicament as largely deriving from the failure to help refugee parents adjust 
to life in the United States some decades ago:
These were peasants from rural areas. . . . The Khmer Rouge killed 
the urban elite and the educated class. They were undereducated, 
even by Cambodian standards. They distrusted government. They’d 
been traumatized by the Khmer Rouge. They’d spent years in refugee 
camps with a whole different set of problems. Suddenly they’re in 
the United States. Most ended up in tough, poor, racially- conflicted 
neighborhoods, surrounded by whites, Blacks and Hispanics. They 
didn’t speak English. There was no Buddhist infrastructure. In Cam-
Cambodians Go “Home” 109
bodia, if there’s a problem, you can go to the monks. They had no 
monks, no leaders. (Carlson 2007)
Therefore, it was no surprise that some refugee children joined street 
gangs, which, Ellis said, at least “let them belong to something.”
Aihwa Ong describes Cambodian gangs in inner cities in the United 
States as mostly modeled after the Cambodian family, nonviolent, and a 
way for young males to seek camaraderie on the streets, get some cash, and 
thus acquire self- respect—the “most obvious way to explore what it takes 
to become an American male” (2003, 237). Billy,18 a returnee who grew up 
in Long Beach, told me: “Man, our parents were traumatized, didn’t know 
what was happening with us kids. I was a good boy at home—washed the 
dishes, cleaned up—so they didn’t know anything about gangs. We just 
got into gangs to protect ourselves. We were just kids, thrown in the inner 
city with Mexicans and blacks. We’re the product of the American system” 
(personal communication, August 2008).
Like Billy, Karney described himself as a “good boy,” who had helped 
distribute water and food in the refugee camps, always fair and kind. In 
the United States, he tried to obey his strict uncle, who assumed the role 
of his father, but, never feeling he could measure up, Karney sought com-
fort elsewhere:
I started going to school . . . and was getting harassed by every-
body. The Hispanics. The blacks and the whites. Then I had my bike 
taken. My silver necklace taken. I started meeting other Asian males 
around there so we started going in groups. Not just alone. That 
way we’d feel more protected. Which worked. So that . . . you know, 
slowly but surely, it turned into more serious stuff. We started retali-
ating. We started fighting in school. And by the time I was fourteen 
. . . seventh grade . . . you know . . . I started not going to school. 
Then I started having problems failing. I went to different schools 
and after school and stuff. So that’s how things got started. [It] got 
worse. (personal communication, August 2008)
The group solidarity of gangs often led youths such as Karney to commit 
punishable offenses. Convictions were for a wide spectrum of offenses, 
from urinating on the grass (in Houston this was interpreted as a sex crime 
similar to exhibitionism) to drug trafficking, robbery, or money laundering 
(Ehrlich 2003; Stokes 2007, 57), as well as more major offenses like robbery, 
rape, manslaughter, and murder.19 All of the returnees whom I spoke to 
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were involved in gang activity in their neighborhoods, which eventually 
led to their convictions. All had anticipated returning to their families after 
serving their jail sentences and had little notion of what awaited them.
 “No, Man. You’re Going Home Home.”
When Karney completed his prison sentence, he was picked up by the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (ins) officials,20 taken to a deten-
tion center, and held there for twelve months before he was transported to 
Cambodia in 2003. A clean- cut young man with deeply gazing eyes, Kar-
ney was in his mid- thirties and rebuilding his life in Cambodia when we 
met. He had been displaced from Cambodia when he was ten, in 1979, and 
had spent two years in various Thai border refugee camps; eventually he 
was settled in the United States as a permanent resident. After twenty- two 
years he was forcibly uprooted and had to leave behind his three kids. It 
came as a shock for him: “I had a card as a permanent resident. I thought 
it meant ‘permanent’!” His daughter asked him on the telephone, “When 
are you coming home, Daddy? You said you were coming home when you 
got out of prison.”
Billy felt luckier than most other returnees because at least he had a few 
weeks’ notice:
Lots of guys, you know, just get a knock on the door, and that’s it. 
You got no chance to close your banking account, you got no chance 
of saying goodbye to friends, family, nobody. . . . You’re gone. . . . I 
was laying on the couch, and the phone rang, and nobody was home. 
And I went to go pick up the phone, like, and my lawyer called and 
said, “I got bad news for you. . . . You know, your final order for 
deportation has come in.” . . . I was like, “What does that mean?” 
and he said, “Well, you’re going to be deported.” I said, “Well, in 
what time?” and he said, “Well, we don’t know that yet, but we will 
keep in contact with you.” . . . I got twenty days. (personal communi-
cation, August 2008)
With or without time to mentally prepare, the whole process of disloca-
tion after receiving the deportation order is very disorienting. Deportees 
are picked up from various locations in the United States, flown from one 
location to another, and detained until their numbers are deemed suffi-
cient to repatriate them to Cambodia on the same flight. During this time 
their families do not know where they are, and even find it difficult to 
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connect with them via the authorities.21 Sareth, a returnee who had served 
twelve years in prison, described how he had been moved several times 
from one immigration facility to another for a whole year before being told 
he was being sent to Cambodia:
I knew something was wrong, ’cause the ins officer, he [usually] sees 
me and comes to talk to me. [That day] when he sees me, he starts 
moving away, like, don’t want to talk to me. . . . And they call me to 
come down the stairs, so I went downstairs, he was like, “Hey, you’re 
going home, right?” I said, “Hey, which home?” He said, “Which 
home you want it to be?” I said, “My home back in [U.S. city] with 
my family.” He said, “No, man. You’re going home home.” . . . That 
night they put me in a cell. He said, “You’re on the move.” So, eight 
o’clock in the morning, I was taken by the ins people. Put on a 
plane to New Jersey. . . . Then I went to Louisiana. I don’t remem-
ber the name. So, stayed there for part of the day. Then they flew 
me to Texas. Yeah, went to Texas. Then they flew us back to Chi-
cago. Pick up some more people. And went back to San Francisco 
and San Diego. There for almost a month, I think. And then to Ari-
zona. Flew out of Arizona. To here [Cambodia]. (personal commu-
nication, August 2008)
The most difficult part of the whole deportation process is the sudden, 
forced breakup of a family. Karney talked about how difficult it was: “It’s 
the worst when [returnees] had a wife and kids in the States, and can’t 
ever go back there. That’s a punishment too harsh. They served their time. 
Didn’t kill anybody. It’s too hard to keep them from their families. It’s hard 
on them, hard on their families. The kids end up growing up with no dad. 
And they can’t support them” (personal communication, February 2006). 
Another Cambodian returnee, when he learned he was to be deported, 
had his two- month- old daughter’s name tattooed on his arm so it would 
be there forever. Just like life under the Khmer Rouge, once again children 
are taken from their parents, and parents separated from their children, 
except that this time it is happening in America. Other deportees suffer the 
same pains and have similar profiles.22 They are being deported to some of 
the poorest countries that are still recovering from the damage of violent 
civil wars stoked by U.S. “counterinsurgency interventions,” such as El Sal-
vador, where the twelve- year civil war (1980–92) drove more than a million 
refugees into Southern California. Others are deported to Haiti. These too 
are predominantly young males, poorly educated and often with a history 
Figure 5.1. “KK” (gang- style initials for “Crazy Crip”), the thirty- one- year- old 
deportee from Long Beach, California, speaks Khmer but cannot read or write the 
language. He set up the Tiny Toones break- dancing troupe for local children in 
Phnom Penh. The house of the Tiny Toones also serves as a drop- in center for  
at- risk youths, where English lessons are offered. (© 2008 Stuart Isett)
Figure 5.2. This twenty- seven- year- old deportee from Memphis is unemployed 
and sleeps most nights in a park by the Independence Monument in Phnom Penh. 
(© 2006 Stuart Isett)
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of gang activities, who are returned as outcasts to homelands they left in 
early childhood (Montaigne 1999, 45).
 “I Can’t Just Be a Normal Cambodian”
For forced returnees, going “home” to Cambodia is ironically rendered as 
banishment. Few returnees feel as if they have “cultural citizenship” or a 
connection with society in Cambodia (Ommundsen, Leach, and Vanden-
berg 2010). Those who have some memory of Cambodia often have a 
frozen sense of what being “Cambodian” and Cambodian culture should 
be (Poethig 2006). Compared to their unfamiliarity with Cambodia, the 
wariness that Cambodian society has toward them is more troublesome. 
Boomer, a returnee in 2003 and cofounder of Straight Refugeez, a hip- hop 
enterprise, expressed this dilemma clearly: “I could never be adjusted to 
Cambodia. Adapted, yes, I’m adapting pretty fast, but adjusted, no. The so-
ciety won’t let me adjust. I can’t just be a normal Cambodian. They always 
want to look at me as Cambodian- American. . . . When they see us, they 
always have to add that word into it” (quoted in Melamed, July 30, 2005). 
Differences in food preferences, language problems, the swaggering walk 
and appearance—baggy pants, tattoos, and basketball shoes typical of 
inner- city streets in the United States—immediately signal “foreigner” in 
Phnom Penh. Those who do not want to stand out wear long- sleeved shirts, 
even in the hot weather, to cover their tattoos and adopt more conformist 
dressing in public and for work. Again, Boomer echoed how most of my 
interviewees felt:
I can’t stay away from the returnees; I need to be in that commu-
nity. I need to be in the same culture as somebody. . . . I miss the cul-
ture. I miss the lifestyle. I miss hanging out. I miss giving the proper 
handshake. I miss the culture. . . . On work days you just want to 
think about work—once I’m over here [workplace], I’m on another 
level. Once I’m over there [with the other returnees] I’m back in the 
States. (Quoted in Melamed, July 30, 2005)
What further compounds the situation for returnees is that Cambodia 
itself has been struggling to recover from past traumas and to seek its own 
identity. The 1993 Constitutional Convention identified as a future task the 
determination of who the “People of Cambodia” really are (Poethig, 2006, 
74). The ruling Kanakpak Pracheachun Kâmpuchéa (Cambodian People’s 
Party, Cpp), led by Hun Sen, extolled “cultural purity” based on stationary 
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Khmerness—referring to those who had stayed put and not fled Cambo-
dia (Poethig 2006, 75)—as key to the rebuilding of the nation. This line 
of thinking seemed crafted to undermine the credibility of the opposition 
FunCinpeC party,23 which comprised many who had fled Cambodia as 
refugees but have returned with dual citizenships. These returnees, labeled 
anikachun (a term originally used to refer to resident aliens and now to 
foreign domiciled Cambodians who are dominant in business and poli-
tics) or anikachun chochun (a derogatory term), were portrayed as having 
“betrayed their patriotism” and were considered inassimilable (Poethig 
2006, 75). This popular debate had heightened general public conscious-
ness of who is “true” Khmer and who is not and clouded perceptions of 
the first group of forced returnees arriving in 2001; this group was labeled 
as American criminals who had no place in the local society.
Furthermore, the anticipation of the steadily increasing number of 
deportees from the United States prompted the head of the Cambodian 
League for the Promotion and Defense of Human Rights (liCadho), a 
large national- level ngo, to worry about them “planting the seeds for long- 
term social disruption.” She said, “We already have a lot of problems. If we 
have thousands and thousands of these young Cambodians come back, it’s 
going to be a burden to our society . . . [if they begin] training the young 
to become like them and join gangs” (quoted in Hyland 2007, 3). Such 
concerns in Cambodia were not backed up by any evidence of gang ac-
tivities, even six years after the first group of deportees landed. A similar 
situation, where deportees are presumed to be criminals and bring shame 
to relatives who shelter them temporarily, has been observed among the 
five thousand Haitians deported from the United States from 1996 to 2009 
(Bracken 2009).
The difficulties that the returnees face are also exacerbated by the lack 
of any officially supported system of assistance put in place by the U.S. 
and Cambodian governments.24 Nor has the moral responsibility of the 
U.S. government to provide reparations been broached. Socially displaced 
again at “home,” many Cambodian returnees are trapped in a vicious 
cycle: the little assistance and support they receive make them vulnerable 
to drugs, alcohol, and fights, which in turn alienate them further from the 
local community. A few have ended up in prison, and one committed sui-
cide. Bill Herod and George Ellis estimated that a third of the returnees 
were employed and living independently, and another third seemed settled 
in but were financially dependent on families in the United States, while 
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the rest faced difficulties with drugs, alcohol abuse, fights, depression, and 
anger (Melamed 2005; Stokes 2007, 58).
But there are also positive stories of resilience and reintegration into 
society in a foreign country. Some returnees have found work in the tourist 
industry and the nonprofit sector using their English, web- design, or other 
Internet- related skills. Karney, for instance, remarried and had found new 
meaning in life by helping others:
I even help people that are the same as I was. I give ’em food, a place 
to stay in my house. As long as they don’t mess up. Although I’m 
struggling myself, . . . it’s time for me to give back and sometimes 
even though I get tired and wonder, “Why am I doing this?” I’m 
helping a few people myself with a lot of things. I have to do it. It’s a 
way of giving back to what I’ve taken from society. (personal com-
munication, August 2008)
Another returnee who goes by the name of KK founded Cambodia’s first 
break- dance troupe in an inner- city community where drug and alcohol 
abuse was prevalent among the youths. KK founded Tiny Toones as a way 
of sharing his love for break dancing, which he learned on the streets of 
Long Beach as a member of a street gang. Now he wants to contribute to 
society by influencing Cambodian youths to avoid drug abuse (see Mydans 
2008). When I spoke with KK in 2008, after his dance troupe had just re-
turned from performing as invited guests at the International aids Con-
ference in Mexico City, he told me that Tiny Toones had expanded through 
small centers across Cambodia to involve approximately two thousand 
youngsters. They teach not only break dancing but also Khmer, English, 
and computer literacy (personal communication, August 2008).
Another group of returnees work for Korsang, a small nonprofit or-
ganization dedicated to fighting hiv and drug- related problems among 
the street population in Phnom Penh. They are committed to promoting 
harm- reduction efforts, risk education, and health- related services, as well 
as to serve each person with the “highest level of dignity, compassion, and 
respect”—what they themselves yearned for as boys on the streets of U.S. 
cities.25 In some ways those helped by this nonprofit organization became 
family for many of the newer returnees: they share a similar status of mar-




This chapter has outlined the multiple displacements in the lives of forcibly 
repatriated Cambodian residents in the United States. These multiple dis-
placements are interrelated. The forced return of these former refugees to 
Cambodia relates historically to the displacements caused by U.S. military 
interventions in postcolonial civil strife in Indochina, these Cambodians’ 
consequent displacement within the American host society, and social dis-
placement and rifts faced after they are deported to Cambodia. The his-
tory of how one form of displacement led to another to a great extent re-
flects the changing global order of the latter half of the twentieth century. 
There is a discernible shift in U.S. governmental strategy: military actions 
are largely regarded as undesirable, and overtly racist riots such as those 
targeting Chinese immigrants in the nineteenth century are unacceptable. 
Instead, regulatory and legal systems have become preferred modes for 
maintaining social order. The violent displacement induced by the wars 
in Indochina was indiscriminate; by comparison the displacement by de-
portation is selective, targeted, conducted according to legal procedures, 
and becoming a routine practice. While wars and revolutions seek to over-
throw sovereignties, deportation is a measure that is readily available to 
U.S. authorities within the current political order. It relies on and seeks to 
enhance sovereign power.
Transnational agreements, such as that between the United States and 
Cambodia, have been critical to facilitating deportation. A Memorandum 
of Understanding between the governments of the United States and Viet-
nam (January 22, 2008) enables the forced repatriation of Vietnamese per-
manent residents who entered the United States after July 12, 1995, if they 
violate any U.S. laws.26 As this chapter demonstrates, the legal terms of the 
relations between individuals and nation- states can involve, and some-
times necessitate, disruptions and displacement. Although the Cambodian 
returnees (and also Vietnamese returnees) lived most of their lives in the 
United States and came to know nowhere else as home, the United States 
refuses to recognize their political citizenship; yet, in Cambodia, despite 
their status as full citizens, these Cambodian returnees have been effec-
tively deprived of cultural citizenship. Selective partial subjectifications 
by different sovereignties place the returnees in a very awkward position.
Still, the shift from military intervention to legal regulation is not irre-
versible. Underlying both modes of rule and the consequent displacements 
is an American paradox that results in external interventions or solutions 
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driven by domestic fear. The year 2003 may turn out to have been another 
turning point in U.S. immigration history. In that year the ins was split, 
and jurisdiction over immigration was transferred from the Department 
of Justice to the Department of Homeland Security, signaling intensified 
fears about aliens within U.S. borders.27 In the same period, the United 
States invaded Iraq, which then president George W. Bush explicitly re-
lated to the fear of terrorism post–September 11: “Since America put out 
the fires of September the 11th, and mourned our dead, and went to war, 
history has taken a different turn. We have carried the fight to the enemy. 
We are rolling back the terrorist threat to civilization, not on the fringes 
of its influence, but at the heart of its power.”28 This Iraq war and con-
tinued U.S. military presence have already generated more than two mil-
lion international refugees (Refugees International 2007), 64,174 of whom 
had entered the United States as of March 31, 2012.29 Many of these are 
children, living in families faced with poverty and many other difficulties 
(Jonsson and Chick 2009). Are these children potential deportees? Is this 
cycle repeating itself? Without attention to the ramifications of current 
policies and practices regarding interventions and subsequent resettle-
ments, and the revision of these, alas, the potential is all too high for simi-
lar scenarios to be repeated.
Notes
 1. Deportations have continued to escalate. In October 2011 the U.S. government re-
ported that it had deported a record number (just under 400,000) of undocumented 
immigrants for the third year in a row, of whom 188,000, or 48 percent, were convicted 
of crimes (Simanski and Sapp 2012, 1). This report does not acknowledge the num-
ber who were “permanent residents” and not illegal. In the ten years between April 
1997 and August 2007 the U.S. deported 87,884 Legal Permanent Residents for crimi-
nal convictions (average rate of 8,700 per year) (International Human Rights Clinic 
et al. 2010, 4). The number deported to Cambodia and classified as criminal removals 
reached 316 between 2002 and 2011, with a three- times increase between 2010 and 
2011, from 25 to 74 (U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2012, 106–112).
 2. The term returnees was how my informants referred to themselves, and it is widely 
used by the media, government officials, and ngo activists alike—rather than the stig-
matizing term deportees.
 3. See the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, “Removal Statistics,” http://
www.ice.gov/removal- statistics/ (accessed December 30, 2012). Statistics for previous 
years found at http://www.dhs.gov/yearbook- immigration- statistics.
 4. Although accurate numbers are difficult to obtain, according to the 2010 U.S. 
Census, 28,424 individuals in Massachusetts and 102,317 in California identified them-
selves as Cambodians (SEARAC 2011, 5).
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 5. Over this period, I interviewed thirty returnees, twenty- nine men and one 
woman. In addition to, sometimes multiple, interviews (averaging ninety minutes 
with a minimum of one hour and a maximum of five hours each), I also did participant 
observation in workplaces, organizations, and other social settings. My interviews and 
observations are supplemented by extensive documentary studies and media reports 
that situate personal experiences and emotions in the larger historical and structural 
context. The interviews were conducted in English, as the interviewees were fluent in 
English and for most it was their dominant language. They were conducted in Phnom 
Penh, Siem Reap, and Battambang.
 6. The usa paTrioT Act, named in full, refers to the Uniting and Strengthening 
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terror-
ism Act, signed by President George W. Bush on October 26, 2001.
 7. The Cambodian government, now called a democracy under a constitutional 
monarchy, is controlled by the longtime prime minister Hun Sen and his Cambodian 
People’s Party, who have oversight over all institutions and exert power over those who 
challenge their authority. Opposition parties have been made ineffective through con-
testable elections and government tactics, and while the monarchy still exists, it has 
little influence (Picken 2011).
 8. U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, “The Immigration and Na-
tionality Act of 1952 (The McCarran- Walter Act),” see http://history.state.gov/mile 
stones/1945–1952/ImmigrationAct (accessed December 30, 2012).
 9. The crash of a plane in January 1948 that was carrying deported Mexicans, who 
lost their lives, brought public attention to deportation practices and civil and humane 
omissions. The folk singer Woody Guthrie’s song “Deportees” remains a poignant 
reminder today of the human cost of deportation. Lyrics available at http://www 
.woodyguthrie.org/Lyrics/Plane_Wreck_At_Los_Gatos.htm, accessed February 14, 
2013.
 10. See “Death Tolls for the Major Wars and Atrocities of the Twentieth Century.” 
Available online at http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/warstat2.htm, accessed Febru-
ary 14, 2013.
 11. An estimated 1,250,000 Southeast Asian refugees entered the United States be-
tween 1975 and 1994, the country’s largest refugee group since the Second World War. 
See http://www.answers.com/topic/southeast- asian- american, accessed February 14, 
2013. Of the over two million estimated Cambodians, Vietnamese, and Lao refugees 
from the war, many others went to France. Other countries that accepted refugees in 
smaller numbers from this war included Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, New 
Zealand, Italy, and the Netherlands.
 12. In the 2010 U.S. Census, Cambodians were grouped in the Asian category, along 
with any of the people whose origin was in the Far East, Southeast Asia (except Viet-
nam), or India. In the period between 2000 and 2010, the Asian population grew faster 
than any other major designated racial group; it increased by 43 percent.
 13. Carol Mortland (2010) describes four waves of immigrants: the first (approxi-
mately 6,000 between 1975 and 1977) was mostly made up of the educated and middle 
class, with connections to American businesses; the second (approximately 10,000 in 
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1979) was primarily rural farmers; the third and largest (approximately 122,228 be-
tween 1980 and 1986 alone [according to Niedzwiecki and Duong 2004, quoted in 
Mortland 2010, 77]) was also mostly rural people with limited educational resources 
and urban occupational skills; and the fourth (9,579 between 1987 and 1993 [accord-
ing to Niedzwiecki and Duong 2004, quoted in Mortland 2010, 77]) was made up of 
mostly family members rejoining earlier refugees.
 14. searaC (Southeast Asian Resource Action Center). See “sea Statistics,” 2010, 
http://www.searac.org/content/publications- and- materials, accessed February 14, 
2013, pdF, and Cambodia Town, http://portfoliolab.org/portal/DesktopDefault.aspx 
?pId=1635&TabId=1718&HtmlId=7952&MenuId=5367.
 15. Based on the 2010 U.S. Census, the population of Long Beach (462,257) was 46.1 
percent white, 40.8 percent Hispanic, 13.5 percent black, 12.9 percent Asian (some in-
dicated more than one race). The median age was 32.7 (younger than the U.S. median). 
Median household income was usd 52,945. Somewhat less diverse, the population of 
Lowell (106,519) was made up of 60.3 percent white, 20.2 percent Asian, 17.3 percent 
Latino, 6.8 percent black (some indicated more than one race). The median age (32.6) 
was younger than the U.S. median. Median household income level was usd 51,471. 
See American Fact Finder: U.S. Census 2010: Cities, at http://factfinder2.census.gov 
/faces/nav/jsf/pages/community_facts.xhtml (accessed February 14, 2013).
 16. “Asian Gangs in Los Angeles County,” Streetgangs.com, http://www.streetgangs 
.com/asian/ (accessed December 31, 2012).
 17. There had already been shifts in the role of Buddhism during wartime in Cam-
bodia, and the Khmer Rouge attempted to supplant Buddhist beliefs with its political 
ideology (Smith- Hefner 1998). Efforts to establish temples in the United States were 
also fraught with disputes and struggles for power (Gerson 2008).
 18. This is a pseudonym. All informant names have been changed to protect their 
identities.
 19. Deportees from the United States to many other countries have similar profiles 
to those of the Cambodians. They are predominantly young, male, poorly educated, 
and often have a history of gang activities. Deportation is said to have exported the 
gang culture to countries such as Haiti, where gangs were previously not at all part of 
the social life (Bracken 2009). Across Central America and the Caribbean, criminal 
deportees numbered more than 56,000 in 1998. This created dire problems for many 
countries that were just beginning to recover from years of political violence (Mon-
taigne 1999, 45). In a report from September 2, 2009, the mayor of Juarez, Mexico, Jose 
Reyes Ferriz, pointed to the return of criminal deportees as a source of great harm, 
because they added “a deadly ingredient to an already volatile state of security.” Citing 
gang drug activity, Juarez noted that “in the past 45 days, 10 percent of those killed in 
Juarez had been deported from the United States in the past two years.” He acknowl-
edged, however, that there were no statistics noting how many of these had criminal 
records in the United States (Cnn World 2009).
 20. This U.S. agency was reorganized into the Department of Homeland Security 
and the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (iCe) became the agency with over-
sight.
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 21. iCe now has posted on its website a “detainee locator” form for family mem-
bers to fill out to locate a relative. See U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
at https://locator.ice.gov/odls/homePage.do (accessed February 14, 2013). U.S. Public 
Broadcasting System, Frontline, film Lost in Detention, provides an insider’s view of 
detention centers in the United States in 2011. See http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages 
/frontline/lost- in- detention/ (accessed February 14, 2013).
 22. According to the study of Jacqueline Hagan, Karl Eschbach, and Nestor Rodri-
guez (2008), one- third of the Salvadoran deportees had lived in the United States for 
more than ten years, and one- third had spouses and children, while Haitian deportees 
had lived in the United States for twenty years or more (Bracken 2009).
 23. The acronym FunCinpeC is from the French phrase “Front Uni National pour 
un Cambodge Indépendant, Neutre, Pacifique, et Coopératif ” (National United Front 
for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia).
 24. Bill Herod’s Returnee Assistance Program, founded with small donations to 
provide transitional housing, assistance with job searches, and psychological support 
services, evolved into risp. Set up with U.S. Agency of International Development 
(usaid) funding, risp employed returnees to show newer arrivals the ropes. But in 
August 2008, just three years later, I learned that its usaid funding had not been re-
newed. In Haiti, similarly, returnees were seemingly abandoned without support or 
funding for resettlement, except briefly when the International Organization for Mi-
gration program assisted deportees arriving between April 2007 and August 2008 
(Bracken 2009). By comparison, El Salvador has the program Bienvenido a Casa (Wel-
come Home), which is supported by the International Organization for Migration and 
Catholic Relief Services, to help Salvadorans deported from the United States (some 
10,684 from 1999 to 2004) (Hagan, Eschbach, and Rodriguez 2008, 68). Apart from 
helping find jobs and reintegrate, the program also provides resettlement funds, re-
ferrals to social service agencies, and counseling services to assist with trauma and 
stress. Most of the Salvadorans have been deported for immigration violations, using 
fraudulent documents, or petty crimes (Hagan, Eschbach, and Rodriquez 2008, 66; 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2006).
 25. Korsang was founded in 2004. See http://www.korsangkhmer.org (accessed Feb-
ruary 14, 2013).
 26. After ten years of negotiations, Vietnam and the United States reached agree-
ment on the deportation of Vietnamese citizens, and it was signed by United States 
Homeland Security Assistant Secretary for Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
Julie L. Myers and Deputy Foreign Minister for the Government of Vietnam Mr. Dao 
Viet Trung. See the New York Times, January 23, 2008, at http://www.nytimes.com 
/2008/01/23/us/23immig.html?_r=0 (accessed February 14, 2013).
 27. iCe was established in 2003, after the Homeland Security Act of 2002. Prior to 
this, other agencies performed many of the functions of iCe: U.S. Customs Service 
(Treasury), Immigration and Naturalization Service (Justice), and Federal Protective 
Service. iCe describes its functions as follows: “U.S. Immigration and Customs En-
forcement (iCe) is the largest investigative arm of the Department of Homeland Secu-
rity (dhs), responsible for enforcing the nation’s immigration and customs laws that 
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protect national security and public safety. With more than 20,000 employees world-
wide, iCe is a key component of dhs’s layered approach to protecting the nation” (see 
the “Leadership Offices” page on the iCe website, http://www.ice.gov/about/offices 
/leadership/ [accessed February 14, 2013]).
 28. George W. Bush, text of speech on Iraq, September 7, 2003. Available online at 
http://www.commondreams.org/headlines03/0907–10.htm (accessed September 27, 
2009).
 29. See Iraqi Refugee Processing Fact Sheet, U.S. Immigration and Customs Ser-
vices, at http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9bb95919f35e66f6141765
43f6d1a/?vgnextchannel=68439c7755cb9010VgnVCM10000045f3d6a1RCRD&vgnext
oid=df4c47c9de5ba110VgnVCM1000004718190aRCRD (accessed February 14, 2013).
ChApter sIx
Rescue, Return, in Place
Deportees, “Victims,” and the Regulation of Indonesian Migration
johan lindquisT
Three significant changes in the current infrastructure of migration be-
tween Malaysia and Indonesia, in particular, and in Southeast Asia, more 
generally, provide a useful starting point for this chapter. First, there has 
been an enactment of a series of formal and informal agreements between 
national governments aimed at enforcing documented migration at the 
expense of undocumented migration (Hugo 2009, 42). In this context, 
I am especially concerned with the emergence of a bilateral deportation 
regime from Malaysia to Indonesia. Second, there has been a proliferation 
of countertrafficking programs that are mainly concerned with the forced 
entry of women and children into prostitution. Third, a growing num-
ber of actors—most notably nongovernmental organizations (ngos) and 
journalists—have become engaged in recording and publicizing human 
rights violations, particularly through moving images, thus transforming 
human trafficking, migrant deportations, and related forms of abuse into 
media spectacles.
These developments should be considered together as measures aimed 
at both regulating and protecting migrants. This perspective shifts atten-
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tion away from a primary focus on migrant experience, which predomi-
nates recent anthropological literature on migration, to one on emerging 
infrastructures that regulate migrant mobility. While there is much work 
that helps us understand why unskilled migrants leave home, as well as 
what abuses and problems they face upon arrival, we know much less 
about the particular channels that facilitate and constrain migrant mobility 
between departure and destination (Lindquist 2010a). More specifically, 
the production of these channels should be considered not only in relation 
to the political economy but also with regard to the humanitarian interven-
tions that have a growing impact on transnational migrant mobility. In this 
context, the conceptualization of the “migration industry” must be broad-
ened to include not only the actors and institutions that move migrants but 
also mass media and ngos that are engaged in interventions that respond 
to abuses against, or aim to protect, migrants (Hernandez- Leon 2005; see 
also Rudnyckyj 2004).
Following the theme of this book, my discussion is focused on the ques-
tion of “return,” or more specifically “returning home,” which stands out as 
a critical component in the changes outlined above, namely bilateral agree-
ments, countertrafficking programs, and media reporting in the context 
of the migration industry. The transnational circulation of migrants on bi-
laterally regulated temporary contracts is premised on the return home of 
the migrant, programs focused on the struggle against human trafficking 
aim to “reintegrate” victims through return, while documentary films and 
other forms of media reporting frequently conceptualize the return home 
as a necessary response or an adequate solution to violations against mi-
grants. As such, the return home of the migrant is facilitated by or enforced 
through various forms of interventions. More generally, return remains 
taken for granted and unproblematic in all these contexts—particularly in 
relation to “home”—and this comes to have important effects on the regu-
lation of transnational migration. In this process, home becomes an empty 
signifier that is implicitly understood as either a safe haven for the migrant 
or the place where he or she belongs, according to state administrative defi-
nitions.1 The return home of the migrant can come to be embraced through 
various forms of interventions. From this perspective, states, ngos, and 
mass media that support return should not be understood in opposition 
to one another, but rather as together shaping an emerging transnational 
regime of circular migration (Vertovec 2007).
The notion of return is of course not alien to migrants. The external 
interventions that impose or facilitate return may either be in conjunction 
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or in conflict with migrants’ own perceptions of return. Since the 1970s both 
domestic and international migration have increased steadily throughout 
Southeast Asia and Indonesia (Hugo 2004, 35–37). In Indonesia, migra-
tion should be understood through the cultural logic of merantau, which 
means “to go out into the world before returning home again.” In other 
words, return is implicated in the very meaning of migration. While his-
torically associated with particular ethnic groups such as the Minangkabau 
of West Sumatra, and often understood as a process of transformation or 
a rite of passage in which the boy leaves the village and returns as a man, 
merantau, in its contemporary form, has become nationalized, increas-
ingly feminized, and closely intertwined with capitalist development. The 
return home of the migrant—in any sustainable sense—becomes possible 
primarily through economic success, which in turn creates independence 
from the insecurities of temporary wage labor that characterizes everyday 
life across Indonesia. However, for many migrants who face failure, malu, 
meaning shame or embarrassment, keeps them on the move, suggesting an 
unresolved moral tension in relation to return home as an unproblematic 
response to migrant abuse abroad (Lindquist 2009). In other words, the 
cultural idiom merantau not only stresses the successful completion of the 
migration project, often in economic terms, but is also based on a circular 
movement that by no means implies emplacement.
Since the colonial era, Malaysia has been a key destination for meran-
tau, a process that has intensified during the last two decades, as Indonesia 
has become one of the main sending countries for unskilled migrant labor 
in Asia. Malaysia is one of the largest receiving countries, having been 
transformed into a “tiger economy” with an expanding middle class and a 
growing demand for migrant labor on palm- oil plantations, on construc-
tion sites, and as domestic servants. As many as two million Indonesians, 
many of them undocumented, labor in Peninsular Malaysia and Sarawak, 
mostly on a circulatory basis (Hernández- Coss et al. 2008, 19). Since the 
1997 Asian economic crisis there has been a move from undocumented to 
documented migration, as Indonesia and Malaysia, as well as other gov-
ernments throughout Asia and the Middle East, have become increasingly 
concerned with regulating migrant mobility (Silvey 2004). This introduces 
new forms of return that are organized, facilitated, enforced, monitored, 
and evaluated by various parties according to purposively designed pro-
cedures.
In the introduction to this book, Xiang Biao argues that throughout 
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Asia, return has come to function as a form of migrant emplacement that 
reinforces particular forms of sovereign power (see also Malkki 1995a). 
This concern with return in the context of the regulation of transnational 
migration in Asia is, Xiang claims, a response to several decades of in-
tensifying globalization and regional integration. More specifically, return 
is associated with state attempts to reestablish sovereignty in the face of 
increasing flows of undocumented migrants—or in some cases anxieties 
with such flows. This is notable in Malaysia, where unease with Indonesian 
undocumented migration in the context of crime and unemployment is 
evident in public discourse and political practice, particularly since the 
1997 crisis (Chin 2008).
While the relationship between state sovereignty and return appears 
obvious in regimes of government- organized migrant deportation, this is 
less evident in countertrafficking programs and in media reports of mi-
grant abuses, which both take a universalist human rights discourse as 
their point of reference and thus appear to be located beyond the politi-
cal. But deportation, countertrafficking, and media reporting have increas-
ingly come to intersect precisely in the shared concern with migrant re-
turn. A focus on return thus allows us to conceptualize a particular kind 
of relationship between state sovereignty and universalist human rights 
concerns, and to further consider how they generate common effects in the 
context of the control and protection of unskilled migrant labor through a 
shared mode of intervention. Nevertheless, it is also important to reiterate 
that in practice return remains contested and should not strictly be under-
stood in terms of emplacement. In fact, the logic of merantau and the gov-
ernance of migrant mobility can come into conflict, because the demands 
of success keep migrants on the move.
In order to more carefully consider these effects, I compare three dif-
ferent overlapping phenomena, each corresponding to the three major 
developments. Specifically, these refer to an Indonesian government pro-
gram that handles deportees from Malaysia; an award- winning Australian 
documentary film, Inside the Child Sex Trade, in which two Indonesian 
teenagers are rescued from a brothel and returned home; and a project 
on the repatriation of trafficking victims run by the Indonesian office of 
the International Organization for Migration in collaboration with local 
ngos. Through these different case studies I highlight how different forms 
of interventions—both in the name of state sovereignty and of human 
rights—become components of and reinforce a new order of mobility.
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Organizing Deportation
Prior to 2002, return as an organized form of intervention for transnational 
migrants was rarely an issue in Indonesia. In the 1990s and particularly after 
1997, as Indonesian migration became an increasingly important political 
issue, the Malaysian government created detention camps for migrants and 
initiated a series of ad hoc and chaotic deportation campaigns. The prob-
lem of government staff shortages led to the expansion of a state- sponsored 
civil volunteer corps, the self- styled heroic rela (an acronym for Ikatan 
Relawan Rakyat Malaysia, or Volunteers of the Malaysian People), which 
was offered minimal training and cash rewards by the Malaysian govern-
ment for the detention of undocumented migrants (Chin 2008; Kaur 2006, 
49). This form of regulation—widely criticized by international observers 
as lacking in long- term vision—intensified with the 2002 Malaysian immi-
gration act, which transformed immigration violations by both migrants 
and employers into criminal offenses (Kaur 2006, 48–49).
After a period of amnesty, the Malaysian government initiated mass- 
deportation campaigns in 2002 that sent migrants through a number of 
Indonesian ports, including Batam (Riau Islands Province), Dumai (Riau 
Province), and Nunukan on the eastern coast of Borneo (East Kaliman-
tan Province). The scale of these deportations, which numbered nearly 
400,000 people, caught government authorities in Indonesia off guard. 
The chaos that ensued in Nunukan in particular—with widespread media 
images of deported migrants lacking even basic clothing—led to a major 
public outcry with demands that future deportation processes be handled 
more humanely on both sides of the border (Ford 2006).
Following in the wake of these events, there has been a gradual shift 
toward bilaterally planned deportations. As a result, the process of return 
is now carefully controlled at the multiple transit points and via various 
modes of transportation until the migrants arrive in their home villages, 
with the Indonesian government covering all costs. Every week more than 
five hundred migrants who have been arrested and detained in different 
parts of Peninsular Malaysia depart from Johor and arrive at the port of 
Tanjung Pinang on the island of Bintan in Riau Islands Province.2
These deportees are handled on the Indonesian side of the border by a 
number of government agencies led by the Agency for Social Affairs and 
Labor (Despos for short) which transport the deportees a few kilometers 
from the center of Tanjung Pinang to a holding center that is rented from 
a labor recruitment company that sends migrants to Malaysia. Deportees 
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are detained for up to a week before being sent on to Jakarta and then fur-
ther afield.
The groups of deportees awaiting return in the holding center in Tan-
jung Pinang at any given time share space with migrants who are waiting 
to enter Malaysia legally through the same labor- recruitment agency that 
owns the holding center. “It shouldn’t be like that” (seharusnya tidak be-
gitu), the government official in charge told me when I visited the center 
with a local ngo in 2006, meaning that the two different groups of mi-
grants—one inside and the other outside the law—should not be located 
in the same space. This intersection is far from coincidental since in the 
current transnational labor migration regime, the sustainability of labor 
exports through legal channels relies on the enforcement of deportation. 
It is important to note that for most observers this does not signal a cha-
otic process. In fact, on a visit to the holding center in 2006, the un’s spe-
cial rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, Jorge Bustamante, noted 
that migratory movements in Tanjung Pinang were conducted “in a very 
orderly fashion.”3
From Tanjung Pinang migrants are sent by regular passenger ship to 
Jakarta’s main port, Tanjung Priok, which has historically been an interna-
tional hub for goods and people traveling to and from Malaysia, Singapore, 
and further abroad. Tanjung Priok is an infamous transit site that various 
forms of brokers have used as fertile ground for making money off mi-
grants (see Jones 2000), much like the migrant terminal at the Soekarno- 
Hatta International Airport in Jakarta, which was established precisely to 
protect them (Silvey 2007). With the rise of low- cost air travel, however, 
shipping companies are handling far fewer passengers and local entre-
preneurs at the port are facing hard times. As a result, Tanjung Priok has 
been transformed from a hub for spontaneous outflows to a strategic site 
for organized returns.
While the Indonesian government handles the actual transport, rep-
resentatives from the Indonesian migrant labor union Sarekat Buruh 
Migran Indonesia (sbMi, Indonesian migrant worker union)—many of 
them former migrants themselves—participate as monitors when depor-
tees arrive from Tanjung Pinang. In May 2007, I joined sbMi’s staff as a 
ship with seven hundred deportees and several hundred regular passen-
gers docked at Tanjung Priok. At the port for passenger ships, officials 
from Depsos were waiting to let us in through the gate. It was obvious that 
sbMi and Depsos were on good terms as they chatted and joked with each 
other. I never heard sbMi staff members say anything negative about the 
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work that Depsos was doing and neither noticed nor heard of any conflicts 
between them.
While the regular passengers exited first through the main gate, the de-
portees came last and were directed through a separate entrance by an offi-
cial using a loudspeaker system. Once inside the large waiting room, which 
had been officially inaugurated by Indonesia’s president in August 2006 as 
a “ruang tamu TKi” (Indonesian migrant waiting room),4 the migrants—
most of whom were men—were led to sit in sections that were divided 
according to their respective home provinces. In one of the corners of the 
room there was a small makeshift health clinic, and banners on the wall 
read: “Coordinating Post for the Sending Home [pemulangan] of Migrant 
Workers Deported from Malaysia” and “We Will Facilitate Return to Your 
Area of Origin [daerah asal].” The majority of the migrants were from the 
islands of Java, Lombok, and Sumbawa, with a handful each from Aceh, 
Sulawesi, and the eastern parts of Indonesia. As the names of provinces 
were called one by one, migrants lined up in front of a desk with two offi-
cials, where they were photographed and asked for their addresses, ages, 
places of origin, and where they had been in Malaysia. This took several 
hours. As far as I can understand, the data collected were not used for any 
further purpose than data collection itself, and the fact that the migrants 
were deportees was not held against them.
There were at least half a dozen journalists on site, two groups from 
television and the rest from major newspapers, a typical turnout for the 
weekly event in the ongoing story about the travails of Indonesian mi-
grants abroad. One woman from Indonesian TransTV asked me if I had 
spoken to a migrant, preferably a woman, who had been caned by Malay-
sian authorities and might be willing to be interviewed. There were only 
a handful of women and just two children in the entire group. One of the 
women was obviously mentally ill and wandered around barefoot, sing-
ing and acting out, as a staff member from sbMi told me that she had 
been forced into prostitution and was depresi (depressed). The television 
journalist asked if she could interview her, but members of the sbMi staff, 
who apparently were the migrants’ gatekeeper, refused. Instead, the jour-
nalist made a call to an Indonesian staff member at the Counter Traffick-
ing Unit at the International Organization for Migration (ioM) in Jakarta, 
since she felt that this should be considered a case of trafficking. But after 
some background explanation, the ioM staff said that they could not take 
the woman since it was unclear where she was from and that they would 
not know where to send her back. Although ioM states in its Victims of 
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Trafficking program that victims do not have to return home,5 clearly this 
was the norm. Victims who had nowhere to go—nowhere to be “reinte-
grated”—were a problem for this program.
Once all the deportees had been registered, they were loaded onto buses 
that took them to a public bus station where they waited with officials from 
Depsos to be escorted to their various destinations later that same after-
noon. Those headed to Mataram, the capital of Lombok, were confronted 
with a thirty- six- hour bus ride. The head of the bus station claimed that 
one of the most infamous labor brokers at the Tanjung Priok harbor had 
offered to pay him 100,000 rupiah (about usd 10) per migrant he handed 
over—certainly hoping to broker them back over the border to Malaysia, 
which he apparently had many times before. But the man at the bus sta-
tion had refused. It was, he told me, his duty that all the migrants arrived 
home safely to the provincial government offices.
It is possible to identify an infrastructure in which government officials, 
labor- recruitment agencies, ngo activists, and journalists share a com-
mon concern with the regulation and protection of migrants. Here, regu-
lation and protection are not opposed to one another—as they potentially 
could be—precisely because “return home” is the agreed upon endpoint. 
The work of journalists concerned with abuses abroad and the ngos that 
monitor government officials both reinforce the ethics of return and the 
sovereign power of the Indonesian state. The desires of individual migrants 
become irrelevant in this process as protection and regulation converge in 
the expansion of pastoral forms of power.
The Spectacle of Rescue
At the center of the debate on the regulation of international migration in 
Asia and across the globe is the reported rise in human trafficking, as well 
as the ensuing demand for intervention. In this process, mass media have 
been critical—often in explicit collaboration with ngos—in transform-
ing trafficking into a public issue, while ngos are increasingly using mov-
ing images (Lindquist 2010b).6 In her documentary film from 2005, In-
side the Child Sex Trade (originally made for the Australian current- affairs 
program Dateline), the television journalist Olivia Rousset travels to the 
Indonesian island of Batam—located just a forty- minute ferry ride away 
from Singapore and in close proximity to Tanjung Pinang, along the Indo-
nesian border—to create a documentary film about the island’s prostitu-
tion industry, and particularly the sexual exploitation of children.7 Rous-
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set, a white woman and the film’s narrator, tells us that in Batam’s brothels, 
“Islam’s moral code is non- existent” and that young women there “are 
brought from distant villages and sold into sexual slavery for a few hun-
dred dollars.” She further claims that “of the estimated 15,000 trafficked sex 
workers here [in Batam], nearly half of them are thought to be children.”
In the film we are introduced to Batam through the work of the local 
ngo Prai (an abbreviation of Perlindungan Anak Indonesia, which trans-
lates to “Protection of Indonesian Children”). Ramses, the man who runs 
Prai, leads Rousset to Diana and Lina, two fourteen- or fifteen- year- old 
girls from the island of Madura (located just off the east coast of Java) 
who have become prostitutes in Batam’s largest quasi- legal brothel area. 
Together with staff from Prai, Rousset visits the brothel “undercover” with 
a hidden camera, because they are run by the “local mafia.” She tells us that 
the girls have been brought to the brothel by a trafficker, who sold them 
for usd 400 each.
The central plot of the film is the ensuing attempt to get the two girls 
out of the brothel and return them to their families in their home villages. 
The camera follows the ngo workers as they use another prostitute in the 
brothel as a go- between, since neither Diana nor Lina are interested in 
talking to them. Meanwhile, Ramses is able to contact the girls’ parents 
in Madura and their uncles (or at least one uncle; this is not entirely clear 
in the film) travel to Batam along with two “concerned politicians and a 
social worker.” This, Rousset claims, is the “rescue team,” and “the girls’ 
future depends on the success of their mission.” Together they drive to the 
brothel, but neither Lina nor Diana has been told about the plan.
When the group enters the brothel, the camera moves straight toward 
Lina. She looks shocked and falls silent before beginning to cry hysteri-
cally. Her uncle puts his arm around her and tells her to stop, while the 
camera remains in her face. In the end she does not turn away or resist but 
continues to weep. Meanwhile, in the background there is some negotia-
tion with the brothel owner who claims that the girls were not coerced but 
came of their own free will. “No one is being sold here,” the man says. Lina’s 
uncle follows her to her room where he tells her just to bring what is nec-
essary and to leave everything else behind. She tells him that she does not 
have any money, but he says that it does not matter. The narrator claims 
that the fact that she has no money to show makes her even more ashamed. 
Meanwhile, Diana runs out of the brothel to the back of the building, and 
a local Madurese businessman who has come along to help goes out to 
find her, as the camera follows. Like Lina, she begins to cry hysterically as 
Rescue, Return, in Place 131
the camera stays on her while she packs her bag. As they leave the brothel 
and get into the waiting car, Diana says goodbye to everyone, including the 
brothel owner who, as the narrator phrases it, “imprisoned her.”
After some downtime with Prai, Diana and Lina return by plane to 
Madura together with Ramses and Rousset. In the minivan that takes them 
home along the rural roads, the girls have put on their jilbab (Muslim 
headscarves) and we find out that their real names are Saharta and Su-
tia. They are obviously excited and overjoyed to be back. The camera joins 
them as they arrive in their separate villages, where they are reunited with 
their families. In Diana’s village, her family is clearly moved and happy that 
she is back. In Lina’s village, a half hour further away, the reaction is more 
subdued as her grandmother greets her by telling her to enter the house 
and stop crying. The narrator reveals that Lina’s mother is absent, as she 
has been working in Malaysia during the last decade, while her father is 
ill. As they sit down to talk, Ramses asks her father where he wants to send 
her to school. The father says that he cannot afford schooling and even if he 
could, Lina says that she wants to help harvest the tobacco crop.
In the final scene, Lina is surrounded by friends, all young women wear-
ing jilbab. Prompted by the filmmaker, she offers advice to others who want 
to leave: “Don’t go. I wouldn’t let them go.” But as the narrator points out, 
in a village where it is difficult to survive on farming alone, “there’s little 
choice but to leave.” Rousset then asks if there are children who have trav-
eled abroad, and Lina responds, “Lots, to Malaysia and wherever,” while 
another adds “Saudi” (Arabia). Lina ends by saying, “No one tells them to 
go. No one makes them. I wanted to go. I wanted to help my parents. But I 
didn’t help them, I hurt them instead.” But as she speaks she looks straight 
into the camera, offers a crooked smile, and winks mischievously, adding 
emphasis to her claim that she has a will of her own.
There are multiple perspectives from which to consider this film, from 
the initial identification of the girls to the shocking rescue, and finally to 
their return home. There is also much to be questioned regarding statistical 
claims, the role of Rousset in the making of the film, and the representa-
tion of prostitution in Batam. Instead of addressing these problems, I focus 
on the relationship between rescue and return in the film. In the narrative 
structure of Inside the Child Sex Trade, the rescue is not only the obvious 
climax, but also the point where an ethics of witnessing takes precedence 
over an ethics of consent. This form of witnessing thus creates a particular 
type of “victim” who demands intervention and protection (see Pandolfi 
2008, 173). This becomes most obvious through the spectacle of Lina and 
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Diana’s shock and distress. The rescue had come to overshadow return, 
which initially appeared to have been taken for granted by the filmmaker 
and the ngo as a relatively unproblematic process. The potential compli-
cations associated with return were not even raised until after the girls left 
the brothel, when the question of schooling surfaced. In Diana and Lina’s 
actual return there was a more general lack of closure, if not in the film-
maker’s own recognition that for young people in the village “there’s little 
choice but to leave,” then in Lina’s smile and wink, which ran against the 
grain of the film’s moralizing tone and suggested that she might just decide 
to leave again. Even before Lina’s departure, her mother had been gone for 
almost a decade, her father was clearly ill, and her grandmother did not 
appear to offer much empathy or support. With no money for school and 
irregular and low- paying wages in the fields, marriage or migration ap-
peared to be the only routes forward.8 But in the end the filmmaker was 
not able to offer a significant response to this apparent dilemma, and the 
camera left Diana and Lina behind.
Institutionalizing Return in Victims of Trafficking Programs
While the formation of trafficking as a media spectacle has been critical 
to creating public interest on a global scale, countertrafficking programs 
are another important component of the current migration infrastruc-
ture that I am describing. As one ngo activist involved in monitoring the 
Malaysian deportation program in Tanjung Pinang put it: “Before 2003 I 
didn’t know the meaning of trafficking, but then I saw a brochure from ioM 
and I just knew. Apparently these things didn’t just happen in films.”9 It 
was in this defining moment that she turned her organization’s activities 
away from a concern with children’s rights and toward a focus on traffick-
ing, thus adding to a process of institutionalization that followed from the 
United States Trafficking Victims Protection Act and the United Nations 
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Espe-
cially Women and Children. Adopted in 2000 (Kempadoo 2005, xii–xiv; 
Warren 2007), both of these documents came to legitimize trafficking as a 
problem that demanded intervention, thus generating new transnational 
funding circuits.10
During the last decade the struggle against human trafficking has 
gained a global institutional form through governments, agencies, organi-
zations, journalists, and academics who generate various forms of knowl-
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edge, projects, and modes of intervention. Inside the Child Sex Trade is one 
example of this. Despite being dispersed over an uneven global landscape 
and pursuing radically different political agendas—faith- based right- wing 
Christian organizations in the United States and left- leaning Indonesian 
ngos, to name but two examples—almost all these individuals and orga-
nizations have been able to converge around the figure of the trafficking 
victim. Generally speaking, those concerned with human trafficking focus 
on how migrants are transformed into victims in the migratory process, 
either through explicit coercion or other forms of trickery. In this pro-
cess, overwhelming attention has been paid to the forced trafficking into 
prostitution of young women and children, who have become the iconic 
subjects of modern forms of slavery. The primary response has been a 
widespread call to find and free these individuals. As such, rescue in its 
various forms is at the heart of countertrafficking discourse, with return—
usually “home”—following from the primary intervention (see, e.g., Doe-
zema 2010).
Inside the Child Sex Trade was shot during the same period that ioM 
Indonesia initiated their Victims of Trafficking program in October 
2004—the great majority of whom were women who had been to Malay-
sia, more than half legally as domestic workers—the program has gener-
ally been considered a success, and even a “model for the world” according 
to the director of the U.S. State Department’s countertrafficking program.11 
Although the timing of the film and the ioM program may appear coinci-
dental—much like the intersections of deportation and labor export—
these two events should arguably be understood as part of an emerging 
transnational logic concerning trafficking, and in extension the regulation 
of human mobility.
ngos such as Prai are located at the margins of these circuits, and it 
is here that another critical link between the ioM program and Inside the 
Child Sex Trade emerges; both have depended on direct collaborations 
with ngos that have access to victims. Within the ioM program, victims of 
trafficking were identified and largely supported by more than fifty part-
ner ngos across Indonesia. The program itself explicitly focused on three 
chronological stages: return, recovery, and reintegration. In the first stage, 
typically a local ngo would encounter a potential victim—on rare occa-
sions via a government agency (an embassy abroad or the local police, for 
instance)—and would then contact ioM. A standardized ioM form with 
a series of questions for the migrant would then be filled out and faxed to 
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the head office in Jakarta, where it would be considered by the head of the 
Counter Trafficking Unit.12
If the migrant was cleared as a “victim,” money would be wired to the 
ngo or government agency, which would be used to escort the victim or 
victims to the closest designated recovery center, housed in police hospi-
tals in three major cites: Jakarta, Makassar, and Surabaya. Although this 
process was not supposed to be gendered—and despite the fact that the 
majority of the victims were men—female victims were generally brought 
to the hospitals, in keeping with the logic of countertrafficking. There they 
were medically and psychologically evaluated and tested for sexually trans-
mitted infections before being escorted to ioM partner ngos in their home 
provinces. Once in place, victims were offered support, for schooling if 
underage or to start a small business if they were adults. This could include 
funds for buying cattle or a motorcycle to be used as a taxi, or for opening a 
small shop. On average, there was around five million rupiah, or about usd 
500, available for reintegration per victim, equivalent to one year’s salary 
for an unskilled laborer in many parts of the country. In this process, vic-
tims were monitored by the partner ngos who made evaluation visits to 
schools, places of work, or homes.
ngos in Batam were among the most successful in identifying victims 
of trafficking within the Indonesian ioM program, which had sometimes 
led to intense competition for victims. For instance, when I showed Inside 
the Child Sex Trade to a man from another ngo in Batam (where several of 
Prai’s staff members had previously worked), he complained that his orga-
nization had been in touch with Diana and Lina long before Prai, and that 
they had also been planning to take them out of the brothel. With fund-
ing available from ioM, several ngos developed programs on the identifi-
kasi dan repatriasi (identification and repatriation) of trafficking victims, 
which fit well with already running programs dealing with child protec-
tion or hiv/aids prevention.13 While ioM made it clear that it did not 
fund “rescue missions,”14 prior to the development of its program, neither 
government agencies nor ngos had previously considered supporting the 
return of migrants or even the exit of prostitutes from brothels because 
of a lack of funding. In other words, the ioM program initiated the pos-
sibility of new forms of intervention. In keeping with the structure of de-
velopment aid in the neoliberal era, local ngos appeared as links to local 
communities and facilitated the return and emplacement of migrants. It 
thus becomes evident that sovereignty should be conceptualized not only 
as formal political power but also as a spatial constellation that comes 
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to involve societal forces centered on the state and restricted by national 
boundaries.
If the contemporary regulation of migration in Asia can be understood 
in relation to the reestablishment of state sovereignty, it is also possible 
to claim that the intensifying concern with trafficking is part of this pro-
cess. This may appear contradictory, since countertrafficking is explicitly 
concerned with the protection of victims in the context of the global ex-
ploitation of human life and labor, rather than the reinforcement of sover-
eignty per se. But as Ishan Ashutosh and Alison Mountz (2011) show, ioM 
reinforces the central role and sovereignty of the nation- state through the 
regulation of migration flows, while Diana Wong (2005) describes how 
ioM was a critical actor in the integration of trafficking into the broader 
issue of “illegal” migration, as rising numbers of asylum seekers led to 
growing concerns about migration management within the European 
Union after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In this process, trafficking, 
organized crime, and illegal migration were increasingly conceptualized 
together. Indeed, the 2000 United Nations Counter- trafficking Protocol, 
which in an important sense formalized trafficking as a global problem, is 
a supplement to the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. 
More specifically, however, countertrafficking and deportation programs 
both engage in a strictly controlled process of return in which migrants 
are literally escorted back to their home villages in the name of their own 
protection (perlindungan)—a process that offers a very limited range of 
choices and in a sense demobilizes migrants, thereby at least temporarily 
emplacing them and reinforcing state sovereignty.
The actual effects of these programs of return became clear as I shifted 
my attention to the island of Lombok, located just east of Bali, and one 
of the main Indonesian sending areas for unskilled migrants to Malaysia, 
particularly to the palm oil industry. Largely agricultural, irrigated rice 
cultivation dominates the island’s economy, but other cash crops such as 
tobacco are common. On Lombok, Panca Karsa was the local ngo part-
ner for the ioM Victims of Trafficking program; receiving and monitoring 
victims from Lombok and Sumbawa. By 2006, more than one hundred 
victims—most of them from villages in Central and East Lombok—had 
been handled by Panca Karsa.
In one of those villages, I joined staff from Panca Karsa on a “moni-
toring” visit to one of the success stories of ioM’s program. We arrived 
without an appointment and the man we were looking for was away on an 
errand. His wife, who ran the small shop that he had opened with reinte-
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gration funds, assured us that he would be back soon, so we decided to 
wait. Sitting on a bench to the side of the building was a man who had just 
returned from Malaysia a month earlier, after two years abroad as an un-
documented migrant. Like most other male migrants on Lombok, he had 
borrowed money at 100 percent interest in order to pay the labor brokers. 
On his first trip to Malaysia five years earlier, he had sold what little land 
he had and now after two trips he had only just been able pay off his debts.
When Adi, the “victim” from the ioM project, finally arrived, he had 
much more to say. He admitted right away that he had been very lucky to 
be identified as a victim and that this had allowed him to transform his 
life. Together with sixteen other men and women from Lombok, Adi had 
been picked by sbMi in the Tanjung Priok harbor after having been de-
ported from Malaysia via Tanjung Pinang—again highlighting the occa-
sional conjuncture between deportation and the Victims of Trafficking 
programs. While the men were sent to the sbMi office, the women were 
taken to the recovery hospital before being returned to Lombok. Within a 
few months of having entered Malaysia legally with a private recruitment 
agency, Adi fled without his passport from the palm oil plantation where 
he had been sent, because the wages were far lower than promised. Six 
months later he was apprehended by a rela volunteer group on a different 
plantation and was moved among three holding centers in Malaysia before 
being deported to Tanjung Pinang in November 2005.
Adi and I talked a bit about why between 50,000 and 100,000 people—
out of a population of three million—were leaving Lombok annually, 
mainly to Malaysia and Saudi Arabia. Most of the work in Lombok was 
day labor (harian) and a salary could never be guaranteed, while in Malay-
sia migrants could make more than one and a half million rupiah (approxi-
mately usd 150) per month, about five times the average salary in Adi’s 
village. With school fees and other regular payments increasing since the 
economic crisis and the ensuing liberalization of the economy, however, 
a predictable wage had become a necessity, making migration the only 
reasonable alternative. But now, after receiving support from ioM, Adi had 
developed a modest shop and had expanded his business to selling cellular 
phone cards. He was satisfied and had no plans to return to Malaysia. For 
the other man—who was basically destitute and sat quietly next to him—
there appeared no way forward within the realm of the village.
On our way back to Lombok’s capital, Mataram, the Panca Karsa staff 
admitted that Adi was their most successful victim (korban); in fact shortly 
after receiving compensation, many of the earlier victims had sold the 
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commodities—cows and motorcycles, in particular—that they had been 
able to buy with ioM funding and left for Malaysia again. In this process, 
reintegration inevitably came to mean recirculation, suggesting that the 
refusal of migrants to stay in place followed from the logic of merantau, 
or circular migration, which demanded economic capital in excess of that 
which was offered by ioM. In fact, ioM’s funding was approximately the 
same amount that it cost to pay labor agents to work in Malaysia on a two- 
year contract, around five million rupiah, or usd 500.
Conclusion: From Reintegration to Recirculation
I have moved between three overlapping projects—a deportee program, 
a documentary film, and a countertrafficking program—and discerned 
a common structure or logic that connects various models of engaging 
with the plight of Indonesian migrants. In particular, I have shown that 
any explicit problematization of “return home” is lacking in each of these 
projects. This lack is significant precisely because it makes obvious that 
which is taken for granted, namely that there is a particular type of migrant 
experience associated with loss and trauma that is strikingly similar to 
what Liisa Malkki (1995a) has previously identified in relation to refugees. 
The institutionalization of this type of migrant experience governs return 
through protection, because migrant victims are assumed to share a com-
mon experience. As Mariella Pandolfi (2008, 170) articulates, labels such 
as “victim” and “trafficked woman” come to “activate procedures” rather 
than “fully relate the experiences of surviving traumatic events.” This is 
made most evident through the ioM program that evaluates each of its vic-
tims according to a standardized trajectory, with psychological and sexual 
evaluations being at the heart of the process of recovery; this is then turned 
into a spectacle for mass consumption through the “rescue” in media prod-
ucts such as Inside the Child Sex Trade. Meanwhile, the Indonesian depor-
tee program, which makes no distinctions between “trafficking victims” 
and “stranded migrant workers,”15 continues to return migrants to their 
home villages, making evident the intersections between state power and 
humanitarian intervention. More broadly, beyond the distribution of capi-
tal that makes possible both deportation and countertrafficking programs, 
and the production of spectacles that spread the “rumor of trafficking” 
(Wong 2005), the effects of the deportation program and the Victims of 
Trafficking program on the lives of migrants appear to be quite similar.
The sustainability of return, however, is dependent on the very eco-
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nomic capital that the migrants lacked before they left in the first place. 
This helps us understand Lina’s shame (malu), Lina’s wink, why Adi is sat-
isfied with his life, and even why many of those who were supported by 
ioM’s countertrafficking program have left again. Within the cultural logic 
of merantau, as well as the turn to documented migration and counter-
trafficking initiatives, return is clearly inscribed. In the documentary film 
and the countertrafficking and deportation programs that I have dis-
cussed, home is an empty signifier that can be understood as either a safe 
haven in humanitarian terms or the place where the migrant belongs from 
the authorities’ point of view. But for the migrants themselves, the kam-
pung (meaning both home and village) is a singular place that embodies 
various forms of relationships, hierarchies, and meanings that cannot be 
understood a priori according to the general model of the migrant victim, 
which predominates in contemporary discourse. The return home of the 
migrant must be understood in relation to this life world, which demands 
some form of success that allows for a transition in the life cycle. In the 
contemporary context of Indonesia, return without the possibility of such 
transitions is rarely sustainable and thus in direct tension with the inter-
ventions of governments, ngos, and journalists that I have described.
In closing, it is worth briefly considering a broader and more compli-
cated historical and sociological problem: namely, why the different pro-
grams that I have described have come to intersect in such striking fashion, 
and in particular how the figure of the trafficked person has gained such 
significance in this process. There is clearly wide- ranging support for the 
expansion of temporary circular migration, generally understood as a win- 
win- win situation, as receiving countries are guaranteed labor, sending 
countries receive remittances, and migrants earn employment and steady 
wages (Vertovec 2007, 2). This is in part a response to processes of global-
ization and regional integration, described by Xiang in the introduction to 
this book, but also more specifically to growing concerns about undocu-
mented migration. In this process, the trafficking victim has become a 
key figure and a problem on which ngos, international organizations, and 
state agencies can focus their attention. As labor markets become more 
precarious, fragmented, and difficult to govern in the era of neoliberal-
ism, the concern with trafficking allows various actors to patrol the un-
clear boundaries of these markets, ostensibly in the name of human rights. 
Phrased more strongly, the figure of the trafficking victim allows actors to 
avoid more complicated political issues such as labor rights and freedom 
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of mobility that might threaten liberalism’s uncompromising distinction 
between free and unfree labor.
Notes
 1. For a review on the literature about the meaning of home, see Mallet 2004.
 2. This figure remained relatively stable for several years. During the first six months 
of 2009, just over seventeen thousand migrants were deported through Tanjung 
Pinang. By early 2013, however, these numbers had dropped to between 500 and 1000 
per month (data from the Agency for Social Affairs and Labor, Tanjung Pinang).
 3. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants, Jorge Busta-
mente, on his mission to Indonesia, December 12–20, United Natons General Assem-
bly, at http://www.acnur.org/biblioteca/pdf/4992.pdf?view=1 (accessed February 8, 
2013).
 4. TKi is an acronym for Tenaga Kerja Indonesia, or Indonesian Migrant Worker.
 5. ioM Jakarta (n.d.), “Recovery Centres for Trafficked Victims,” brochure in au-
thor’s possession.
 6. Feature films such as Lilya 4- ever, which deals with a fictional young woman from 
Russia who is lured into prostitution in Sweden; news reports; and a seemingly endless 
stream of documentaries that take the form of melodrama—Carol Vance (2005) has 
termed them melomentaries, i.e., melodramatic documentaries—have become criti-
cal instruments in raising consciousness about trafficking. As Meg McLagan (2003) 
has noted, with the rise of digital video since the 1990s, mediated forms of testimony 
have become increasingly critical in making human rights claims public, a process that 
is particularly evident in the relationship between countertrafficking campaigns and 
media reporting. This is part of a broader trend since the 1980s in which testimonials 
and other “truth- telling discourses” have become forms of evidence of human rights 
abuses among feminist activists in particular (Hesford and Kozol 2005, 8).
 7. See the Journeyman Pictures website for details on the film: http://www 
.journeyman.tv/?lid=18621. For a transcript of the film, see http://www.journeyman 
.tv/?lid=18621&tmpl=transcript. For a ten- minute clip, see http://www.youtube.com 
/watch?v=szKqtiKmbC8 (all accessed August 1, 2011).
 8. In the end, it was perhaps this recognition that led Rousset to buy the girls goats 
and cows—local forms of capital—that offered them other possibilities. This was not 
part of the film. Ramses, the head of Prai, told me this in Batam in August 2006.
 9. Fieldnotes, my translation, Tanjung Pinang, August 12, 2006. See Ford and Lyons 
2012 for a series of strikingly similar quotes from their research on countertrafficking 
in Tanjung Pinang.
 10. In conjunction with the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, an annual report is 
published by the U.S. Department of State (“Trafficking in Persons Report”), which in-
cludes a global ranking of countries according to how they are dealing with trafficking. 
Tier 3 countries are the worst cases, tier 2 ones are borderline cases, and tier 1 nations 
are considered to be compliant with the U.S. government’s countertrafficking recom-
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Top U.S. State Department Official,” press release, November 4, 2006, http://www.iom 
.or.id/news.jsp?lang=eng&code=102&dcode=4 (accessed February 20, 2009).
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program in Jakarta, in August 2006, an assistant came in with a pile of papers for her 
to sign. She turned to me and said, “This is what I do all day, sign trafficking forms.”
 13. For a further description of ioM’s collaboration with ngos in the Riau Islands, 
see Ford and Lyons 2012.
 14. Interview with Kristin Dadey, Jakarta, August 2006.
 15. According to a report from ioM, the Department of Social Affairs has stopped 
distinguishing between the categories “stranded migrant workers” and “trafficking 
victims” and laments that any attempt to create datasets on trafficking victims has 
failed (David 2007, 36).
ChApter seven
Return of the Global Indian
Software Professionals and the Worlding of Bangalore
Carol upadhya
The debate on transnational migration between and from Asian countries 
usually focuses on low- skilled and semiskilled migrants. Less attention 
has been paid to the substantial streams of high- skilled and professional 
migrants who move from countries such as India to the West in pursuit 
of higher education or better job opportunities, who occupy very different 
social positions in both the home and destination countries, and whose 
transnational experiences are also distinct. Yet their migration choices are 
also deeply inflected by state policies at both ends.
Indian information technology (iT) professionals are a key example 
of this type of migration. As a group of mobile, transnational knowledge 
workers circulating within the global information economy, iT profes-
sionals have become a highly visible segment of the Indian diaspora in the 
West. While the dominant trend for several decades has been the move-
ment of highly educated professionals from India to the West, many of 
these high- tech migrants have recently been induced to return to India—
in part due to its newfound image as an emerging economy following the 
economic liberalization program of the late 1990s. The city of Bangalore 
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in particular, with its burgeoning software industry, is viewed as a place 
that offers economic opportunities and lifestyles similar to those avail-
able abroad. Data on this reverse flow are unreliable, but the Ministry of 
Overseas Indian Affairs has estimated the number of returnees at 10,000 
to 20,000 a year since 2000, and a nassCoM (the software industry asso-
ciation) report claims that 35,000 iT professionals returned to Bangalore 
alone between 2000 and 2004 (Varrell 2011, 305).1 These figures represent 
only a small proportion of highly educated international migrants from 
India, but they point to a significant shift in the migration pattern of skilled 
professionals, from a “brain drain” to a “brain gain” (see Chacko 2007; 
Khadria 1999).
The sojourn abroad, and the subsequent return of iT professionals to 
work or invest in Bangalore’s software industry, is linked to the reconstitu-
tion of the nation and citizenship as well as to transformations in the urban 
milieu. I describe an emerging “global Indian” form of citizenship and 
identity that has been largely promulgated by the Indian state in its efforts 
to encompass Overseas Indians (the official nomenclature) within the na-
tional community, but which also has provided transnational professionals 
with new strategies for claiming, creating, and negotiating citizenship. This 
neonationalist discourse converges with the patriotic narratives of Indi-
ans living abroad who desire to give back to the motherland and help to 
build the “new India” by returning to share their wealth, knowledge, and 
entrepreneurial skills. The themes of return and the “new India” are both 
marked by the idea of the “global”, which in turn signifies modernity and 
progress. But they are by no means placeless projects.2 In this chapter I 
also explore how this kind of neonationalism is played out on the ground 
through returnees’ strategies of emplacement, especially in the case of Ban-
galore. Returnees, driven by a desire to help India take its rightful place in 
the world, bring with them new ideas about modernity and proper civic 
life through which they reenvision the city as a global place. These practices 
of place making have clear material outcomes for urban society, economy, 
and politics. They also neatly dovetail with the program of neoliberal urban 
redevelopment that has been promoted by political and economic elites in 
order to transform Bangalore into a so- called world- class city. I flesh out 
this argument through an examination of the narratives and practices of 
iT professionals living abroad and those who have returned to Bangalore. 
I also look at broader discourses that circulate within transnational social 
fields inhabited by Overseas Indians and those living in Bangalore, espe-
cially through cyberspace and the media.3
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A few clarifications about the notion of “return” and the cohort of iT 
professional returnees interviewed in Bangalore are in order. In many 
cases, the return of software professionals to Bangalore is not a simple 
move back home but is just one journey within a larger pattern of circu-
lar or multinodal transnational mobilities. Most Indian software workers 
are deployed on temporary contracts (“bodyshopped”) or are employed by 
Indian software services companies who send them abroad on short- term 
onsite assignments (see Upadhya and Vasavi 2008; Xiang 2007).4 But many 
iT professionals and other highly educated migrants connected with the 
iT industry have migrated more or less permanently to Western countries, 
or hope to do so.5 However, even for iT professionals who have obtained 
a permanent- residence permit or foreign citizenship, the plan to settle 
down abroad is usually contingent, and the dream of return always hovers 
in the background. Moreover, for some techno- managerial professionals, 
coming back to India is not really a process of return but is just another 
stage in a transnational career strategy. In the context of career- driven 
global mobility, the terms migration and return migration do not really 
capture the complexity of these movements. In this chapter I primarily 
draw on the narratives and experiences of those who have lived abroad for 
a number of years and have then chosen to return to India, leaving aside 
for the present purpose the larger number of circulatory techno- migrants 
who come and go at frequent intervals (Ong 2005b).
The majority of techno- migrants as well as returnees are lower- level 
routine programmers or middle- level managers. However, a significant 
subcategory consists of those who have risen to senior levels in large tech 
companies in the United States and elsewhere and have been deputed to 
head their Indian subsidiaries. According to one source, 95 percent of 
foreign- owned multinational software companies in Bangalore are headed 
by Indians who have lived and worked abroad—mostly in the United States 
(Kapur 2002; cited in Chacko 2007, 136). A top headhunter (recruitment 
agent) estimated that around 250 to 300 high- level executives of iT com-
panies in Bangalore have come back from the United States. In addition, a 
number of returnees relocate to India in order to start their own iT com-
panies, feeding into Bangalore’s growing startup culture. These entrepre-
neurs often shuttle between Bangalore, Europe, East Asia, and the United 
States as they look after their business interests that straddle several bor-
ders (Upadhya 2004). This chapter focuses primarily on these higher- and 
middle- level professionals and entrepreneurs, who in the popular imagi-
nation are the archetypical “global Indians.” They also epitomize the neo-
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nationalist ideological stance and emplacement strategies of returnees in 
Bangalore.
Return and Neonationalism
Most returnees in Bangalore appear to be iT professionals in the younger 
and middle- aged groups who come back to India to work in the software 
industry or start their own companies. AnnaLee Saxenian (2004, 176–77) 
notes that until the 1990s, few of the thirty thousand Indian professionals 
working in Silicon Valley returned to India, unlike in the case of Taiwan 
where the return migration of engineers played a key role in realizing the 
“Taiwan miracle.” However, from around 2000 the pattern of Chinese “as-
tronauts” (referring to Chinese families whose members shuttle between 
Greater China, North America, and other places; see Ley and Kobayashi 
2005; Ong 1999) began to be replicated among transnational Indian iT 
entrepreneurs and professionals, suggesting that the earlier pattern of 
brain drain is being replaced by “brain circulation” (Saxenian 2004). By 
most accounts, this reverse brain drain has been stimulated by the rapid 
growth of the Indian economy following liberalization; the rise of the soft-
ware industry, which opened up new employment opportunities for highly 
educated professionals; the wider availability of consumer goods and 
leisure industries that cater to the upwardly mobile middle classes, which 
made India more attractive to returnees by affording them lifestyles simi-
lar to those that they enjoyed in the West; and the more difficult economic 
and political environment in the United States after September 11 and the 
subsequent series of economic crises. In contrast to earlier decades, India 
is now viewed as a place where iT professionals can both advance their 
careers and be “at home.” Kishore, a marketing professional employed by a 
large American computer chips manufacturer, who relocated to Bangalore 
in 2005 after living in the United States for ten years, said:
I am not really keen on coming back to India just because it is my 
birthplace. But from what my friends and associates tell me, things 
are going to move out to India in a big way. I want to be here to catch 
all the action happening. Also, I feel I have saturated there. I get paid 
well. Yet, I feel I am not doing much there. It is time I moved out to a 
different place. Experience a new place and new people. I am ambi-
tious and I want to have new challenges.
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But these economic and technological developments are not the only driv-
ing forces behind the return flows. This chapter calls attention to the politi-
cal, cultural, and moral dimensions of return migration.
Politically, strategies of return and practices of citizenship among mi-
grant professionals have shaped, and been shaped by, India’s policies 
toward Non- resident Indians (nris), or Indian citizens living abroad,6 
and Overseas Indians (the current official designation for a broad range of 
people of Indian origin who are citizens of foreign countries). Unlike sev-
eral East and Southeast Asian countries (Ong 2005a), India has not actively 
or systematically encouraged the return of highly skilled migrants as a de-
velopment strategy. Instead, the Indian government has viewed techno- 
professional nris as a brain bank that can be tapped for financial resources 
and perhaps expertise from a distance (Kapur 2003; Khadria 2001). nris 
were initially courted by the Indian government in the 1970s as a signifi-
cant source of remittances, foreign exchange, and capital investment (Les-
singer 1992), and nris were encouraged to invest in India through the 
provision of special legal and economic privileges, such as favorable inter-
est rates.7 More recently, the state’s interest in cultivating Overseas Indi-
ans has expanded beyond narrow economic goals, especially under the 
coalition government led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (bjp, or “Indian 
People’s Party”), a right- wing Hindu nationalist party that came to power 
in 1999. This government floated the concept of a “global India” encom-
passing people of Indian origin (even several generations removed) across 
the world, similar to the category of “Chinese living overseas” (Nonini and 
Ong 1997, 9). India was reimagined as a potentially powerful country that 
is culturally (rather than geographically) defined through a transnational-
ized version of hindutva (a right- wing and exclusionary political ideology 
that promotes “Hinduness” as the basis of Indian culture; see Rajagopal 
2000). Shampa Biswas writes, “In calling on Indian- Americans to contrib-
ute to the Indian economy, the Indian state has hailed them as ‘Indians,’ 
reminding them of their (cultural) connections to India” (2005, 58). This 
culturally redefined idea of the nation, which enjoins material, political, 
and other kinds of contributions by “citizens” living abroad, has been em-
braced by many nris and rnris (returned nris) who inhabit transnational 
social fields such as the one constituted by the circulation of iT capital and 
labor (van der Veer 2005).
India’s approach to “transnational governance” has undergone signifi-
cant shifts since the 1990s (Dickinson and Bailey 2007, 758), representing 
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alterations in the prevailing notions of nation and citizenship. For instance, 
the government promulgated several changes in citizenship laws in order 
to create an official “global Indian” category of quasi- citizenship. A long- 
standing demand of the nri lobby has been that India should permit dual 
citizenship, which would accord legal recognition to their transnational 
existence and greater ease of transactions and movement. Overseas Indi-
ans argue that dual citizenship will enable them, as patriotic diasporic sub-
jects, to participate more fully in India’s development even while retain-
ing the “safety” of a foreign passport (see Faist 2000, 209–10). To address 
this demand, the Persons of Indian Origin (pio) scheme was announced 
in 2002, which granted special rights such as visa- free entry and property 
ownership to certain categories of “people of Indian origin” who have ac-
quired foreign citizenship. In 2005 the government went a step further 
by introducing an additional category of “Overseas Citizenship of India” 
(oCi), which provides a sort of quasi- citizenship for Indian- origin foreign 
nationals (Anupama Roy 2006).8 These state actions concretized the offi-
cial construction of a global- Indian community and effectively deterritori-
alized Indian citizenship (Anupama Roy 2008).9 They represent a form of 
cultural nationalism that at once narrowed the definition of the citizen to 
include only particular classes and communities of Indians and broadened 
the definition to encompass certain categories of noncitizens of Indian ori-
gin living abroad. Eligibility for oCi membership was initially limited to 
those who had emigrated after 1950 to particular regions and countries, 
namely North America, Europe, Australasia, Singapore, and Thailand. This 
ensured the inclusion of primarily middle- class, educated migrants who 
left India in pursuit of economic success, and the exclusion of descendants 
of indentured workers who were shipped overseas during the colonial 
period as well as more recent labor migrants to the Persian Gulf (Anupama 
Roy 2008, 242). The oCi scheme clearly targeted highly skilled migrants 
of the post- 1970s generation (Varrel 2011)— especially those deemed to be 
professionally successful (Dickinson and Bailey 2007, 765–66)—which is 
in line with the class bias of Indian policy toward Overseas Indians that 
has aimed to construct a “neoliberal economic cosmopolitan community” 
(Edwards 2008, 453).10 These policy shifts have produced what Aihwa Ong 
(2006, 121) terms “latitudinal citizenship,” creating divisions within the 
diaspora based on transnational market relations (Vora 2011, 313–14).
The deterritorialization of the nation- state has been augmented by the 
intensifying “materiality” of diasporic relations (Werbner 2000). Most of 
the policies directed at nris since the 1980s have been oriented toward 
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garnering their resources, and more recently toward promoting nri in-
vestment, for example by setting up Special Economic Zones (sezs) ex-
clusively for them. The reconstitution of Indian citizenship as well as the 
discursive construction of the global Indian community reflect a political 
reconfiguration of sovereignty and citizenship and are also firmly rooted 
in India’s neoliberal development agenda. These policies have provided a 
mechanism and incentive for Overseas Indians who hold foreign pass-
ports to engage in business activities or freely pursue their careers across 
borders, or to return to India while retaining foreign citizenship—a kind 
of “flexible citizenship” (Ong 1999) or “diasporic citizenship” (Siu 2005) 
that has been particularly advantageous for affluent nris living in North 
America and Europe.11
Negotiating Citizenship and Belonging
Mobile software professionals are located in a liminal political- legal posi-
tion from which they try to negotiate between different forms of citizen-
ship and residence within India as well as in the countries where they live 
and work. As a result, the legal categories that frame their global move-
ments are invested with different symbolic meanings and are manipulated 
in line with their transnational life strategies.
For many nris, a foreign passport appears to be nothing more than a 
convenient document. Very often, a decision to apply for a U.S. (or other 
foreign) passport is linked to a definite plan to return, because it provides 
assurance that one can always go back to the United States if things do 
not work out in India. While return is often framed in terms of a nation-
alist desire to help “develop” the nation or a more self- centered ambition 
to “catch the rising tide,” returnees keep their options open for themselves 
and their children by retaining their foreign passports or residence per-
mits. Like the Chinese “astronauts,” Indian iT professionals may return to 
India to pursue their careers or to reconnect with Indian culture, but plan 
to send their children (who usually have U.S. passports) back to the United 
States for their higher education. Kishore speaks about his plans for his 
four- year- old daughter: “I want Pooja to have an Indian grounding. That’s 
probably one of the main reasons I want to come back. . . . She speaks of 
Halloween and Easter. I want her to know Holi and Diwali too. . . . At least 
till her graduation she should be here. Then she can go to the USA again 
for higher studies.” Although this example suggests that highly skilled mi-
grants have evolved a form of “flexible” or “graduated” citizenship (Ong 
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1999, 2000), most iT professionals living abroad still struggle with ques-
tions of citizenship, identity, and belonging.12 Acquiring a foreign passport 
requires the formal revocation of Indian citizenship, which for many nris 
signifies renunciation of the mother country—a decision that is fraught 
with moral and political anguish. For this reason, several long- term resi-
dents of the Netherlands whom my research team and I interviewed in 
2005 were eagerly waiting for dual citizenship to be legalized by India so 
that they could acquire Dutch passports without losing their Indian citi-
zenship. The oCi category has partly resolved this dilemma: while it does 
not represent full citizenship it allows migrants to think of themselves as 
citizens of India and to enjoy most of the privileges of Indian citizenship, 
rendering the acquisition of a U.S. or European passport a mere formality. 
The availability of pio and oCi cards has effectively transformed the notion 
of citizenship among transnational professionals into one that is in some 
ways flexible, yet is firmly rooted in a reconstituted Indian national and 
cultural identity.
Although the oCi and pio policies were not formulated with the in-
tention of attracting Overseas Indians back to India, an unintended con-
sequence of these schemes has been the facilitation of such returns. Prior 
to 2003 many migrants were hesitant to return to India because of legal 
problems associated with foreign citizenship.13 Now, a foreign passport 
coupled with an oCi card allows them to live on par with other Indians in 
most respects while still being able to easily travel to and from India. For 
many nris, acquiring a U.S. passport is the tipping point that enables them 
to realize the dream of return. What is usually regarded as the final step in 
the assimilation of immigrants—attainment of citizenship—ironically has 
become the mechanism that allows them to return to the home country.
The redefinition of citizenship among transnational iT professionals is 
linked more broadly to the reconstitution of Indian identity, and the re-
imagination of India itself, from the autarchic nationalism of the freedom 
struggle and the early post- Independence period to the more expansive 
global- Indian identity that has emerged since the 1980s. The graduated 
form of citizenship that these policies have introduced is the legal counter-
part of the figure of the global Indian that has been made popular by the 
mainstream English media—a new class of worldly, techno- savvy, progres-
sive, and entrepreneurial professionals whose return to India will trans-
form the social, political, and economic landscape.
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Return as Reciprocity: Building the New India
For many iT migrants, the act of return is the culmination of a long series of 
movements and flows—including remittances to families at home, invest-
ments in Resurgent India government bonds,14 or support for charities and 
ngos. Although return may be regarded in many cases as a strategy for con-
solidating their new class position or social status within India, returnees’ 
calculations are not purely financial or practical. As noted above, returning 
to India is often represented as a form of reciprocity, a way to repay their 
debt to the nation by contributing to economic development and social 
renewal.15 In particular, they see themselves as helping India to become 
a global economic power—a “new India” that has cast off its Nehruvian 
socialist legacy in favor of rapid economic growth and capital- led change.
This attitude was expressed by several software professionals working 
in Europe, who voiced a nationalist pride in the iT industry and India’s 
newly prominent place in the global economy. For them, software is India’s 
special contribution to the world, a global industry at the vanguard of 
the new economic growth curve that will garner respect for India and 
Indians. The aspirations of transnational Indians merge into India’s post-
liberalization development narrative, and a newly assertive nation beckons 
Overseas Indians to return and be a part of this great change. The head of 
the Belguim office of a major Indian iT company put it this way: “I had a 
vision—that the Indian iT industry must grow large enough to be taken 
notice of, and this is what has happened. This was in the mid- 1990s. Then, 
a lot of young people wanted to become software engineers because they 
thought it was a ticket to the West. But my vision was to position India so 
that people would queue up to come to India. And this is what is happen-
ing now.”
nris returning to set up their own iT businesses speak of building the 
nation through investment in the “knowledge industries.” According to 
the founder of a high- end startup in Bangalore who had moved back from 
Silicon Valley, professionals with the “right skills and mindset” are now re-
turning to India, and this influx of brainpower and entrepreneurial talent 
will transform not only the Indian iT industry but also India itself. Rajiv, 
another entrepreneur who moved to Bangalore in 2004 after nearly twenty 
years abroad, is an example of this trend. He had established a successful 
telecom company in the United States, which he sold before returning to 
India to start a new enterprise. Soon after his arrival in Bangalore in mid-
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2005 his relatives threw a welcome party for him, where Rajiv gave a long 
speech (in English) about his decision:
I am happy to be back. To my country. To my family. To my people. 
This country gave me a lot of opportunities, and I am what I am 
because of that. Now I’m here to give back some of what I took. It’s 
my turn to serve my country. I believe that if everyone who has left 
our shores and gone abroad were to come back and do their bit for 
our country, we would go leaps and bounds ahead from where we 
are today.
nri websites showcase the experiences of successful returnees like Rajiv, 
reinforcing the patriotism that is echoed in many returnees’ narratives. 
In an article about Vani Kola, the founder of two successful tech compa-
nies in the United States, who returned to start a venture in Bangalore, the 
reporter notes: “Indians are going back. Many are younger folks who see 
an opportunity to become India’s version of a [Vinod] Khosla or [Desh] 
Deshpande.16 . . . They want to jump into the nation’s booming, crazy, 
thrilling tech industry and take advantage of their knowledge of both India 
and the USA. Some hope to get rich. Others want to help their homeland. 
Most want to do both” (Maney 2006). At the same time, returnee entre-
preneurs highlight the obstacles they face as businessmen—bureaucratic 
red tape and corruption, inefficiency and inadequacy of basic services, and 
poor infrastructure, especially in software boomtowns such as Bangalore. 
Their desire to “develop” the nation along the lines of Silicon Valley goes 
hand in hand with the urge to reinvent and reform the city, urban gover-
nance, the polity, and society at large.
Emplacement and the City
I have argued that the return of highly educated iT professionals to India is 
not only linked to an emerging global pattern of expert labor circulation. 
It also reflects a neonationalist discourse emanating from the Indian state 
(and from the diaspora itself) that embraces these professionals as global- 
Indian citizens and bearers of a new globalized modernity. The return of 
global Indians is spurred and legitimized by the narrative and dream of 
a powerful “new India” that is economically developed and globalized as 
well as culturally grounded. Now I explore the articulation of global aspi-
rations through the “worlding” of Bangalore—a process that is driven in 
part by rnris and more broadly by the software industry. Returnees re-
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gard Bangalore as a place where they can live and work while still dwell-
ing largely in the transnational social field that connects them with the 
West. While narratives about migration and return are usually framed in 
terms of the nation- state, other sites (both below and above the level of 
the nation) have emerged as key places where processes of globalization 
are being worked out—in particular the new “global cities” of the South. 
It is to these cities that return migrants mainly gravitate (Chacko 2007).17
Bangalore is seen by returnees as a “happening place,” because of the 
presence of the software industry and also due to the city’s purportedly 
cosmopolitan culture and the availability of sophisticated lifestyle ser-
vices—a vibrant pub culture, good restaurants that offer a range of inter-
national cuisine, shopping malls with all the essential brand- name stores, 
elite international schools, and expensive gated communities and residen-
tial complexes. Bangalore has become, symbolically as well as materially, 
the place where the idea of the “global” gets linked to that of the “Indian,” 
a process that unfolds in part through returnees’ strategies of “emplace-
ment” (Narayan 2002).
Making Place, Making Class
While returning transnational professionals speak of going “home,” their 
actual return is not to their places of birth but to an imagined “new India” 
embodied in global cities like Bangalore. Their sense of belonging and 
identity is wrapped up in global imaginaries of success and advancement, 
and the urban places where they live need to be refurbished and invested 
with new meanings. Return sets in motion a process of reterritorializa-
tion, driven by social and economic aspirations and diasporic longings, 
by which this home is created and materialized. While mobile individu-
als may construct their homes almost anywhere (Nowicka 2007), the re- 
creation of India, or of particular places within India, as home involves 
a particular set of practices and orientations that draw on not only their 
experiences abroad but also imaginaries of the new India that circulate 
within the postliberalization new middle class (see Fernandes 2006; Upa-
dhya 2009). To realize the dream of return and to lay claim to India as 
their own place, returnees must reinvent and colonize the city, in part by 
reproducing a model of contemporary living they have learned abroad. 
The act of return involves practices of emplacement as rnris attempt to 
locate themselves within the existing urban social matrix—putting down 
roots through the purchase of property, acquiring the material trappings 
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of a lifestyle that marks them as cosmopolitan Indians, and enacting their 
status as successful professionals through new social practices and the ar-
ticulation of modern, enlightened values aimed at establishing their dis-
tance from the (negatively marked) “old India.” In this way, the wave of re-
turn has fed into ongoing processes of urban reconstruction that is linked 
to the implantation of the global software industry in Bangalore, as well 
as to the formation of new subcultures and lifestyles in the city that stem 
from the fracturing and transformation of the middle class.
This dual process of class making and place making is most evident 
in Bangalore’s high- end, self- contained, and heavily securitized luxury- 
apartment complexes that enclose within their high walls an array of recre-
ational and domestic facilities on par with affluent housing complexes in 
the West. Real- estate developers in Bangalore explicitly cater to returnees 
by building exclusive gated communities that make it possible to “sur-
vive” in India through separation from the disorder and the environmen-
tal degradation of the rest of the city (see Bose 2007). These posh residen-
tial developments with names (almost always in English) such as Palm 
Meadows, Oakwood, and Serenity self- consciously evoke American sub-
urbia or European- style luxury. Inhabited mainly by rnris, Western ex-
pats, and wealthy Indian business families, these enclaves, most situated 
in the periurban periphery of a rapidly expanding and increasingly cha-
otic “megacity,” successfully simulate affluent Western lifestyles. While 
many returnees are acutely conscious of, and even apologetic about, the 
contradictions inherent in their lifestyles, many believe that by introduc-
ing “better” ways of living they are helping to realize the dream of the new 
India. For them, Bangalore—or at least the locations within the city where 
they live— represents India’s future.
Returnees attempt to establish their class position by enacting a life-
style that is distinct from that of the older, local upper- middle and middle 
 classes—a cosmopolitan one that in practice looks outside for its standards 
and models while retaining allegiance to an abstract notion of Indian cul-
ture. Returnees’ narratives point to a constant search for the material ap-
purtenances of this lifestyle—elements that are appropriately trendy, taste-
ful, and exclusive—Indian contemporary in style but “not too Indian.”18 
The efforts of the returnees Kishore and Asha to establish their household 
in Bangalore illustrate this quest. This couple, in their mid- thirties, planned 
their relocation from the United States meticulously, making several visits 
to Bangalore during 2005 to find the right house in the best location as 
well as the best school for their daughter. During this lengthy process that 
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entailed many discussions with Bangalore- based friends and relatives and 
long tours around the city with real- estate agents, Kishore repeatedly said 
that he wanted to live in the most “happening” and “up- market” part of 
town. Their other requirements reflected the model of living they had be-
come accustomed to in the United States: “I would like an independent 
house, but it should also have all the modern facilities like gym, club house, 
health room, swimming pool, huge gardens, you name it. . . . It should 
be a big house, with very high ceilings. And it should be close to these 
up- and- coming international schools.” While driving around the city in 
search of apartments, they frequently made disparaging remarks about 
the design of the buildings and houses they saw, which they thought com-
pared poorly with homes in the United States. Kishore constantly criticized 
“south Indian homes,” which are not “up- to- date with style and design.” 
They finally settled on an apartment in a new complex located in a “hip” 
and central part of the city. They were happy with the location and facili-
ties, but Kishore was concerned about the image that their address would 
convey because of the street name: “I wonder why they can’t name the road 
something else? Papanna Road sounds so silly; it doesn’t have the same 
class as saying, ‘Hey, I live on Lavelle Road, or Richmond Circle.’ Papanna 
sounds like some old, shoddy place.”19
While the software industry, with its more than 250,000 well- paid and 
well- traveled employees, has been a major factor behind the restructuring 
of class as well as urban space in Bangalore, the influence of returnees such 
as Kishore and Asha, who bring with them new aspirations and ideas about 
the “good life,” also appears to be significant. Within these larger processes 
of class (re)formation, transnational professionals emplace themselves as 
bearers of cosmopolitanism, a global- Indian identity, and contemporary 
international lifestyles, values, and social practices within an urban land-
scape defined by very different sets of social coordinates and histories. 
Globalizing cities of the South such as Bangalore are transformed by their 
transnational economic linkages, and also because they become sites for 
crystallizing diasporic imaginations.
Remaking the City
In addition to their pursuit of transnational lifestyles, rnris are remaking 
the city through direct involvement in civic activism and governance re-
forms. Returnees negotiate their reentry into India and positioning in 
urban society not just as successful migrant subjects who have achieved a 
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new social status but as carriers of a specific ideology, set of social values, 
and mode of living through which they seek to transform India. They re-
turn equipped with self- proclaimed enlightened, liberal, and forward- 
looking orientations and practices, which form a lens through which they 
judge India’s disorder, rampant corruption, and chalta hai (easy- going) at-
titude. Many returnees desire to reform local society and government and 
to contribute to India’s development through various forms of social work, 
philanthropy, and civic activism. Bangalore is envisioned not as a chaotic 
Third World megacity but as what India is (or should be) becoming—a 
modern, well- ordered metropolis run by an efficient and transparent gov-
ernment that is aided by enlightened civil society.
These acquired values have directly fed into the processes of neoliberal 
reform and urban redevelopment that have been under way in Bangalore 
since the late 1990s, in which the globally oriented professional and busi-
ness classes, especially iT industry leaders, have played a major role (Upa-
dhya 2009). To promote Bangalore’s status as a world city, regional political 
and business elites in tandem with international development agencies and 
the national government engage in intensive programs of urban restruc-
turing and infrastructure development. nris who return to Bangalore to 
take advantage of its booming economy see themselves as part of these 
larger transformations. Many rnris express a wish to “make change hap-
pen” by contributing to the remaking of the new city and a refurbished 
civil society.20
The influence of rnris on middle- class public life and city politics in 
Bangalore became quite visible during the 2000s. To illustrate this, I refer 
to two high- profile rnris who are active in Bangalore, but this kind of 
civic involvement is seen among many other less prominent returnees as 
well. The first example is Ramesh Ramanathan, who gave up a success-
ful banking career in the United States to return to India and become in-
volved in public service. In 2001 he founded a civic organization, Janaa-
graha Center for Citizenship and Democracy, to push municipal reforms 
and citizen- centric urban development in Bangalore, such as decentral-
ized ward- based planning and budgeting. Janaagraha’s slogan is “be the 
change you want to see.” Subsequently, Ramanathan became a key figure 
in the reformulation of national urban- development policies, especially 
through the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission—a large 
central- government program that provides matching grants for infrastruc-
ture development and urban- governance reforms in selected cities (a pro-
gram that has been heavily criticized by urban activists for its elitist bias). 
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Ramanathan was nominated as a “Young Global Leader” by the World 
Economic Forum in 2007.
The second example is Rajeev Chandrasekhar, convener of ABIDe 
(Agenda for Bangalore Infrastructure Development), a private- public task 
force that was appointed by the newly elected bjp- led state government in 
Karnataka in 2008 to revive the city and address pressing urban problems 
caused by rapid growth. The task force includes key bureaucrats and poli-
ticians as well as representatives of the private sector, especially promi-
nent rnris (including Ramesh Ramanathan). Chandrasekhar is a success-
ful entrepreneur who began his career with Intel in the United States and 
returned to India in 1991, subsequently founding bpl Mobile, one of the 
earliest private- sector telecom companies in India. Now a venture capital-
ist, he has been extensively involved in public activities, including being 
chairman of the Infrastructure Task Force of the Government of Karna-
taka (1999–2002) and a director of the new Bangalore International Air-
port. He is also a member of Parliament.
A major focus of such high- profile returnees is to develop urban infra-
structure—widening roads, building flyovers and underpasses, working 
on the new international airport project, and so on—and to put in place 
the physical facilities needed to make Bangalore a so- called world- class 
city (mainly by facilitating mobility and traffic flow). These efforts in turn 
are expected to attract and retain foreign investment and the iT industry’s 
client base. The urban reform agendas of Janaagraha and ABIDe support 
this vision of urban transformation and the administrative and urban- land- 
market reforms that are deemed necessary to push through large urban re-
development and infrastructure projects, including redrawing the map of 
Bangalore itself to create the largest metropolitan region in the country. 
In general, rnris like Chandrasekhar and Ramanathan advocate neolib-
eral and technocratic approaches to urban planning and governance, with 
an emphasis on private investment, public- private partnerships, and the 
introduction of the latest (usually imported) technologies. These “social 
entrepreneurs” also work closely with the state, whose policies are being 
rethought in line with this essentially corporate vision of urban develop-
ment.21 As Thomas Blom Hansen and Finn Steppatut (2005, 30) put it, 
transnational subjects who have become “proper citizens” through their 
class, education, and sojourn abroad are recruited to aid in the “civilizing 
process” needed to make urban India livable as well as amenable to for-
eign capital.
Many ordinary rnris also espouse an urge to improve their environ-
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ment by remodeling political and governmental processes. For instance, 
many of these rnris are active members of city- oriented websites and 
Internet- based interest groups that focus on urban problems such as envi-
ronmental degradation, traffic congestion, and bureaucratic inefficiency.22 
Similarly, young U.S.- returned iT professionals who populate the many 
large upmarket apartment complexes around the outskirts of the city or-
ganize their housing societies (residents’ bodies responsible for the main-
tenance of common facilities) along the lines of apartment complexes in 
the United States. A comment frequently heard in residents’ meetings, 
when problems such as garbage clearance or careless use of facilities are 
being discussed, is: “This could not have happened in the U.S.”23 Return-
ees thus bring with them a model of respectable living and civic life. By 
promoting a more “civilized” mode of existence, they help to establish the 
difference between themselves and the so- called old middle class or tradi-
tional Indian society.
Conclusion
I have explored the phenomenon of return migration among Indian iT 
professionals by locating it at the intersection of several broad trends: 
(1) the emergence of a new image of “India shining” in the era of liberal-
ization, which is partly linked to the success of the software- outsourcing 
industry; (2) the creation of a global- Indian identity that draws on a new 
form of cultural nationalism premised on moral obligations of reciprocity 
rather than citizenship rights and duties, and is buttressed by legal changes 
that have underwritten practices of graduated citizenship among high- 
tech migrants; and (3) the worlding of Bangalore by political and economic 
elites in tandem with rnris’ strategies of emplacement and class distinc-
tion. This assemblage of disparate processes points to the forging of new 
global pathways (Werbner 1999) through which international capital, ex-
pert labor, transnational professionals, managers, entrepreneurs, and cos-
mopolitan images of progress traverse and reshape the urban landscape 
of cities like Bangalore. These processes are also closely interlinked—the 
deterritorialization of citizenship represented in the oCi card is matched 
by the deterritorialization of Bangalore in the imagination of iT elites and 
rnris, for whom the city is largely an extension of Silicon Valley. At the 
same time, the globalizing of Bangalore is a project of a state eager to pro-
pel India onto the world economic stage, just as the reinvention of citizen-
ship has been driven by a similar political agenda.
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This interplay of the global, national, and local simultaneously gener-
ates within it a number of contradictions that are manifest at several levels. 
These include the category of the “global Indian,” who is legally a nonciti-
zen yet a true Indian patriot, the affluent professional who comes back 
to serve the motherland yet lives a Californian lifestyle, and the schizo-
phrenic city of Bangalore, whose worlding has created multiple fissures 
and dissensions. But these transformations also provide a resolution to the 
contradictions that they have thrown up. For example, the global- Indian 
identity allows returnees to think of themselves as participating in the ad-
vancement of the nation even while living and working in globalized en-
claves largely cut off from the rest of the city.
Return is always to a home, and home is constituted by the migrant’s 
imagination, memories, and aspirations. In this case the home that iT pro-
fessionals imagine is a future India, one that retains certain elements of 
its “glorious past” and ancient culture but that will soon leave behind the 
chaos and poverty of the current moment. The return of successful nris 
to Bangalore has aided the symbolic projection of the city as a place where 
the new India is being forged. Return also sets in motion simultaneous 
processes of deterritorialization and reterritorialization—reverse migra-
tion by iT professionals, impelled by both global economic trends and neo-
nationalist sentiments, reinforces the remaking of Bangalore into a place 
that is attractive to mobile global capital and transnational subjects. The 
resultant processes of spatial and economic reconfiguration embed the city 
in the global while simultaneously inscribing the expanded space of the na-
tion—conceived as a moral, cultural, and economic community—within 
the space of the reimagined city. Bangalore represents the new India, con-
ceived not only as an economic power but also as a new nation and col-
lectivity of citizens—one that crosses borders in embracing Indians with 
diverse nationalities, histories, and places of residence but that also incor-
porates them into an increasingly homogeneous transnational cultural and 
class identity. Impelled by the neonationalist dream of reinventing India, 
migrants returning to India have become, through their strategies of class 
making and place making, central agents in the realization of that dream.
Notes
 1. Presumably these numbers do not include the large number of temporary migrant 
workers who have not acquired permanent residence or citizenship of foreign coun-
tries, but only those who have returned after relatively long sojourns abroad.
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 2. The term global appears in many contexts in contemporary India, from media re-
ports to the narratives of iT professionals and entrepreneurs. The category has become 
so ubiquitous in middle- class and state discourses that it approaches Ernesto Laclau’s 
(2005) concept of an “empty signifier”—one that is so malleable or multivalent that 
any meaning or function can be attached to it, depending on context. In this chapter 
there is no space to unpack the multilayered and often conflicting meanings of the 
global in different social fields (from the corporate world to middle- class lifestyles), 
or even for this group of transnational subjects, but the narrative should provide some 
sense of the shifting content and strategic uses of this category. While I sometimes use 
quotation marks to indicate these features of this term, their absence does not mean 
that I use the term to refer to a concrete set of processes or characteristics. Of course, 
in India the term global often stands in for the West or even America, but in combina-
tion with the term Indian it also represents a reconstructed national, modern, or class 
identity, a cosmopolitan outlook and subjectivity that is not purely Western nor tradi-
tional Indian. Moreover, it is a category that is under construction, highly mediatized, 
and politically inflected.
 3. This chapter draws on data collected for a study of Indian iT/iTes (information 
technology and iT- enabled services) workers in India and abroad that was carried 
out by A. R. Vasavi and me, along with a research team at the National Institute of 
Advanced Studies, Bangalore, between November 2003 and March 2006. The field 
research was conducted in Bangalore, India, and in the Netherlands, Belgium, and 
Germany during 2004 and 2005. The research project was funded by the Indo- Dutch 
Programme on Alternatives in Development and was conducted in collaboration with 
Peter van der Veer of the University of Utrecht (Upadhya 2006; Upadhya and Vasavi 
2006). The material on which the chapter draws consists mainly of long unstructured 
interview transcripts, notes on informal interactions with iT professionals and ob-
servations in their workplaces and homes, and gleanings from news media and the 
Internet. The chapter also draws on my earlier work on iT entrepreneurs in Bangalore 
(Upadhya 2003, 2004), and subsequent research based mainly on secondary sources, 
media, and Internet research. The informants quoted here are all given pseudonyms.
 4. This type of circular techno- migration has been facilitated by the h- 1b visa 
scheme in the United States (which has the largest demand for software workers), 
which was introduced in the early 1990s to attract highly skilled temporary workers. 
Other countries, such as Australia, Germany, and the United Kingdom, have similar 
schemes that have facilitated the immigration of Indian iT professionals.
 5. Temporary workers often view an assignment in a foreign country as the first step 
toward migration, and they may use the opportunity to search for regular employment 
and acquire permanent residence. Significant numbers of h- 1b visa holders converted 
their status to permanent resident during the 1990s, swelling the number of Indian 
immigrants to the United States to more than two million (Chakravartty 2005, 61; 
Khadria 2001).
 6. To qualify for the nri designation—which carries certain financial and tax ben-
efits—a person must live outside India for more than 183 days a year.
 7. According to one source, since 1991 nris and people of Indian descent have ac-
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counted for almost a quarter of India’s direct foreign investment (Visweswaran and 
Mir 1999/2000, 104; quoted in Biswas 2005, 57). Although India is the top- most 
remittance- receiving country in the world (World Bank 2011, 13), state policies target 
investments by high- worth nris and tend to ignore the greater significance of remit-
tance inflows from lower- skilled workers, especially from the Persian Gulf.
 8. These changes in citizenship law were promulgated through the Citizenship 
(Amendment) Act 2003 and the Citizenship (Amendment) Ordinance 2005. An oCi 
card provides a few more privileges compared to the pio status, but does not include 
the right to hold an Indian passport or political rights such as voting or holding office. 
Although many nris see oCi as a form of citizenship, India still does not allow true 
dual citizenship (i.e., it is illegal for citizens to hold passports of other countries). The 
nri category applies to Indian citizens living abroad, while the pio and oCi cards are 
like long- term visas for noncitizens of Indian origin.
 9. The apparent expansion in the definition of citizenship embodied in the Citizen-
ship (Amendment) Act 2003 has occluded a deeper ideological shift from the prin-
ciple of jus solis (birthplace) to that of jus sanguinis (blood ties and descent) (Anupama 
Roy 2008, 223, 237). Under the new definition, the migrant, even when permanently 
absent and having acquired a foreign passport, remains “Indian” by culture, descent, 
and emotional attachment to the motherland (Anupama Roy 2008, 240). This shift 
is in line with global trends in which the sending countries of international migrants 
are “expanding extraterritorially by de- territorializing political membership” while 
receiving countries are “stepping up the pressure aimed at assimilating and securing 
the loyalties of their migrant populations” (Berking 2004, 110). In the case of India, 
these changes have been driven by a clear political agenda—the attempt to create a 
deterritorialized Indian nation or “global Indian family” that is implicitly understood 
as Hindu (Hansen and Stepputat 2005, 34).
 10. In 2005 the new Congress Party–led government extended the right to apply 
for an oCi card to pios living in other countries, except for Pakistan and Bangladesh 
(Anupama Roy 2008, 244). But membership was still restricted to Overseas Indians 
who had migrated from India after January 26, 1950, thereby applying mainly to highly 
skilled migrants in western and Persian Gulf countries (Edwards 2008, 459). Kate 
Edwards (2008) argues that this shift in policy mirrored a wider change in popular 
perceptions of nris, from the negative image of “not required Indians” to the “national 
reserve of India.” This transformation was closely linked to economic liberalization, 
which “involved in state projects in new ways some strategically selected communities 
of the wider Indian diaspora” (454).
 11. In the remainder of the chapter I use the terms “nri” and “Overseas Indian” in 
their common generic sense, and interchangeably, to refer to Indians living abroad 
regardless of whether they have taken foreign citizenship or pio/oCi status, rather 
than in their narrow legal sense. Although rules about investment and taxation vary 
depending on one’s citizenship status, the government has tried to woo all well- to- 
do Indians abroad across nationality and residence categories. As the following dis-
cussion shows, the distinctions between citizen and non- citizen, resident and non- 
resident, are in any case blurred.
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 12. For an illuminating example of how Indian businessmen in Dubai negotiate 
between various forms of citizenship and belonging—transnational, diasporic, eco-
nomic, and cultural—see Neha Vora (2011).
 13. Before the introduction of the pio scheme, a foreign passport was a liability for 
those wishing to work or establish a business enterprise in India because one needed 
a special visa, a work permit that had to be renewed yearly, and other such clearances. 
In addition, economic activities were hampered by restrictions on real estate and busi-
ness investment and steep rates of taxation, which have been considerably reduced 
following economic liberalization. Moreover, returnees who still held Indian pass-
ports would lose their rights to return to the host country. A key difference between 
the pio and oCi cards is that with the latter, a noncitizen of Indian origin can apply for 
reinstatement of Indian citizenship after five years of residence in India (the normal 
rule is residence of ten years), adding another level of flexibility to citizenship rules 
that primarily benefit transnational professionals and entrepreneurs.
 14. These bonds were floated in 1998 by the State Bank of India on behalf of the 
Government of India to attract investments by overseas Indians and foreign corpo-
rate bodies. They were issued in foreign currency including US dollars and British 
pounds, the purpose being to augment India’s foreign exchange holdings and mitigate 
the balance of payments problem. The Resurgent India bond scheme raised $4.2 bil-
lion mainly from Overseas Indians, while another scheme in 2000 called India Mil-
lennium Deposits raised $5.5 billion (source: Shefali Anand, “Rupee’s Likely Defender: 
Bond, India Bond,” The Wall Street Journal India, February 3, 2013, http://blogs.wsj 
.com/indiarealtime/2012/05/28/rupees- likely- defender- bond- india- bond/, accessed 
February 3, 2013). Although these schemes are marketed as an opportunity to con-
tribute to India’s development, cynics note that nris invest in them mainly for their 
high financial returns.
 15. Aurelie Varrel (2011, 306) suggests that the discourse of reciprocity is part of the 
mythology that has been built up around the figure of the nri as a “necessarily suc-
cessful but homesick professional” (as in the Bollywood movie Swades), and that the 
popular notion that returnees are driven by patriotic values is misleading. However, 
we should not discount the strength of ideological or cultural motivation. The par-
ticular form of Indian national identity that has been produced within the affluent 
diaspora in the West, together with the efforts of the Indian state to woo nris as a key 
resource for development and to incorporate them into the body politic, have pro-
duced a compelling affective discourse and sense of national belonging among many 
migrants. This is indicated by the substantial flows of diaspora philanthropy and other 
kinds of nri involvement in the “development” of their home villages and regions 
across India (Geithner, Johnson, and Chen 2004).
 16. Vinod Khosla and Desh Deshpande are well- known and successful nri tech 
entrepreneurs in the United States.
 17. Recent scholarly work has focused attention on the worlding of metropolises 
of the Global South that have emerged as key nodes in the movement of labor, capi-
tal, and expertise across the globe, often bypassing nation- state structures (Ananya 
Roy 2008; Robinson 2002). Such cities attract not only expat (foreign) professional 
Return of the Global Indian 161
and technical experts who manage their new deterritorialized industries but also a 
new class of “national” transnational professionals and technocrats who return from 
sojourns in the developed world to their own countries to work or invest in these off-
shore enclaves (Nonini and Ong 1997; Ong 2005a).
 18. While dwelling in the West, many iT professionals conspicuously display their 
Indian- ness by decorating their homes with various “ethnic” objects acquired in India, 
but upon return they usually subscribe to international styles and fashion and tend 
to deplore everything that symbolizes the “traditional Indian” (unless it is a valuable 
antique object).
 19. Pappana is a personal name in Kannada (the language of the state of Karnataka 
where Bangalore is located), and the street is probably named after a local notable of 
that name or a bungalow that used to be on that road.
 20. The circulation of global capital and transnational professionals through the 
city are of course only part of the story of the worlding of Bangalore, which also in-
cludes government- funded urban redevelopment and infrastructure projects and the 
booming speculative real estate market. On the role of international and transnational 
Indian capital in urban redevelopment in Bangalore, see Goldman 2011. The tighter 
focus here on the return of transnational iT professionals draws attention to just one 
facet of the materialization of the “extraterritorial” within territories of the metropolis 
(Ananya Roy 2008, 827).
 21. Another example of rnri activism is R. K. Misra, the winner of the Lead India 
contest run by the Times of India media group in 2008. See Udupa 2011 for an account 
of this and other English media- led campaigns to reinvent Bangalore in accordance 
with so- called global standards.
 22. See, for example, the website Citizen Matters, http://bangalore.citizenmatters 
.in/.
 23. Sahana Udupa, personal communication, Bangalore, November 20, 2006.
ChApter eIght
Ethnicizing, Capitalizing, and Nationalizing
South Korea and the Returning Korean Chinese
Melody Chia- Wen lu and shin hyunjoon
Since the 1980s the Republic of Korea (henceforth ROK or South Korea) 
has transformed itself from a country of emigration to one of immigra-
tion, and from a monoethnic country to a multicultural society open to the 
world. In defining and redefining its relation to the world and the South 
Korean nationhood in this context, the South Korean state has also corre-
spondingly made regulation over the Korean diaspora’s mobility an issue 
for policy deliberation. In particular, the notions of return and homecom-
ing have been strongly invoked in both government policies and civil- 
society actions regarding overseas Korean communities. For instance, the 
orchestrated family- reunion programs in the late 1980s, the “hometown- 
visit visa” introduced in the 1990s, and the Overseas Koreans Act in 1999 
are all aimed at welcoming some diasporic groups “home” while discour-
aging others from returning. But on the other hand, the term return has 
not been explicitly used in policies. The government’s active engagement in 
ethnic Koreans’ homecoming without articulating the meanings of return 
precisely signifies the tensions between nationalism and globalization, and 
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the contradictions between ethno- nationalism and civic nationalism. This 
chapter sets out to disentangle this very ambiguity.
The South Korean state simultaneously adopts three strategies to man-
age return migration to its shores in ways commensurable with its state- 
centric globalization agenda. The ethnicizing strategy highlights bio-
logically determined ethnicity as an overriding principle in mobilizing 
resources and defining memberships. Capitalizing in this chapter indi-
cates the rationality that stresses economic value as the paramount con-
cern, for instance by differentiating groups according to their skill levels 
and potential contributions to economic competitiveness. Nationalizing 
implies the recognition of civic and social contractual relations between 
state and citizens internally, and of other nations’ sovereignty externally. 
There are obviously various discrepancies between the three strategies, and 
tensions between them have shaped the interaction between the South 
Korean state and the returning diaspora. In the end the ethnicizing and 
capitalizing strategies seem to be accommodated into the nationalizing 
principle of structuration.
In order to disentangle the intertwinement of these three strategies, this 
chapter focuses on the case of the Korean Chinese (Chaoxianzu in Chi-
nese and Joseonjok in Korean)—citizens of the People’s Republic of China 
of Korean descent. Korean Chinese are the numerically largest overseas 
Korean population, and their relation with South Korea has probably been 
the most complex, as evidenced by the policy changes and public contes-
tations related to their return at different stages. Following the historical 
vicissitudes, we organize the chapter chronologically. We start by reviewing 
how Korean Chinese, as a population and as a category, emerged from the 
century- long history of mobility. The self- identity of the Korean Chinese 
and their relation to China, South Korea, and other ethnic Koreans were 
conditioned by the Japanese colonial rule, communist revolutions, and 
the Cold War geopolitics in East Asia. As a result, their return to South 
Korea has always been a complex and ambiguous project from the begin-
ning. We then discuss how the South Korean government encouraged the 
conditional return of ethnic Koreans in the 1980s as part of the Korean 
vision of globalization. This is followed by two sections that examine the 
logic behind the exclusion of the Korean Chinese by the 1999 Act on the 
Immigration and Legal Status of Overseas Koreans (henceforth, Overseas 
Koreans Act or oKa),1 and the subsequent contestation and amendment 
in the early 2000s. We conclude with an analysis of how the new policies, 
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though more inclusively based on ethnic ties, remain differentiating, be-
cause they are based on national residency and skill levels.
The Making of the Korean Chinese: A History of Mobility and Return
Korean Chinese occupy a unique position in the Korean diaspora due to 
the specific history of and the politics in East Asia. Korean Chinese today 
are descendants of Koreans who migrated to China from the middle of 
the nineteenth century when the Qing dynasty opened up Manchuria in 
northeast China for Korean immigration. The famine in the late 1860s fur-
ther quickened outflows from the peninsula. The Japanese colonization of 
Korea in 1910 and the establishment of the Republic of China in 1911 at-
tracted many Koreans to Manchuria to develop overseas bases of resistance 
against the Japanese. After the Japanese annexed the region and created the 
puppet Manchukuo government (1932–45), they brought in a large number 
of Koreans to serve in their colonial projects, including agricultural and 
infrastructural developments (Chen X. 2005).
After Japan’s defeat at the end of the Second World War in 1945, some 
Koreans in Manchuria returned to the Korean peninsula, but a sizeable 
number chose to stay and eventually became citizens of the People’s Re-
public of China (PRC). During the Korean War (1950–53), some Korean 
Chinese participated as soldiers of the People’s Liberation Army against 
U.S.- supported South Korea (Choi 2001, 124; Jeon 2004). In 1954, ethnic 
Koreans (Chaoxianzu) were designated as one of the fifty- five ethnic mi-
norities of the PRC, and in 1955 the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefec-
ture was instituted in the border region between China and North Korea. 
As a result of the PRC’s ethnic- minority policy, Korean Chinese today 
enjoy a relatively high degree of cultural autonomy in the PRC, especially 
in the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture. For instance, they are free 
to choose between schools where Korean is the first teaching medium and 
other Mandarin schools that offer bilingual education.2 Within the Korean 
diaspora, the Korean Chinese are the only ones who receive formal edu-
cation in Korean and are fluent in both Korean and Chinese, spoken as 
well as written.
Throughout the Cold War period the contacts between Korean Chinese 
and South Korea were very limited. While South Korea was portrayed in 
China as a reactionary capitalist zougou (running dog) state of U.S. im-
perialism, Korean Chinese were regarded as traitors of the Korean nation 
in South Korea. They were seen this way because they fled the fatherland 
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in times of hardship, collaborated with the Japanese imperial govern-
ment, and, above all, participated in the Korean War in support of North 
Korea. Until the 1980s, Korean Chinese were thus seen as allies of North 
Korea. That affinity is still reflected in the name Joseonjok, a translation 
of the Chinese name Chaoxianzu, in that the term Chaoxian (associated 
with North Korea) was chosen instead of Hanguo (associated with South 
Korea). In the 1960s the Chinese government decided to standardize the 
Korean- language education for Korean Chinese and adopted the Joseoneo 
dialect used in North Korea instead of Hangugeo used in South Korea. As 
a result, Joseonjok in South Korea speak North Korean–accented Korean, 
which is easily recognizable in South Korea. As Park Jung- Sun and Paul Y. 
Chang put it: “It is not simply a matter between an ethnic homeland and 
its diaspora, but among two ethnic homelands and their diaspora groups 
that are divided along ideological lines” (2005, 8).
The mid- 1980s marked the beginning of direct contacts between 
Joseonjok and South Korea, with family reunions arranged by the ROK 
government and endorsed by the PRC. This early wave of cross- border 
mobility was officially called “hometown visit” by the ROK government. 
Since there was no direct flight between China and South Korea at that 
time, the Korean Chinese had to travel to Hong Kong first before transit-
ing to a flight to Seoul. The Korean Chinese were treated as quasi- citizens 
by the ROK government, partly due to its ethno- nationalist perception 
and partly because of the absence of diplomatic relations between the two 
countries. The Korean Chinese were not required to produce passports or 
apply for visas for entering South Korea; instead they were issued travel 
certificates or entry permits.3 After diplomatic relations between PRC and 
ROK were established in 1992, large numbers of Korean Chinese migrated 
to South Korea in a short period of time, partly because of the introduc-
tion of direct transportation between the two countries. The normalization 
of bilateral relations also meant that the Korean Chinese were regarded as 
fully fledged PRC nationals and were required to travel to South Korea 
with passports and visas. Most of the Korean Chinese visited on the short- 
term visa (C type) for the purposes of a hometown visit. A small number 
were recruited as workers under the official Industrial Technical Training 
Program (iTTp) (see Xiang, chapter 4)
In order to be eligible for return with the hometown- visit visa, Korean 
Chinese needed to establish that they were born in the Korean Peninsula 
or had parents or siblings who were currently ROK nationals. Applicants 
typically did so by producing household registrations and birth certifi-
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cates issued before 1948 in the Korean Peninsula, Manchuria, or Japan. 
Suspicious that some of these documents might be fabricated, the ROK 
government set an age limit stipulating that only those who were aged 
sixty or above were eligible to apply for the hometown- visit visa, assuming 
that they were more likely to be genuinely born in Korea. Exceptions were 
given to younger offspring of principal applicants who needed company 
during travel for health reasons. The age limit was also meant to prevent 
the abuse of the hometown- visit visa as a backdoor for labor migration. In 
reality, however, many older Korean Chinese and their accompanying sons 
stayed on in South Korea and worked without being properly documented. 
A small number of them were naturalized. They referred to themselves as 
“returned compatriots in South Korea.”4
Precisely because of the wide and deep connections between Korean 
Figure 8.1. The Xinhua News Propaganda Billboard, a notice board in Garibong, 
Seoul, is almost identical to the once- ubiquitous billboards of the Xinhua News 
Agency in China that were dedicated to disseminate government policies and 
display party slogans, but the Xinhua News in the photo is a privately run Chinese- 
language newspaper that caters to migrants in South Korea. Migrants’ mimicry of 
the state in public representation is another aspect of how transnational mobility is 
nationalized. (Courtesy of Melody Chia-wen Lu [2009])
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Chinese and South Korea, the return flows soon reached levels beyond 
that envisioned by the South Korean government, and brought many 
other actors into the picture. Despite the migration control imposed by 
the PRC and ROK governments, these return flows became rather “dis-
orderly” (luan in Chinese). As summed up by Ms. Jin, a Korean Chinese 
turned Korean citizen who worked in a state- owned enterprise in north-
east China before migrating to South Korea in her early sixties in the late 
1990s: “Joseonjok came in numbers and in so many ways. Simple over-
stayers used their original names; others were smuggled, using fake pass-
ports; and you have bogus household registrations with bogus parents, 
sham marriages, bogus tourists, bogus students[,] . . . anything you can 
imagine. Han Chinese also came in these ways.”5
Commercial migration brokerage was sought to facilitate various types 
Figure 8.2. Korean Chinese migrants in front of a day- job agency in Daerim, 
a district in Seoul with a large concentration of Korean Chinese. These Korean 
Chinese have low status as compared to educated returnees, but they are privileged 
as compared to nonethnic Korean migrants because only ethnic Koreans on h- 2 
visas can work in the informal labor market. Ethnic Koreans from other countries 
also formed their own communities in different parts of Seoul. (Courtesy of Melody 
Chia-wen Lu [2009])
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of mobility, regardless of whether the person was potentially a genuine 
returnee as defined by the South Korean government. The brokerage fee 
could amount to ten million Korean won (roughly usd 8,500), which put 
many migrating Korean Chinese in heavy debt. It would take at least three 
years of full- time work in South Korea to repay the debt. Many overstayed. 
According to the official statistics, as of 2002 it was estimated that there 
were 84,793 Korean Chinese residing in South Korea, 79,737 of whom did 
not have legal status (Seol and Skrentny 2009, 155).
In sum, the social group of Korean Chinese emerged from multilay-
ered histories of imperialism, national and socialist revolutions, and wars. 
Korean Chinese never had a fixed identity, and in the early stages, they 
took return more as an economic opportunity than as a response to ideo-
logical and political concerns. This also explains the chaotic conditions in 
the 1990s. This situation changed after 1999 when the South Korean gov-
ernment attempted to define its relation to overseas Koreans and made re-
turn a politically charged and ideologically significant subject. In order to 
understand this change, we need to first examine the South Korean state’s 
perception of return.
Return as Part of “Korean Globalization”
Overseas Koreans have been an important concern of the South Korean 
state and public for various reasons. It was a dominant ideology in South 
Korea since its existence that the nation (minjok) ought to be the single 
ethnic Korean community consisting of the north, the south, and the di-
aspora, and the community’s divide was due to Koreans’ subjugated posi-
tion in the world. The nation must be reunited again. The eventual return 
of overseas ethnic Koreans was seen as critical for addressing injustices 
of the past, as well as for helping to establish a more open and inclusive 
society for the future.
During the Cold War period, Koreans in China and the states of the 
former Soviet Union (or the present Commonwealth of Independent 
States, or Cis) were strategic targets of the South Korean state’s “politi-
cal work,” aimed at infiltrating them, cultivating their loyalty, and even 
turning them into intelligence agents. Starting from the late 1980s when 
the iron curtain was gradually lifted, they were embraced as part of the 
transnational (ethnic) Korean community (hanminjok gongdongche) and 
included in official statistics as Overseas Koreans.6 However, there was 
no official definition of Overseas Koreans until the oKa was promulgated.
The Returning Korean Chinese 169
A turning point came on June 14, 1998. On his return flight from a state 
visit to the United States, the then newly elected president, Kim Dae Jung, 
instructed his aides to draft a law governing Overseas Koreans. While a 
primary objective of that trip was to decide the international interventions 
needed to resolve the financial crisis that hit South Korea hard in 1997, 
it was also a diplomatic visit to seek the support of the Overseas Korean 
community. As a result of the president’s instruction, the oKa was passed 
on December 3, 1999. The oKa regarded overseas Koreans as members of 
the (South) Korean nation- state by granting them various residential and 
social rights that were compatible with those of ROK citizens, such as long- 
term residence, property ownership, participation in medical insurance, 
and financial transactions (Articles 10–16). Park and Chang (2005, 3) call 
these entitlements “quasi- citizenship.”
It is not the offer of quasi- citizenship but the definition of Overseas 
Koreans that created controversy. The oKa defined Overseas Koreans as 
consisting of two groups. There were nationals of the ROK who obtained 
the right of permanent residence in a foreign country or were permanently 
residing in a foreign country. And there were “Koreans with a foreign na-
tionality” (oKa, Article 2, Definitions), referring to those who had previ-
ously held the nationality of the ROK and their lineal descendants. This 
definition is at once unusually broad and unusually narrow. It is broad be-
cause ROK nationals who resided overseas were defined as Overseas Kore-
ans, thus differentiated from citizens who were actually based in South 
Korea, even though they held ROK passports. The main concern was that 
Korean nationals overseas did not fulfill their civic duties, such as paying 
taxes and serving in the military, and thus should not automatically enjoy 
the same rights as local citizens do (see Kalick 2009). In this sense the 
act expressed a deep civic nationalism that regarded formal membership 
alone as insufficient for determining one’s status and rights in relation to 
the nation- state, emphasizing as well actual services that were being ren-
dered to the country.
The oKa definition is unusually narrow in the sense that, by limiting 
Overseas Koreans to those who possessed or had possessed ROK citizen-
ship, it effectively excluded a large number of ethnic Koreans who had 
never had any formal political ties to the country. It categorically ruled out 
North Korea nationals. As the vast majority of the Korean Chinese left the 
Korean Peninsula before the establishment of the ROK in 1948 and never 
had ROK citizenship, they were by definition no longer Overseas Koreans 
despite their strong kinship ties with Korean nationals and the fact that 
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many regarded Korea as their second home. This definition also excluded 
those in the Cis countries for the same reason. By comparison, Koreans in 
Western countries, most of whom migrated recently, fell into the category 
of Overseas Koreans. A large number of Koreans in Japan also left Korea 
before 1948, but were never granted Japanese citizenship and remained as 
Korean (either as ROK or DPRK) citizens. The act thus created a divide 
between Koreans residing in developed countries (primarily the United 
States, Japan, and countries in Europe) and those residing in developing 
countries, resulting in what Seol Dong- Hoon Seol and John D. Skrentny 
(2009) call “hierarchical nationhood.” In other words, different Korean 
diasporic groups were treated differently, according to their nation of resi-
dence and citizenship (see Lee C. 2003).
Academic publications and public commentaries in South Korea and 
overseas suggested that the act adopted the particular definition of Over-
seas Koreans partially for the purpose of excluding the Korean Chinese 
and Koreans in the Cis (Jeanyoung Lee 2002a, 2002b; Park and Chang 
2005). There are a number of possible reasons for this. The first and most 
straightforward explanation is that Korean Chinese constituted the largest 
number of Overseas Koreans who were likely to stay permanently, unlike 
Korean Americans and other Koreans residing in Western countries who 
were not likely to return to South Korea or acquire ROK citizenship. The 
sheer size of the Korean Chinese population, in other words, would pose 
a demographic and social challenge. Second, in the highly sensitive geo-
political context of Northeast Asia, the idea of building a global Korean 
ethnic nation could potentially cause anxiety among South Korea’s neigh-
bors. It was alleged that China was wary of separatist movements among 
major ethnic groups within its borders, and the Korean Chinese’s blood 
and cultural (language) ties with the two Koreas were deemed a threat 
(Jeanyoung Lee 2002b; Park and Chang 2005).7
The last and probably the most important reason is that Korean Chi-
nese do not fit well in South Korea’s vision of globalization. When Presi-
dent Kim Young- Sam institutionalized the nation- state’s relation with the 
diaspora, the purpose was no longer for readdressing historical injustice; 
it was to embrace globalization (segyehwa in Korean). As Shin Gi- Wook 
(2006) points out, Kim Young- Sam’s segyehwa drive was in essence to re-
form South Korea’s political and economic systems in order to face the 
challenges of the rapidly changing global economy. The primary goal was 
to increase and maintain the nation’s competitiveness, and globalization 
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was seen as an instrument to achieve this. South Korea’s pursuit of glob-
alization was, as such, marked with a clear nationalistic agenda. The in-
tensification of ethnic identity, or the “thickening of ethnicity” (Comaroff 
and Comaroff 2009, 92), was but one of the key characteristics of Korea’s 
globalization agenda. The building of a global ethnic community was not 
seen as a reaction to globalization; rather, globalization was a tool for re-
defining the nation in the transition from Cold War ideology to neoliberal 
governance (Shin 2006).
Overseas Koreans are presently identified as important actors in South 
Korea’s globalization because they can contribute to the economic de-
velopment of the nation, and, more importantly, their brains and pro-
fessional experiences can facilitate Korea’s modernization and competi-
tion in the world (Lee 2002a; Shin 2006). In this developmental vision 
of nation building and globalization, a good command of English and a 
Western education are essential and basic qualities of global competitive-
ness. Therefore, when the nation- state evokes ethnic unity and belonging 
among a global Korean community, it is the Korean Americans, and to a 
lesser extent Koreans in other developed countries, whom they have in 
mind. In contrast, Korean Chinese as a group of non- English speakers 
who did not receive Western educations were undesirable and deemed an 
obstacle in South Korea’s globalization process. In addition, their North 
Korean accent evoked memories of a Cold War that South Korea had not 
resolved but was eager to leave behind. As such, the oKa was designed, in 
practice, as an Overseas Koreans classification act.
The Korean Chinese were not only excluded from the privileged group 
of Overseas Koreans but were also positively categorized as disadvan-
taged migrant laborers. Following other developmental states in East and 
Southeast Asia, South Korea devised labor migration policies that favored 
high- skilled migrants and talents while ensuring that unskilled laborers 
remained transient (Lu M. 2011). Korean Chinese became the largest for-
eign labor force in South Korea. They filled the so- called 3- d (dirty, danger-
ous, demeaning) jobs in the manufacturing sector as well as in the service 
and care sectors; apart from these jobs, they also worked as street vendors 
and agricultural laborers. Their language abilities and cultural knowledge 
made them favorable workers in these sectors, which suffered from severe 
labor shortages. The places where Korean Chinese communities were con-
centrated, especially Daerim and Garibong in the southwestern parts of 
metropolitan Seoul, were often portrayed as the hotspots of crime and 
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illegal gambling (Lim 2010, 114). Despite their cultural- ethnic affinity and 
the desirability of their labor, Korean Chinese were regarded as migrant 
workers, needed but unwanted.
Contestation: Return as Rights
The discriminatory clause of the 1999 oKa enraged Korean Chinese in 
South Korea. What triggered discontent was not necessarily the text of the 
act itself; the daily experiences of social exclusion and differentiated treat-
ment that Korean Chinese received after the enactment of the law were 
the direct driving forces. South Korea tightened migration controls with 
the aim of protecting its citizens’ employment rights in Korea while at the 
same time strictly limiting the migrant workers’ status to one of transience 
(Lee H. 2008). Regular crackdowns and repatriations were intensified after 
the financial crisis in 1997. By the early 2000s, yet more migration regu-
lations were put in place, while governmental institutions dealing with 
immigration issues were expanded and strengthened, and methods of mi-
gration management became more sophisticated (Lee H. 2008). Notable 
examples included the Immigration Control Act of 2002 and the Employ-
ment Permit System of 2003 and 2007.8 What was particularly hurtful for 
the Korean Chinese was how the term return used to justify the repatria-
tion of some of them who overstayed their visas. Once they were invited 
to visit their homeland Korea as compatriots, but now they were migrant 
laborers to be returned to their homeland China (see Xiang, this volume).
The Korean Chinese experience of contesting the Korean state can be 
illustrated by Ms. Choi’s experiences. Choi came to South Korea in 1992 
in her mid- fifties and soon obtained ROK citizenship. She had been sell-
ing Chinese herbal medicines and later groceries imported from China 
on a street in central Seoul before she, and consequently her business, was 
evicted by the police in 2000, purportedly to make way for a street gentri-
fication project. Yet local Korean street vendors were allowed to continue 
running their businesses on the same street. She was the only one singled 
out despite having acquired ROK nationality. She argued with the police 
but was told that it was only lawful for returned Korean Chinese to work 
in restaurants, not as street vendors.
She started looking for other Korean Chinese with similar experiences. 
In 2003 she joined a Korean Christian activist group and started to orga-
nize study groups among Joseonjok to discuss the bias of the oKa. They 
were convinced that the oKa was the cause of the acts of discrimination 
The Returning Korean Chinese 173
that they had experienced after 1999, and that legal battles and public pro-
tests were the only ways to demand justice.9 In the words of another Korean 
Chinese activist, Ms. Jin:
We demand dual identities. From the international perspective, 
Joseonjok are Chinese nationals, black and white clear. China is 
Joseonjok’s homeland. But we share the same blood with Korea, be 
it North or South. We share the same language, culture, and cus-
toms. How can you say that we are not compatriots? It is wrong that 
the ROK government does not recognize its “race” [burenzhong, or 
seeds]. . . . Our demand is very simple. We just want to be treated 
equally as the others [other overseas Koreans].10
At the same time, another movement, led by Christian pastors, advo-
cating for “the right to return and live in the hometown” (gohyange do-
rawa sal gwonri) of Korean Chinese, was also under way. This movement 
highlighted Korean Chinese as “returnees” to be distinguished from North 
Korean “defectors” and non- Korean “migrants” (Park Hyun Ok 2005). On 
August 23, 1999, a petition was filed with the ROK Constitutional Court, 
arguing that the oKa violated Articles 10 (right to human dignity and worth 
and to pursue happiness) and 11 (right to equality) of the Constitution. 
Choi, Jin, and fellow Korean Chinese activists started an eighty- four- day 
public strike on April 15, 2003, in central Seoul, while several civil society 
groups supported them by organizing street protests, lobbying politicians, 
and rallying public support. Eventually the Constitutional Court ruled that 
the oKa was discriminatory and unconstitutional.11 The claims of Korean 
Chinese were both universalistic—against selective and differential sub-
jectification—and particularistic, with an emphasis on their ethnicity.
The indignation, mobilization, and organized contestation made the 
Korean Chinese more attached to South Korea and more determined to 
settle there. In other words, it was the process of fighting (for the right of 
return) that made return real. The process of protesting transformed the 
lives of Choi and Jin. Despite her ROK citizenship, Choi was planning to go 
back to China in 2000. When asked why she eventually stayed on in South 
Korea and devoted her time as an unpaid volunteer for the social move-
ment, she said: “Thanks to our upbringing in China, we learned Mao’s 
philosophy. . . . It is deeply rooted in our mind that when we see injustice 
we have to do something about it. I am not special. I don’t want any per-
sonal gains. I just could not let the unjust and unequal treatment toward 
Joseonjok continue.”12
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The effort of fighting for justice brought the migrants back to their ideo-
logical roots and bridged their present to their past in a deep way, through 
which they were reenergized as social and political actors. This enabled 
them to develop meaningful social engagement with the host society and 
to create a new home in South Korea.
The Ethnicity- Nation- Capital Matrix
The victory of the Korean Chinese in 2004 did not usher in a total embrace 
of the ethnicizing rationality. Policies after 2004 introduced a complex 
matrix in calibrating returning Overseas Koreans’ rights in South Korea, 
which reconciled the emphasis on ethnic identity with national member-
ship through the emphasis on human capital. Two changes are significant 
apart from the extension of the category of Overseas Koreans. First, while 
the definition of the Overseas Koreans’ entitlement in the 1999 oKa was 
vaguely worded, various practical arrangements, on issues such as the pro-
cedures of visa application and renewal, are specified with greater detail 
after 2004. Second, instead of differentiating Overseas Koreans explicitly 
according to place of residence or nationality, the new policies adopted 
individual educational level as the key criterion. In theory all Overseas 
Koreans could obtain the “status of sojourn” (F- 4 visa), but in practice 
those who worked in “simple labor activity” were granted the visiting- 
employment visa (h- 2 visa, implemented in 2007).13
The F- 4 and h- 2 visas entail differentiated rights in many aspects. In 
terms of residency provisions, F- 4 visa holders are permitted to stay in the 
country for up to three years, but in practice, with possible visa extensions, 
there is no limit to the duration of stay. h- 2 visa holders, on the other hand, 
can stay a maximum of three years within a five- year period, and upon 
the expiry of the visa are required to return to their “homeland” to reapply 
for another h- 2 visa. As for economic activities, there is no specific limi-
tation for F- 4 visa holders except for the “simple labour activity.” h- 2 visa 
holders by definition are unskilled laborers. In the integrated Employment 
Permit System, jobs in a total of thirty- six sectors are reserved for h- 2 visa 
holders.14 In terms of freedom of employment, laborers in both categories 
are free to change jobs and employers, a privilege that other nonethnic 
Korean foreign workers do not have. Furthermore, there is no age limit 
for F- 4 visa applicants. For the h- 2 visa, only those who are above twenty- 
five years of age are eligible to apply; those who are below fifty- four years 
of age can apply for renewal from their home country. h- 2 visa holders are 
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also not allowed to bring their children, while there is no limit preventing 
F- 4 visa holders from bringing their family members.
Differentiation based on country of current residence still exists, and 
residence is used as a proxy for skill level. Koreans in the developed coun-
tries (primarily in the West and Japan) are in practice almost automatically 
entitled to F- 4 visas regardless of education and skill levels and are granted 
de facto permanent residence and preferential social rights as citizens as 
specified in the 1999 oKa. Skilled Koreans in China and in the Cis are also 
entitled to F- 4 visas, but they have to submit a full set of documents to 
prove their educational and skill levels. Most Koreans in China and the 
Cis have become preferred guest workers as compared to other foreign 
workers, and transient workers with limited prospects of settling as com-
pared to Koreans from (or in) the West.
Such an ethnicity- nation- capital matrix thus constitutes the latest 
manifestation of the partial, selective, and unstable subjectification of re-
turnees by the Korean state. This complication may be inevitable, because 
the relations between nation- states and the mobile subjects are fraught 
with multiple contradictions. On the one hand, ethno- nationalism serves 
as the ideological foundation of policies that facilitate Overseas Koreans’ 
returns, yet ethno- nationalism in the current context is meant to serve an 
expansive and deterritorializing economic globalization, which unsettles 
the direction of return (for how return defines the directionality of move-
ment, see Sasaki, this volume). As such the South Korean state never en-
couraged “real” return whereby overseas Koreans and their families physi-
cally settle down and become citizens of South Korea. On the contrary, 
it fears that a relatively large number of Korean Chinese would become 
permanent returnees, prompting the adoption of the 1999 oKa to restrict 
the definition of “Overseas Koreans.” The notion of return has to remain 
ambiguous in order to accommodate the contradictions between ethno- 
nationalism, civic nationalism, and economic rationality. Furthermore, 
while ethno- nationalism has been combined with globalization objectives 
to constitute a deterritorialized ethnic community, the practical method 
employed by the South Korean state to achieve this has ironically been to 
nationalize Overseas Koreans. Different overseas communities were di-
vided and treated differently according to their nation of residence. Korean 
Chinese were able to become more empowered and less disadvantaged in 
2004 partly because China’s position in the global hierarchy had signifi-
cantly improved.
In spite of these multiple contradictions, the partial, selective, and 
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unstable subjectification highlighted in this chapter has been feasible 
only because the nation- state remains the central organizational frame-
work. Internally, the civic contractual relation of the nation has never 
been undermined, let alone replaced, by ethno- nationalism. Externally 
the newly developed connections between diasporas and Korea hardly 
challenge the established world system of nation- states. While the South 
Korean nation- state has redefined its relation to Overseas Koreans, it has 
also carefully weighed the relations of Overseas Koreans with their nations 
of residence and particularly the relations between South Korea and these 
nations. After all, the Korean way of globalization is about repositioning 
the nation in the world. Thus, lying at the heart of the South Korean state’s 
engagements with the diaspora is its experimentation with multiple strate-
gies of coping with globalization. The return notion is thus ambiguous, 
and the ambiguity is productive. The productive ambiguity illustrates how 
South Korea has refashioned itself in the current global era.
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 12. Group discussion with Joseonjok activists who participated in the 2003 strikes, 
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 13. The preference for Korean Chinese was first institutionalized in the Employ-
ment Management Scheme in 2004, which was integrated into the Employment Per-
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other exclusionary criteria are more abstract, such as committing acts that violate 
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ContrIbutors 
sylvia r. CoWan is a professor and the program director of the Inter-
cultural Relations Program in the Graduate School of Arts and Social Sci-
ences at Lesley University in Cambridge, Massachusetts. She is a co- editor 
(with Tuyet- Lan Pho and Jeffrey N. Gerson) of Southeast Asian Refugees 
and Immigrants in the Mill City: Changing Families, Communities, Insti-
tutions—Thirty Years Afterward. Apart from academic research, she has 
provided extensive advice to educators, executives, and professionals on 
intercultural understanding and conflict over the last twenty- five years.
johan lindquisT is an associate professor of social anthropology at 
Stockholm University. He is the author of The Anxieties of Mobility: Devel-
opment and Migration in the Indonesian Borderlands and articles in jour-
nals such as Ethnos, Pacific Affairs, and Public Culture. He is also the di-
rector and producer of the award- winning documentary film B.A.T.A.M. 
(www.der.org).
Melody Chia- Wen lu is an assistant professor in the Department of 
Sociology, University of Macau. Her recent publications include Asian 
Cross- border Marriage Migration: Demographic Patterns and Social Issues 
(co- edited with Wen- Shan Yang) and a number of journal articles and 
book chapters on gender, family, and comparative migration regimes in 
East and Southeast Asia.
Koji sasaKi is a research fellow of the Japan Society for the Promotion of 
Science. He has published in Japanese, English, Portuguese, and French. 
180 Contributors
His recent publications include “Togo to saikisei: Burajiru Nikkei shakai 
no keisei to imin chishikijin” [Integration and reflexivity: The immigrant 
intellectuals and the formation of the Japanese community in Brazil], 
Imin Kenkyu Nempo [Japanese annual review of migration studies], no. 
17 (2001): 23–42. He is now researching Japanese immigrant intellectuals 
in Brazil and the Japanese government’s engagement with the community 
in Brazil.
shin hyunjoon is a professor at the Institute for East Asian Studies at 
Sungkonghoe University, Korea. He is the author of several journal articles 
on cultural industry and pop music in Korea and East Asia and on Korean 
diaspora in Northeast and Central Asia. He is currently on the interna-
tional advisory board of the journal Popular Music and the editorial board 
of Inter- Asia Cultural Studies.
MariKo asano TaManoi is a professor in the Department of Anthro-
pology, University of California, Los Angeles. Her publications include 
Memory Maps: The State and Manchuria in Postwar Japan, Crossed Histo-
ries: A New Approach to Manchuria in the Age of Empires, and Under the 
Shadow of Nationalism: Politics and Poetics of Rural Japanese Women, as 
well as articles in American Ethnologist, Journal of Asian Studies, Annual 
Review of Anthropology, Ethnology, Japan Focus, South Atlantic Quarterly, 
positions, Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, and Comparative Studies 
in Society and History.
MiKa ToyoTa is an associate professor at the College of Tourism, Rikkyo 
University, Japan. She is a co- editor of Migration and Health in Asia (2005, 
with Santosh Jatrana and Brenda S. A. Yeoh), editor of “International Mar-
riage, Rights and the State in East and Southeast Asia,” a special issue of 
Citizenship Studies; and editor of “Bringing the ‘Left- Behind’ Back into 
View in Asia,” a special issue of Population, Space and Place. Her articles 
have appeared in International Development Planning Review, Ethnic and 
Racial Studies, and Asian Population Studies.
Carol upadhya is a professor in the School of Social Sciences, National 
Institute of Advanced Studies (nias), Bangalore, India. She has published 
extensively on globalization, transnationalism, the middle class, and 
entrepreneurship in India, and is co- editor (with A. R. Vasavi) of In an 
Outpost of the Global Economy: Work and Workers in India’s Information 
Contributors 181
Technology Industry. She is currently the co- director of Provincial Glo-
balisation: The Impact of Reverse Transnational Flows in India’s Regional 
Towns, a collaborative research program with the Amsterdam Institute of 
Social Science Research, and she anchors the nias Urban Research and 
Policy Program.
Wang Cangbai is a senior lecturer in contemporary Chinese studies in 
the Department of Modern and Applied Languages, University of West-
minster. He is the author of Huozai biechu: Xianggang huaren koushu lishi 
[Life Is Elsewhere: Stories of the Indonesian Chinese in Hong Kong] and 
Population Policies and Development in China and India: Comparative Per-
spectives (co- edited with Wong Siu- lun).
Xiang biao is a university lecturer in social anthropology at the Insti-
tute of Social and Cultural Anthropology and at the Centre on Migration, 
Policy and Society, University of Oxford. He is the author of Transcending 
Boundaries, Global “Body Shopping” and The Intermediary Trap.
brenda s. a. yeoh is a professor (provost’s chair) in the Department of 
Geography, as well as dean of the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Na-
tional University of Singapore. Her publications include Contesting Space: 
Power Relations and the Urban Built Environment in Colonial Singapore, 
Gender and Migration, Gender Politics in the Asia- Pacific Region (with 
Peggy Teo and Shirlena Huang), Migration and Health in Asia (with San-
tosh Jatrana and Mika Toyota), and Asian Women as Transnational Domes-
tic Workers (with Shirlena Huang and Noor Abdul Rahman).

reFerenCes 
Amin, Samir, ed. 1974. Modern Migrations in Western Africa. London: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
Anderson, Benedict. 1991. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and 
Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso.
———. 1994. “Exodus.” Critical Inquiry 20, no. 2: 314–27.
Ando, Kiyoshi. 1949. “Hojin shakai no genron shichoshi ron” [On the history of 
the publication and thought in the Japanese society in Brazil]. In Imin 40- nenshi 
[40- year history of immigration], ed. Rokuro Koyama, 301–22. São Paulo: Private 
Edition.
Appadurai, Arjun. 1993. “Patriotism and Its Futures.” Public Culture 5 (3): 411–29.
———. 1996. Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Modernity. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press.
Asahi Shinbun Tokuhakisha- dan. 1972. Guamu ni ikita nijūhachinen: Yokoi Shōichi 
san no kiroku [The twenty- eight years of survival in Guam: The records of the life 
of Mr. Yokoi Shōichi]. Tokyo: Asahi Shinbun- sha.
Ashutosh, Ishan, and Alison Mountz. 2011. “Migration Management for the Benefit 
of Whom? Interrogating the Work of the International Organization for Migra-
tion.” Citizenship Studies 15, no. 1: 21–38.
Baerwald, Hans H. 1983. “Diet.” In Kōdansha Encyclopedia of Japan, vol. 2, 94–96. 
Tokyo: Kōdansha.
Bai Ren. 1983. “Guiqiao rencai wailiu zai Xianggang” [Outflow of returned overseas 
Chinese talents in Hong Kong]. Dipingxian, no. 30: 22–23.
Balachandran, G. 2012. Globalizing Labour? Indian Seafarers and World Shipping, 
c. 1870–1950. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Barabantseva, Elena. 2011. Overseas Chinese, Ethnic Minorities and Nationalism: 
De- centering China. New York: Routledge.
Battistella, Graziano, and Maruja M. B. Asis. 2003. “Southeast Asia and the Specter 
of Unauthorized Migration.” In Unauthorized Migration in Southeast Asia, ed. 
184 References
Graziano Battistella and Maruja M. B. Asis, 1–10. Quezon City: Scalabrini Migra-
tion Center.
Beijing Huawen Jiaoyu Zhongxin, ed. 2000. Zouguo Wushi Nian [Special issue for 
the fiftieth anniversary of Beijing Hauqiao Preparatory School]. Beijing: The 
School.
Benkan Bianjibu. 1958. “Dali guanche shehuizhuyi qiaowu luxian” [To vigorously 
implement socialist qiaowu Course]. Qiaowu Bao, no. 9: 16.
———. 1959. “Guanyu huaqiao nongchang ruogan wenti de huida” [Clarifications 
of some concerns regarding the returned Overseas Chinese farms]. Qiaowu Bao, 
no. 9: 35.
———. 1962. “Yikao qunzhong, minzhu banchang, zhengqu genghao shoucheng” 
[Relying on the masses, managing the farm in a democratic way and aiming for 
greater harvests]. Qiaowu Bao, no. 1: 4.
———. 1966. “Relie huanying ni, zuguo de hao ernv” [Warm welcome to the 
motherland’s great children]. Qiaowu Bao, no. 12: 30.
———. 1980. “Guiqiao, qiaojuan zhishifenzi daliang wailiu de zhuangkuang hen 
zhide zhongshi” [The outflows of intellectuals among Guiqiao and Qiaojuan 
deserved our serious attention]. Qiaolian Dongtai 12: 22.
Berking, Helmuth. 2004. “Dwelling in Displacement: On Diasporization and the 
Production of National Subjects.” In Worlds on the Move: Globalization, Migra-
tion, and Cultural Security, ed. Jonathon Friedman and Shalini Randeria, 103–15. 
London: I. B. Tauris.
Biess, Frank. 2006. Homecomings: Returning pows and the Legacies of Defeat in Post-
war Germany. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Biswas, Shampa. 2005. “Globalization and the Nation Beyond: The Indian- American 
Diaspora and the Rethinking of Territory, Citizenship and Democracy.” New 
Political Science 27, no. 1: 43–67.
Bohning, W. R. 1979. “International Migration in Western Europe: Reflections on the 
Past Five Years.” International Labour Review 118, no. 4: 251–77.
Bon Tempo, Carl J. 2008. Americans at the Gate: The United States and Refugees dur-
ing the Cold War. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Bose, Pablo S. 2007. “Dreaming of Diasporas: Urban Developments and Transna-
tional Identities in Contemporary Kolkata.” topia: Canadian Journal of Cultural 
Studies 17 (Spring): 111–30.
Bracken, Amy. 2009, September 1. “No Mercy: Haitian Criminal Deportees.” North 
American Congress on Latin America Report. https://nacla.org/node/6090.
Burajiru Jiho. 1920a, January 23. “Hakukoku ni ochitsuke” [Settle down in Brazil]. 
Editorial.
———. 1920b, June 9. “Kika to kokuseki” [Naturalization and nationality].
Carlson, Gene. 2007, February 12. “Cambodia: From la gangs to Phnom Penh, Lack 
of Citizenship Turns World Upside Down.” Refugees International. http://www 
.refintl.org/content/cambodia- la- gangs- phnom- penh- lack- citizenship- turns 
- world- upside- down.
Castles, Stephen. 2004. “Why Migration Policies Fail.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 27, 
no. 2: 205–27.
References 185
———. 2006. “Guestworkers in Europe: A Resurrection?” International Migration 
Review 40, no. 4: 741–66.
Census and Statistics Department of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. 
2000. “Returnees to Hong Kong.” In Social Data Collected via the General House-
hold Survey, Special Topics Report No. 25, 47–46. Hong Kong: Social Analysis and 
Research Section, Census and Statistics Department, Government of Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region.
Centro de Estudos Nipo- Brasileiros. 2002. Relatório: Pesquisa de Comunidade 
Nikkei [Report: Study of Nikkei community]. São Paulo: Centro de Estudos Nipo- 
Brasileiros.
Chacko, Elizabeth. 2007. “From Brain Drain to Brain Gain: Reverse Migration to 
Bangalore and Hyderabad, India’s Globalizing High Tech Cities.” Geojournal 138 
(2–3): 131–40.
Chakravarty, Paula. 2005. “Weak Winners of Globalization: Indian h1- b Workers in 
the American Information Economy.” aapi Nexus 3, no. 2: 59–84.
Chandler, David. 1993. A History of Cambodia. 2nd ed. Boulder: Westview Press.
Chatterjee, Partha. 1986. Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative 
Discourse? London: Zed Books for the United Nations University.
Chen Guojun. 1960. “Zuguo shi wennuan de da jiating” [Motherland is a big warm 
family]. Qiaowu Bao, no. 1: 22.
Chen Kuan- Hsing. 2010. Asia as Method: Toward Deimperialization. Durham: Duke 
University Press.
Chen Xiangming. 2005. As Borders Bend: Transnational Spaces on the Pacific Rim. 
Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield.
Chin, Christine. 2008. “Diversification and Privatization: Securing Insecurities in 
the Receiving Country of Malaysia.” Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology 9, no. 4: 
285–303.
ChinCa (China’s International Contractors’ Association). 2004, December. Zhong-
guo duiwai laowu hezuo niandu baobao 2004 [Annual report on China’s inter-
national labor collaboration]. Beijing: Zhongguo Duiwai Chengbao Gongchen 
Shanghui.
Choi Woogill. 2001. “The Korean Minority in China: The Change of Its Identity.” 
Development and Society 30, no. 1: 119–41.
Chusho Kigyo- cho. 1987. Showa 61- nendo- ban chusho kigyo hakusho [White book on 
small and medium enterprises in Japan Fy 1986]. Tokyo: Chusho Kigyo- cho.
Cnn World. 2009, September 2. “Mayor: Deportations Harm Juarez, United States.” 
http://www.studentnews.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/americas/09/02/mexico.juarez 
.deportations/index.html.
Comaroff, John L., and Jean Comaroff. 2009. Ethnicity, Inc. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press.
Comissão de Elaboração da História dos 80 Anos da Imigração Japonesa no Brasil, 
Sociedade Brasileira de Cultura Japonesa. 1992. Uma Epopéia Moderna [A mod-
ern epic]. São Paulo: Editora huCiTeC.
Commission of the European Communities. 2007, May 16. “Communication from 
the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Eco-
186 References
nomic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: On Circular  
Migration and Mobility Partnerships between the European Union and Third 
Countries.” CeleX no. 52007dC0248 Brussels. http://eur- lex.europa.eu/LexUri 
Serv/LexUriServ.do?uri=com:2007:0248:fin:en:html.
Cong Zhongxiao. 2004, June 1. “Riben dedao toukui zhongguo nv yanxiusheng 
de laoban zhengshi jugong daoqian” [Japanese boss in Tokushima who peeped 
female trainees formally bowed and apologized]. Guanxi Huawen Shibao (Osaka). 
http://www.chinanews.com/news/2004year/2004–06–01/26/443386.shtml. Last 
accessed February 4, 2013.
Coppel, Charles A. 1983. Indonesian Chinese in Crisis. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
Cotia Sangyo Kumiai. 1956. “Showa 30- nendo Cotia Sangyo Kumiai Tandoku Seinen 
Koyo Imin no dai 1- ji boshu yoko” [The Guideline for the primary recruitment 
of Cotia Agricultural Cooperative’s Youth Employment Emigration for Fy 1956]. 
Gaimu- Sho Gaiko Shiryokan [Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Japan].
Das, Veena. 1995. Critical Events: Moments in the Life of a Nation. Delhi: University 
of Oxford Press.
David, Fiona. 2007. “asean and Trafficking in Persons: Using Data as a Tool to 
Combat Trafficking in Persons.” Report prepared for asean and ioM.
Deeherd, C. 2003, January 14. “Home Isn’t Sweet for Cambodians Deported from 
the U.S.” Seattle Times, a10.
de Genova, Nicholas. 2002. “Migrant ‘Illegality’ and Deportability in Everyday Life.” 
Annual Review of Anthropology 31: 419–47.
de Haas, Hein. 2006. “Migration, Remittances and Regional Development in South-
ern Morocco.” Geoforum 37, no. 4: 565–80.
Deportation Nation. 2011. “Round- up: Immigration and Enforcement Systems  
under Fire Amidst Record- Number Deportations.” http://www.deportation 
nation.org/2011/10/round- up- immigration- and- enforcement- systems- under 
- fire- admist- record- number- deportations/.
Dickinson, Jen, and Adrian J. Bailey. 2007. “(Re)membering Diaspora: Uneven 
Geographies of Indian Dual Citizenship.” Political Geography 26, no. 7: 757–74.
Dikotter, Frank. 1990. “Group Definition and the Idea of Race in Modern China 
(1793–1949).” Ethnic and Racial Studies 13, no. 3: 420–29.
Doezema, Jo. 2010. Sex Slaves and Discourse Masters: The Construction of Trafficking. 
London: Zed.
Dower, John W. 1979. Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese 
Experience, 1878–1954. Cambridge: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard Uni-
versity.
———. 1986. War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War. New York: 
Pantheon.
———. 1999. Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II. New York: 
W. W. Norton and Company.
Duara, Prasenjit. 1995. Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of 
Modern China. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
References 187
———. 1996. “De- constructing the Chinese Nation.” In Chinese Nationalism, ed. 
Jonathan Unger, 31–55. Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe.
———. 2008. “The Global and Regional Constitution of Nations: The View from 
East Asia.” Nations and Nationalism 14, no. 2: 323–46.
———. 2009. The Global and Regional in China’s Nation- Formation. London: Rout-
ledge.
———. 2010. “Asia Redux: Conceptualizing a Region for Our Times.” The Journal of 
Asian Studies 69, no. 4: 963–83.
Dudden, Alexis. 2008. Troubled Apologies among Japan, Korea, and the United States. 
New York: Columbia University Press.
Edwards, Kate. 2008. “For a Geohistorical Cosmopolitanism: Postcolonial State 
Strategies, Cosmopolitan Communities, and the Production of the ‘British,’ 
‘Overseas,’ ‘Non- resident,’ and ‘Global’ Indian.” Environment and Planning D: 
Society and Space 26 (3): 444–63.
Ehrlich, Richard S. 2003, September 1. “American Felons Deported to Cambodia.” 
The Laissez Faire Electronic Times. http://www.oocities.org/asia_correspondent 
/cambodia03amerfelonset.html. Last accessed February 21, 2013.
Evans, Peter. 1995. Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Faist, Thomas. 2000. “Transnationalisation in International Migration: Implica-
tions for the Study of Citizenship and Culture.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 23, no. 2: 
189–222.
Fang Fang. 1961. “Fang Fang fu zhuren xiang quanguo zhengxie baogao qiaowu 
gongzuo” [Fang Fang, the deputy director of state commission of Chinese affairs, 
reporting Overseas Chinese affairs to the National Political Consultative Confer-
ence]. Qiaowu Bao, no. 6: 2–3.
Fang Xiongpu and Feng Ziping. 2001. Hauqiao Huaren Baike Quanshu: Qiaoxiang 
Juan [Encyclopedia of overseas Chinese: The volume of qiaoxiang]. Beijing: 
Zhongguo Huaqiao Chubanshe.
Fernandes, Leela. 2006. India’s New Middle Class; Democratic Politics in an Era of 
Economic Reform. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Field, Frank. 2008, September 8. “Balance the Ins and Outs.” The Guardian. http://
www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/sep/08/immigrationpolicy.eu. Last 
accessed February 4, 2013.
Fitzgerald, John. 1996. “The Nationless State: The Search for a Nation in Mod-
ern Chinese Nationalism.” In Chinese Nationalism, ed. Jonathan Unger, 56–85. 
Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe.
Fitzgerald, Stephen. 1972. China and the Overseas Chinese: A Study of Peking’s Chang-
ing Policy, 1949–1970. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ford, Michele. 2006. “After Nunukan: Recent Developments in the Regulation of 
Labour Migration from Indonesia to Malaysia.” In Mobility, Labour Migration and 
Border Controls in Asia, ed. Amarjit Kaur and Ian Metcalfe, 228–47. London: Pal-
grave Macmillan.
Ford, Michele, and Lenore Lyons. 2012. “Counter- trafficking and Migrant Labour 
Activism in Indonesia’s Periphery.” In Labour Mobility and Human Trafficking in 
188 References
Southeast Asia: Critical Perspectives, ed. Michele Ford, Lenore Lyons, and Willem 
van Schendel, 75–94. New York: Routledge.
Fujita, Toshiro. 1921, May 13. “Zairyumin shokun ni tsugu” [An announcement to 
the expatriates in Brazil], Burajiru Jiho.
Gaimu- sho. 1941. Burajiu ni okeru Nihonjin hattenshi jo- kan [The history of the 
development of the Japanese in Brazil, vol. 1]. Tokyo: Gaimu- sho America- Kyoku.
———. 1953. Burajiu ni okeru Nihonjin hattenshi ge- kan [The history of the devel-
opment of the Japanese in Brazil, vol. 2]. Tokyo: Gaimu- sho Obei- Kyoku Iminka.
Gania, Edwin T. 2006. U.S. Immigration: Step by Step. Naperville, Ill.: Sphinx Pub.
Gao Mingxuan. 1956. “Bixu zuohao dui guiguo huaqiao zhigong de anzhi gong-
zuo” [Must fulfill the task of allocating returned Overseas Chinese to state units]. 
Qiaowu Bao, no. 3: 3–5.
Geithner, Peter F., Paula D. Johnson, and Lincoln C. Chen, eds. 2004. Diaspora Phi-
lanthropy and Equitable Development in China and India. Cambridge: Global 
Equity Initiative and Harvard University Press.
Gerson, Jeffrey N. 2008. “The Battle for Control of the Trairatanaram Cambodian 
Temple.” In Southeast Asian Refugees and Immigrants in the Mill City: Changing 
Families, Communities, Institutions—Thirty Years Afterward, ed. Pho Tuyet- Lan, 
Jeffrey N. Gerson, and Sylvia R. Cowan, 153–72. Burlington: University of Ver-
mont Press.
Ghosh, Bimal. 1998. Huddled Masses and Uncertain Shores: Insights into Irregular 
Migration. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Gibney, Matthew J., and Randall Hansen, eds. 2005. Immigration and Asylum: From 
1900 to the Present, Volume 3. Santa Barbara, Calif.: abC- Clio.
“Give Ops Tegas a Chance.” 2005, March 22. Daily Express (Sabah, Malaysia). http://
www.dailyexpress.com.my/news.cfm?NewsID=33404. Last accessed December 27, 
2008.
Gladney, Druc. 1998. Making Majorities: Constituting the Nation in Japan, Korea, 
China, Malaysia, Fiji, Turkey, and the United States. Stanford: Stanford University 
Press.
Global Commission of International Migration. 2005, October 5. “Migration in an 
Interconnected World: New Directions for Action. Report of the Global Commis-
sion on International Migration.” http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/435f81814 
.html.
Godley, Michael R. 1989. “The Sojourner: Returned Overseas Chinese in the People’s 
Republic of China.” Pacific Affairs 62, no. 3: 330–52.
Goldman, Michael. 2011. “Speculative Urbanism and the Making of the Next World 
City.” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 35, no. 3: 555–81.
Goss, Jon, and Bruce Lindquist. 1995. “Conceptualizing International Labour Migra-
tion: A Structuration Perspective.” International Migration Review 29, no. 2: 
317–51.
Guowuyuan Qiaoban ji Zhongyang Wenxian Yanjiushi, ed. 2000. Deng Xiaoping 
lun qiaowu [Deng Xiaoping’s speeches on qiaowu]. Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian 
Chubanshe.
Hagan, Jacqueline, Karl Eschbach, and Nestor Rodriguez. 2008. “U.S. Deporta-
References 189
tion Policy, Family Separation, and Circular Migration.” Immigration Migration 
Review 42, no. 1: 64–88.
Haines, David W. 2010. Safe Haven? A History of Refugees in America. Sterling, Va.: 
Kumarian Press.
Handa, Tomoo. 1966. “Doho syakai no shisoshi no ichi danmen” [An aspect of the 
intellectual history of the society of the compatriots]. In Ima nao tabiji ni ari: Aru 
imin no zuiso [Still on my journey: Essays of an immigrant], 140–55. São Paulo: 
San Pauro Jinmon Kagaku Kenkyukai.
———. 1987. O imigrante Japonês: História de sua vida no Brasil [The Japanese 
immigrant: The history of his life in Brazil]. São Paulo: Centro de Estudos Nipo- 
Brasileiro.
Hansen, Thomas B., and Finn Stepputat. 2005. “Introduction.” In Sovereign Bodies: 
Citizens, Migrants, and States in the Postcolonial World, ed. Thomas Blom Hansen 
and Finn Stepputat, 1–36. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Hardt, Michael, and Antonio Negri. 2000. Empire. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press.
———. 2004. Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire. New York: Pen-
guin.
Hayashi, Eiichi. 2007. Zanryū Nihonhei no shinjitsu [The reality of the Japanese sol-
diers who had been left behind]. Tokyo: Sakuhin- sha.
———. 2009. Tōbu Jawa no Nihonjin heishi [The Japanese soldiers in the eastern 
Java]. Tokyo: Sakuhin- sha.
Hayashi, Fumiko. 1988. “Furōji” [Homeless children]. In Bungei Shunjū ni miru 
Shōwa- shi, vol. 2, ed. Bungei Shunjū- sha, 26–34. Tokyo: Bungei Shunjū- sha.
Hein, Jeremy. 1995. From Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia: A Refugee Experience in the 
United States. New York: Twayne.
Hemingway, Ernest. 1996. “Soldier’s Home.” In In Our Time, 69–77. New York: 
Scribner.
Hernández- Coss, R., G. Brown, C. Buchori, I. Endo, E. Todoroki, T. Naovalitha, 
W. Noor, and C. Mar. 2008. “The Malaysia- Indonesia Remittance Corridor: 
Making Formal Transfers the Best Options for Women and Undocumented 
Migrants.” Working Paper no. 149, the World Bank.
Hernandez- Leon, Ruben. 2005. “The Migration Industry in the Mexico-U.S. Migra-
tory System.” On- line Working Paper Series, California Center for Population  
Research, UC Los Angeles, http://escholarship.org/uc/item/3hg44330. Last 
accessed February 18, 2013.
Hesford, Wendy S., and Wendy Kozol. 2005. “Introduction.” In Just Advocacy: 
Women’s Human Rights, Transnational Feminisms, and the Politics of Representa-
tion, ed. W. S. Hesford and W. Kozol, 1–29. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers Univer-
sity Press.
He Xiankai, ed. 1994. Guoji laowu hezuo shiwu [Practical issues in international 
labor cooperation]. Beijing: Beijing Gongye Daxue Chubanshe.
Higuchi, Naoto. 2005, November 30–December 2. “Brazilian Migration to Japan: 
Trends, Modalities, and Impact.” Paper presented at the Expert Group Meeting on 
International Migration and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean, 
190 References
Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations 
Secretariat, Mexico City.
Hing, Bill Ong. 2005. “Deporting Cambodian Refugees: Justice Denied?” Crime and 
Delinquency 51, no. 2: 265–90.
Hirschman, Albert O. 1970. Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Declines in Firms, 
Organizations, and States. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Holst, Frederik. 2009, August 8. “Creating the Outside ‘Other’: The Role of Migrant 
Workers in Malaysia’s Media Discourse.” Paper presented at Sixth International 
Convention of Asia Scholars, Daejeon, South Korea.
Homu- sho Nyuukoku Kanrikyoku. 2008. Heisei 20- nendo Shutsunyuu- koku Kanri 
[Emigration and immigration control, Fy 2007]. Tokyo: Homu- sho.
Hong, Sisi. 1989. “Huaqiao dui xinhai geming de juda gongxian” [The great contri-
bution of Overseas Chinese to the 1911 revolution]. In Zheng Min and Liang Chu-
ming, eds., Huaqiao huaren shi yanjiu ji, di yi ji [Selected works of the research on 
Overseas Chinese history, volume 1], 146–63. Beijing: Haiyang Chubanshe.
Hong Kong Transition Project. 2002, May. “The First Five Years: Floundering Gov-
ernment, Foundering Democracy?” Hong Kong Baptist University, Government  
and International Studies. http://hktp.hkbu.edu.hk/5years/5years.pdf. Last 
accessed February 4, 2013.
Huang Jing. 1999. “Guiqiao zai Zhongguo dalu de wenhua shiying (1949–1998): Dui 
Beijing Yinni guiqiao qunti de diaocha fenxi” [Cultural adaptation of returned 
Overseas Chinese in mainland China (1949–1998): A survey on returned Over-
seas Chinese from Indonesia in Beijing]. Huaqiao Huaren Lishi Yanjiu, no. 45: 
45–54.
Huang Shentien. 2011. “Yanbian Chaoxianzu shuanyujaoyu xiankuan ji fenxi” [Con-
ditions and analysis of bilingual education among Chaoxianzu in Yanbian]. Jiaoyu 
Jiaoxue Luntan [Education Teaching Forum] no. 5: 191–92.
Huang Xiaojian. 2005. Guiguo huaqiao de lishi yu xianzhuang [The history and 
present situation of the returned Overseas Chinese]. Hong Kong: Xianggang She-
hui Kexue Chubanshe Youxian Gongsi.
Huang Xiaojian, Zhao Hongying, and Cong Yuefen. 1995. Haiwai qiaobao yu kangri 
zhanzheng [Overseas Chinese and the anti- Japanese war]. Beijing: Beijing Chu-
banshe.
Hugo, Graeme. 2004. “International Migration in Southeast Asia since World 
War II.” In International Migration in Southeast Asia, ed. Aris Ananta and Evi 
Nurvidya Arifin, 28–70. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
———. 2009. “Best Practices in Temporary Labour Migration for Development:  
A Perspective from Asia and the Pacific.” International Migration 47, no. 5: 23–74.
Hyland, Anne. 2007, April 13. “The Outsiders.” The Wall Street Journal. http://online 
.wsj.com/article/SB117639427943467835.html. Last accessed February 4, 2013.
Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística. 2003. Atlas do censo demográfico 2000 
[Atlas of the demographic census of 2000]. Rio de Janeiro: Instituto Brasileiro de 
Geografia e Estatística.
International Human Rights Clinic, UC- Berkeley School of Law; Chief Justice Earl 
Warren Institute on Race, Ethnicity and Diversity, UC- Berkeley School of Law; 
References 191
Immigration Law Clinic, UC- Davis School of Law. 2010. In the Child’s Best Inter-
est? The Consequences of Losing a Lawful Immigrant Parent to Deportation. Report 
available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Human_Rights_report.pdf. Last 
accessed February 20, 2013.
International Organization for Migration. 2002, May. “Assisted Voluntary Return 
Programmes in Europe.” Geneva: International Organization for Migration.
———. 2004. Return Migration: Policies and Practices in Europe. Geneva: Interna-
tional Organization for Migration.
———. 2006. World Migration 2005.
Itō, Tadahiko. 1972. Nihonjin sono sei to shi: Yokoi Shōichi kiseki no nijūhachinen 
[The life and death of the Japanese: Yokoi Shōichi and the miracle of twenty- eight 
years]. Tokyo: Nichigei Shuppan.
Jeon Hyeon- su. 2004. “Jungguk Joseonjok- ui hangukjeonjaeng chamjeon yeongu” 
[A study on the participation in the Korean War of ethnic Koreans in China]. 
Gukminyunri Yeongu 57: 241–70.
Jiang Zemin. 2001. “Jiang Zemin zai qingzhu jiandang bashi zhounian dahui shang 
de jianghua” [Jiang Zemin’s speech at the celebration conference for the 80th 
anniversary of the founding of CCp], Renmin Ribao [People’s daily], July 2. http://
www. people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/16/20010702/501591.html. Last accessed May 
16, 2013.
Jones, Sidney. 2000. Making Money off Migrants: The Indonesian Exodus to Malaysia. 
Hong Kong: Asia 2000.
Jonsson, Patrik, and Kristen Chick. 2009, June 18.“Many Iraqi Refugees in U.S. Now 
in Dire Straits.” Christian Science Monitor. http://www.csmonitor.com/2009/0618 
/p02s15- usfp.html. Accessed February 16, 2013.
Kaigai Nikkeijin Renraku Kyokai. 1960. Kaigai Nikkeijin Taikai ni tsuite: Kaigai Nik-
keijin Kyokai setsuritsu [On the Convention of the Overseas Japanese and Their 
Descendants: Founding the Association of the Overseas Japanese and Their 
Descendants]. Tokyo: Kaigai Nikkeijin Renraku Kyokai.
Kalick, Konrad. 2009. “Ethnic Nationalism and Political Community: The Overseas 
Suffrage Debates in Japan and South Korea.” Asian Studies Review 33 (2): 175–95.
Kanstroom, Daniel. 2007. Deportation Nation: Outsiders in American History. Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press.
Kapur, Devesh. 2002. “The Causes and Consequences of India’s iT Boom.” India 
Review 1 (2): 91–110.
———. 2003. “Indian Diaspora as a Strategic Asset.” Economic and Political Weekly 
38, no. 5: 445–48.
Kaur, Amarjit. 2006. “Order (and Disorder) at the Border: International Migration 
and Border Controls in Southeast Asia.” In Mobility, Labour Migration and Bor-
der Controls in Asia, ed. Amarjit Kaur and Ian Metcalfe, 23–51. London: Palgrave 
Macmillan.
Kawabata, Sajiro. 1941, May 10. “Koei aru taikyaku imin taran” [We shall be the 
glorious retreat migrants]. Seisyu Shimpo.
Kawasaki, Masumi. 2003. Kaettekita Taiwanjin Nihonhei [The Japanese soldier of the 
Taiwanese descent who returned home]. Tokyo: Bungei Shunjū Shinsho.
192 References
Kempadoo, Kamala, ed. 2005. Trafficking and Prostitution Reconsidered: New Per-
spectives on Migration, Sex Work, and Human Rights. Boulder: Paradigm Pub-
lishers.
Khadria, Binod. 1999. The Migration of Knowledge Workers: Second- Generation 
Effects of India’s Brain Drain. New Delhi: Sage.
———. 2001. “Shifting Paradigms of Globalization: The Twenty- First Century Tran-
sition towards Generics in Skilled Migration from India.” International Migration 
of the Highly Skilled 39, no. 5: 45–72.
King, Russell, ed. 1986. Return Migration and Regional Economic Problems. London: 
Croom Helm.
———. 2000. “Generalization from the History of Return Migration.” In Return 
Migration: Journey of Hope or Despair?, ed. Bhimal Ghosh, 7–56. Geneva: ioM/un.
Kishimoto, Kyuyo. 1947. Nambei no senya ni koritsu shite [Standing alone in the 
South American battlefield]. São Paulo: Private Edition.
Kokusai Kyoryoku Jigyodan. 1987. Kaigai ijuu toukei Showa 27- nendo- 61- nendo 
[Statistics of the overseas emigration Fy 1951–86]. Tokyo: Kokusai Kyoryoku 
Jig yodan [Japan International Cooperation Agency].
Kosei- sho Daijin Kambo Kikakushitsu. 1956. “Kosei hakusho: Showa 31- nendo- ban” 
[White paper of the health and welfare: Fy 1955]. Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Simpo Sha.
———. 1997. Engo gojūnen- shi [The fifty- year history of the state’s assistance of the 
repatriates]. Tokyo: Gyōsei.
———. 2000a. Hikiage engo no kiroku [The records of the state’s assistance of the 
repatriates]. Tokyo: Kuresu Shuppan.
———. 2000b. Zoku hikiage engo no kiroku [The sequel to the records of the state’s 
assistance of the repatriates]. Tokyo: Kuresu Shuppan.
Koser, Khalid. 2000. “Return, Readmission and Reintegration: Changing Agendas, 
Policy Frameworks and Operational Programmes.” In Return Migration: Journey 
of Hope or Despair?, ed. Bimal Ghosh, 57–99. Geneva: International ioM/un.
Koser, Khalid, and Richard Black. 1999. “The End of the Refugee Cycle?” In The End 
of the Refugee Cycle: Refugee Repatriation and Reconstruction, ed. Richard Black 
and Khalid Koser, 2–17. New York: Berghahn.
Kosonju. 1941a, July 5. “Zaihaku Nihonjin no yukue” [The future of the Japanese in 
Brazil]. Seisyu Shimpo.
———. 1941b, July 9. “Zaihaku Nihonjin no yukue” [The future of the Japanese in 
Brazil]. Seisyu Shimpo.
———. 1941c, July 12. “Zaihaku Nihonjin no yukue” [The future of the Japanese in 
Brazil]. Seisyu Shimpo.
Krishna, V. V., and B. Khadria. 1997. “Phasing Scientific Migration in the Context 
of Brain Gain and Brain Drain in India.” Science, Technology and Society 2, no. 2: 
348–85.
Krugman, Paul. 2006, March 31. “The Road to Dubai.” New York Times. http://
query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=F60F12FC39540C728FDDAA0894
DE404482). Last accessed February 4, 2013.
Labrianidis, Lois, and Brikena Kazazi. 2006. “Albanian Return- Migrants from 
References 193
Greece and Italy: Their Impact upon Spatial Disparities within Albania.” Euro-
pean Urban and Regional Studies 13, no. 1: 59–74.
Laclau, Ernesto. 2005. On Populist Reason. London: Verso.
Lakzco, Frank. 2000. “Return Migration: Reshaping Policy Approaches.” In Return 
Migration: Journey of Hope or Despair?, ed. Bimal Ghosh, 153–80. Geneva: ioM/
un.
Lawless, Richard. 1986. “Return Migration to Algeria: The Impact of State Inter-
vention.” In Return Migration and Regional Economic Problems, ed. Russell King, 
213–42. London: Croom Helm.
Lee, J., A. Lei, and S. Sue. 2001. “The Current State of Mental Health Research on 
Asian Americans.” In Psychosocial Aspects of the Asian American Experience: 
Diversity within Diversity, ed. Choi N. G., 159–78. Binghamton, N.Y.: Hayworth.
Lee, Jonathan H. X. 2010. “Cambodian American Ethics of Identity Formation.” In 
Cambodian American Experiences: Histories, Communities, Cultures, and Identi-
ties, ed. Jonathan H. X. Lee, 343–53. Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall Hunt.
Lee Chulwoo. 2003. “‘Us’ and ‘Them’ in Korean Law: The Creation, Accommodation 
and Exclusion of Outsiders in South Korea.” In East Asian Law: Universal Norms 
and Local Cultures, ed. Arthus Rosett, Lucie Cheng, and Margaret Y. K. Woo, 
106–36. London: RoutledgeCurzon.
Lee Hye- kyung. 2008. “Hanguk iminjeongchaegui suryeomhyeonsang: Hwakdaewa 
poseobui banghyangeuro” [The shift of immigration policy toward expansion and 
inclusion in South Korea]. Hanguksahoehak 42, no. 2: 104–37.
Lee Jeanyoung. 2002a. “Hangukui jaeoedongpo jeongchaek” [The policy on overseas 
Koreans in ROK]. ioM Migration Research and Training Center Working Paper 
Series, No. 2010–11.
———. 2002b. “Hanjung oegyogwangyewa jaejung dongpo: Jaeoe dongpobeob 
heonbeob bulilchi gyeoljeongeul jungsimeuro” [ROK- PRC diplomatic relations 
and Korean Chinese: On the decision that oKa violated the constitution]. Gukga-
jeollyak 8, no. 4: 77–99.
Lee Jeanyoung, Hye- kyung Lee, and Hyun Mee Kim. 2008. “Bangmunchuieopje- e  
daehan siltae mit dongpo manjokdo josa” [Research on the real conditions of 
visiting employment system and the satisfaction from the ethnic Koreans from 
abroad]. Report, Ministry of Justice Korean Immigration Service, Republic of 
Korea.
Lesser, Jeffrey. 1999. Negotiating National Identities: Immigrants, Minorities, and the 
Struggle for Ethnicity in Brazil. Durham: Duke University Press.
Lessinger, Johanna. 1992. “Investing or Going Home? A Transnational Strategy 
among Indian Immigrants in the United States.” In Towards a Transnational Per-
spective on Migration: Race, Class, Ethnicity, and Nationalism Reconsidered, vol. 
645, ed. N. Glick Schiller, L. Basch, and C. Blanc- Szanton, 53–80. New York: New 
York Academy of Sciences.
Ley, David, and Audrey Kobayashi. 2005. “Back to Hong Kong: Return Migration or 
Transnational Sojourn?” Global Networks 5, no. 2: 111–28.
Liao Hui. 1989. “Zai guowuyuan qiaowu gongzuo shuiyi shang de gongzuo baogao” 
194 References
[Working report to the Overseas Chinese Affairs Conference of the State Coun-
cil]. Qiaowu Gongzuo Yanjiu 4: 7.
Li Cheng, ed. 2005. Bridging Minds across the Pacific: U.S.- China Educational 
Exchanges, 1978–2003. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
Li Minghuan. 2001. “Oumeng guojia yimin zhengce yu Zhongguo xinyimin” [Immi-
gration policies of eu states and new Chinese immigrants]. Xiamen Daxue Xue-
bao, no. 4: 105–12.
———, ed. 2005. Fujian qiaoxiang diaocha: Qiaoxiang rentong, qiaoxiang wangluo 
and qiaoxiang wenhua [An investigation of homes of overseas Chinese in Fujian: 
Identity, network, and culture]. Xiamen: Xiamen Daxue Chubanshe.
Lim Sun- il. 2010. “Esnisiti byeonhyeongeul tonghan hanguk sahoe ijunodongja- ui 
munhwa byeonyong yeongu: hangukgyewa bihangukgye ijunodongja- ui sarye 
bigyo” [A study on the acculturation through ethnicity transformation of migrant 
workers in Korea: A comparative analysis of ethnic Korean and non- Korean 
groups]. PhD diss., Sungkonghoe University.
Lindquist, Johan. 2009. The Anxieties of Mobility: Development and Migration in the 
Indonesian Borderlands. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press.
———. 2010a. “Images and Evidence: Human Trafficking, Auditing, and the Pro-
duction of Illicit Markets in Southeast Asia and Beyond.” Public Culture 22, no. 2: 
223–36.
———. 2010b. “Labour Recruitment, Circuits of Capital and Gendered Mobility: 
Reconceptualizing the Indonesian Migration Industry.” Pacific Affairs 83, no. 1: 
115–32.
Li Tao, ed. 2000. Zhonghua liuxue jiaoyu shilu [A history of Chinese going abroad 
for education]. Beijing: Gaodeng Jiaoyu Chubanshe.
Liu Hong. 2005. “New Migration and the Revival of Overseas Chinese Nationalism.” 
Journal of Contemporary China 14, no. 43: 291–316.
Li Yu- ning. 1971. The Introduction of Socialism into China. New York: Columbia Uni-
versity Press.
Long, Lynellyn D., and Ellen Oxfeld, eds. 2004. Coming Home? Refugees, Migrants 
and Those Who Stayed at Home. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Lu, Melody Chia- Wen. 2011. “Appearance and Techniques of Migration Control: 
Examining Labour Migration Regimes in East Asia.” In Constructing and Imag-
ining Labour Migration: Perspectives of Control from Five Continents, ed. Elspeth 
Guild and Sandra Mantu, 87–108. London: Ashgate.
Lu Haiyun and Quan Haosheng, eds. 2001. Guiqiao qiaojuan gaishu [A general 
account of guiqiao and qiaojuan]. Beijing: Huaqiao Chubanshe.
Lu Xinyuan. 1956. “Guanyu jiedai he anzhi guiguo huaqiao de gongzuo: Zai zhong-
hua quanguo qiaolian chengli dahui shang de baogao” [On the tasks of receiving 
and allocating returned Overseas Chinese: A report to the inaugural meeting of 
All- China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese]. Qiaowu Bao, no. 2: 13, 17.
Ly, Kuong Chang. 2010. “Between Two Lives.” In Cambodian American Experiences: 
Histories, Communities, Cultures, and Identities, ed. Jonathan H. X. Lee, 332–42. 
Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall Hunt.
References 195
Mabogunje, Akin L. 1970. “Systems Approach to a Theory of Rural- Urban Migra-
tion.” Geographical Analysis 2, no. 1: 1–18.
Mackie, J. A. C., ed. 1976. The Chinese in Indonesia: Five Essays. Canberra: The Aus-
tralian Institute of International Affairs.
Maeyama, Takashi. 1982. Imin no Nihon kaiki undo [The Japanese immigrant’s 
revitalization movement]. Tokyo: Nippon Syuppan Hoso Kyokai.
Mahbubani, Kishore. 2008. The New Asian Hemisphere: The Irresistible Shift of 
Global Power to the East. New York: Public Affairs.
Mainichi Shinbun- sha Henshû- bu, ed. 1972. Saigo no ippei: Guamu- to shuzaikisha- 
dan no zen kiroku [The last soldier: The records by the expedition group to the 
island of Guam]. Tokyo: Mainichi Shinbun- sha.
Malkki, Liisa. 1995a. Purity and Exile: Violence, Memory, and National Cosmology 
among Hutu Refugees in Tanzania. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
———. 1995b. “Refugees and Exile: From ‘Refugee Studies’ to the National Order of 
Things.” Annual Review of Anthropology 24: 495–523.
Mallett, Shelley. 2004. “Understanding Home: A Critical Review of the Literature.” 
The Sociological Review 52, no. 1: 62–89.
Maney, Kevin. 2006, June 22. “Indian Entrepreneurs Increasingly Go Home to  
Join Tech- Industry Explosion.” usaToday.com. http://usatoday30.usatoday.com 
/money/industries/technology/maney/2006–08–22- indian- enterpreneurs_x.htm.
Mao Qixiong and Lin Xiaodong, eds. 1993. Zhongguo qiaowu zhengce gaishu [A brief 
account of the qiaowu policies of the PRC]. Beijing: Zhongguo Huaqiao Chuban-
she.
Martin, Philip. 2008, September 14. “Another Miracle? Managing Labour Migra-
tion in Asia.” Working paper, United Nations Economic and Social Commission 
for Asia and the Pacific Population Division, Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs, Bangkok.
———. 2009. “Migration in the Asia- Pacific Region: Trends, Factors, Impacts.” 
Human Development Research Paper 32, United Nations Development Pro-
gramme.
Martin, Philip, Manolo Abella, and Christiane Kuptsch. 2006. Managing Labor 
Migration in the Twenty- First Century. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Martin, Robert A. 1999. “The Joint Terrorism Task Force: A Concept That Works.” 
Anti- defamation League. http://www.adl.org/learn/jttf/default.asp.
McLagan, Meg. 2003. “Human Rights, Testimony, and Transnational Publicity.” The 
Scholar and Feminist Online 2, no. 1. www.barnard.edu/sfonline/ps/mclagan.htm.
Meissner, Werner. 2003. “Collective Identity and Nationalism in Europe and 
China.” In China Today: Economic Reforms, Social Cohesion and Collective Iden-
tities, ed. Taciana Fisac and Leila Fernández- Stembridge, 197–221. London: 
RoutledgeCurzon.
Meillassoux, Claude. 1981. Maidens, Meal, and Money: Capitalism and the Domestic 
Community. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Melamed, Samantha. 2005, July 30–31. “Stranger in Their Homeland: Cambodi-
ans Deported from the U.S. Build New Lives on Fragile Foundations.” Cambodia 
Daily. http://www.cambodiadaily.com/selected- features/cambodians- deported 
196 References
- from- the- us- build- new- lives- on- fragile- foundations- 1018/. Last accessed Febru-
ary 14, 2013.
Ministério do Trabalho e Emprego. 2003. Brasileiras e Brasileiros no Exterior [Brazil-
ians abroad]. Brasilia: Ministério do Trabalho e Emprego.
Miyao, Susumu. 2003. Shindo Renmei: Imin kuhaku jidai to doho shakai no kon-
ran [Shindo Renmei: The time of vacuum in migration and the confusions in the 
Japanese society in Brazil]. São Paulo: São Paulo Jinmon Kagaku Kenkyujo.
Montaigne, Fen. 1999. “Deporting America’s Gang Culture.” Mother Jones 24, no. 4: 
44–51.
Mori, Koichi. 1995. “Burajiru kara no Nikkeijin Dekasegi no tokucho to suii” [The 
characteristics and trajectories of the Nikkeijin Dekasegi migration from Brazil]. 
In Kyodo kenkyuu Dekasegi Nikkei Burajirujin jo- kan: Syuurou to seikatsu (ronbun 
hen) [Collaborative research on Brazilian Nikkeijin Dekasegis: Vol. 1, work and 
life (Papers)], ed. Masako Watanabe, 491–546. Tokyo: Akashi Shoten.
Mortland, Carol A. 2010. “Cambodian Resettlement in America.” In Cambo-
dian American Experiences: Histories, Communities, Cultures, and Identities, ed. 
Jonathan H. X. Lee, 76–102. Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall Hunt.
Mydans, Seth. 2008, November 29. “US Deportees Bring Street Dance to Street Boys 
of Cambodia.” New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/30/world/asia 
/30dancer.html?_r=1. Accessed February 9, 2013.
Naicang, Jingzi. 2010. Guxiang yu taxiang: Guangdong guiqiao de duoyuan shequ he 
wenhua shiying [Home and away: A plural- pattern complex community, cultural 
adaptation of the home- returned Overseas Chinese in Guangdong]. Beijing: She-
hui Kexue Wenxian Chubanshe.
Narayan, Kiran. 2002. “Placing Lives through Stories: Second- Generation South 
Asian Americans.” In Everyday Life in South Asia, ed. Diane P. Mines and Sarah 
Lamb, 425–39. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Ngai, Mae. 2004. Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern 
America. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Niedzwiecki, Max, and T. C. Duong. 2004. Southeast Asian American Statistical Pro-
file. Washington: Southeast Asia Resource Action Center (searaC). Available at 
http://www.searac.org/sites/default/files/seastatprofilemay04.pdf. Last accessed 
February 22, 2013.
Nijkamp, Peter, and Maurice Voskuilen. 1996. “International Migration: A Compre-
hensive Framework for a Survey of the Literature.” European Spatial Research and 
Policy 3, no. 1: 5–28.
Nippak Shimbun. 1924, October 10. “Kikokusha wo kaerimite” [Commentary on 
those who return home]. Editorial.
Noda Mitsuharu. 1976. “Horyo no ki” [The diary of a poW]. In Documento Shōwa- 
shi: Sengo- hen, ed. Nakajima Kenzō, 138–42. Tokyo: Heibonsha.
Nolin, Catherine. 2006. Transnational Ruptures: Gender and Forced Migration. 
Aldershot; England: Ashgate.
Nonini, Donald M., and Aihwa Ong. 1997. “Introduction: Chinese Transnational-
ism as an Alternative Modernity.” In Underground Empires: The Cultural Politics of 
References 197
Modern Chinese Transnationalism, ed. Aihwa Ong and Donald M. Nonini, 3–33. 
London: Routledge.
Norman, Herbert E. 1943. Soldier and Peasant in Japan: The Origins of Conscription. 
New York: Institute of Pacific Relations.
Nou, Leckhena. 2008. “Exploring the Psychosocial Adjustment of Khmer Refugees 
in Massachusetts from an Insider’s Perspective.” In Southeast Asian Refugees and 
Immigrants in the Mill City: Changing Families, Communities, Institutions—Thirty 
Years Afterward, ed. Tuyet- Lan Pho, Jeffrey N. Gerson, and Sylvia R. Cowan, 
173–91. Burlington: University of Vermont Press.
Nowicka, Magdalena. 2007. “Mobile Locations: Construction of Home in a Group of 
Mobile Transnational Professionals.” Global Networks 7, no. 1: 69–86.
Nyíri, Pál, and Joana Breidenbach, eds. 2005. China Inside Out: Contemporary Chi-
nese Nationalism and Transnationalism. Budapest: Ceu Press.
O Estado de S. Paulo. 1955, March 17. “Incidente no consulado do Japão nesta capital” 
[Incident at the consulate of Japan in the city].
Ommundsen, Wenche, Michael Leach, and Andrew Vandenberg, eds. 2010. Cultural 
Citizenship and the Challenges of Globalization. New York: Hampton Press.
Ong, Aihwa. 1999. Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality. Dur-
ham: Duke University Press.
———. 2000. “Graduated Sovereignty in Southeast Asia.” Theory, Culture, and 
Society 17, no. 4: 55–75.
———. 2003. Buddha Is Hiding: Refugees, Citizenship, the New America. Berkeley: 
University of California Press.
———. 2004. “The Chinese Axis: Zoning Technologies and Variegated Sover-
eignty.” Journal of East Asian Studies no. 4: 69–96.
———. 2005a. “Ecologies of Expertise: Assembling Flows, Managing Citizenship.” 
In Global Assemblages: Technology, Politics, and Ethics as Anthropological Prob-
lems, ed. Aihwa Ong and Stephen J. Collier, 337–53. Oxford: Blackwell.
———. 2005b. “Splintering Cosmopolitanism: Asian Immigrants and Zones of 
Autonomy in the American West.” In Sovereign Bodies: Citizens, Migrants, and 
States in the Postcolonial World, ed. Thomas Blom Hansen and Finn Stepputat, 
257–75. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
———. 2006. Neoliberalism as Exception: Mutations in Citizenship and Sovereignty. 
Durham: Duke University Press.
Onoda Hiroo. 1974. Tatakatta, ikita, Lubangu- tō sanjūnen [I fought and I survived: 
The thirty years of my life on the island of Lubang]. Tokyo: Kōdansha.
———. 1982. Waga Burajiru jinsei [My life in Brazil]. Tokyo: Kōdansha.
———. 1995a. Tatta hitori no sanjūnen sensō [The war I fought alone for thirty 
years]. Tokyo: Tokyo Shinbun Shuppan- kyoku.
———. 1995b. Waga kaisō no Lubangu- tō [My memory of the island of Lubang]. 
Tokyo: Asahi Shinbun- sha.
Onoda Hiroo, and Kazuo Sakamaki. 1977. Harukani sokoku o kataru [Speaking of 
my fatherland from afar]. Tokyo: Jiji Tsūshin- sha.
Orr, James J. 2001. The Victim as Hero: Ideologies of Peace and National Identity in 
Postwar Japan. Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press.
198 References
Ortner, Sherry B. 1995. “Resistance and the Problem of Ethnographic Refusal.” Com-
parative Studies in Society and History 37, no. 1: 173–93.
Paddock, R. C. 2003, March 28. “Cambodia’s Black Sheep Return to Fold.” Los Ange-
les Times, a27.
Pandolfi, Mariella. 2008. “Laboratory of Intervention: The Humanitarian Gover-
nance of the Postcommunist Balkan Territories.” In Postcolonial Disorders, ed. 
Mary- Jo DelVecchio Good, Sandra Teresa Hyde, Sarah Pinto, and Byron J. Good, 
157–88. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Pang Lu (Deputy Chair of Sixth Executive Committee of Sino- Japan International 
Training Cooperation Organization and Secretary General of China’s Interna-
tional Contractors’ Association). 2006, October 16. “Zhongguo Zhong- Ri yanxiu-
sheng xieli jigou di liu jie lishihui gongzuo baogao” [Working report of the Sixth 
Executive Committee of Sino- Japan International Training Cooperation Orga-
nization]. Report presented to the Seventh Executive Committee of Sino- Japan 
International Training Cooperation Organization, Beijing, October 16–17.
Park Hyun Ok. 2005. “Repetition, Comparability, and Indeterminable Nation: 
Korean Migrants in the 1920s and 1990s.” boundary 2 32, no. 2: 227–51.
Park Jung- Sun, and Paul Y. Chang. 2005. “Contention in the Construction of a 
Global Korean Community: The Case of the Overseas Korean Act.” Journal  
of Korean Studies 10, no. 1: 1–27.
Parrenas, Rhacel Salazar. 2001. Servants of Globalization: Women, Migration and 
Domestic Work. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Paulista Shimbun- sha. 1977. Paulista Shimbun ni miru Koronia Sanjunen no Ayumi 
[The thirty- year path of the Colônia in Paulista Shimbun]. São Paulo: Paulista 
Shimbun Sha.
Peutz, Nathalie. 2006. “Embarking on an Anthropology of Removal.” Current 
Anthropology 47, no. 2: 217–41.
Pho, Tuyet- Lan, Jeffrey N. Gerson, and Sylvia R. Cowan, eds. 2008. Southeast Asian 
Refugees and Immigrants in the Mill City: Changing Families, Communities, Institu-
tions—Thirty Years Afterward. Burlington: University of Vermont Press.
Picken, Margo. 2011, January 13. “The Beleaguered Cambodians.” New York Review 
of Books, 4.
Poethig, Kathryn. 2006. “Sitting between Two Chairs: Cambodia’s Dual Citizen-
ship Debate.” In Expressions of Cambodia: The Politics of Tradition, Identity, and 
Change, ed. Leakthina Chau- Pech Ollier and Tim Winter, 73–85. London: Rout-
ledge.
Quanguo Renda Changweihui Bangongshi, ed. 1987. Quanguo Renda jiqi changwei-
hui dashiji, 1954–1987 [The annals of npC and its standing committees, 1954–1987]. 
Beijing: Falu Chubanshe.
Quanguo Renda Neiwu Sifa Weiyuanhui Bangongshi, ed. 1992. Quanguo Renda Dai-
biao Dahui Zhuanmen Weiyuanhui gongzuo shouce [npC’s special committees’ 
handbook]. Beijing: Zhongguo Minzhu Fazhi Chubanshe.
Rajagopal, Arvind. 2000. “Hindu Nationalism in the US: Changing Configurations 
of Political Practice.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 23, no. 3: 467–96.
References 199
Ravenstein, Ernest. 1985. “The Laws of Migration.” Journal of the Statistical Society  
of London 48, no. 2: 167–227.
———. 2007, March 29. “Meeting the Needs of Internally Displaced and Refugees 
in Fy 2008.” http://www.refugeesinternational.org/policy/testimony/meeting 
- needs- internally- displaced- and- refugees- fy- 2008.
Ritter, Peter. 2007, June 17. “Timeline: Hong Kong, 1997–2007.” Time. http://www 
.time.com/time/photogallery/0,29307,1630252,00.html. Last accessed February 4, 
2013.
Robinson, Jennifer. 2002. “Global Cities and World Cities: A View from off the 
Map.” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 26, no. 3: 531–54.
Rodriguez, Robyn. 2010. Migrants for Export: How the Philippine State Brokers Labor 
to the World. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Rogers, Rosemarie. 1997. “Migration Return Policies and Countries of Origin.” In 
Immigration Admissions: The Search for Workable Solutions in Germany and the 
United States, ed. Kay Hailbronner, David A. Martin, and Hiroshi Motomura, 
147–204. Providence: Berghahn Books.
Roy, Ananya. 2008. “The 21st Century Metropolis: New Geographies of Theory.” 
Regional Studies 43, no. 6: 819–30.
Roy, Anupama. 2006. “Overseas Indian Citizen: A New ‘Setubandhan’?” Economic 
and Political Weekly 41, no. 15: 1421–24.
———. 2008. “Between Encompassment and Closure: The ‘Migrant’ and the Citi-
zen in India.” Contributions to Indian Sociology (N.S.) 42, no. 2: 219–48.
Rudnyckyj, Daromir. 2004. “Technologies of Servitude: Governmentality and Indo-
nesian Transnational Labor Migration.” Anthropological Quarterly 77, no. 3: 
407–34.
Ruhs, Martin, and Philip Martin. 2008. “Numbers vs. Rights: Trade- offs and Guest 
Worker Programs.” International Migration Review 42, no. 1: 249–65.
Sack, William H., Shanrithy Him, and Dan Dickason. 1999. “Twelve- Year Follow- up 
Study of Khmer Youths Who Suffered Massive War Trauma as Children.” Journal 
of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry 38, no. 9: 1173–79.
Sankei Shinbun- sha Henshû- bu, ed. 1972. Rikugun gochō Yokoi Shōichi: Sono nijū-
hachinen no Guamu- tō seikatsu [The army corporal Yokoi Shōichi: His life on the 
island of Guam for twenty- eight years]. Tokyo: Mainichi Shinbun- sha.
Sansom, George B. 1943. “Foreword.” In E. Herbert Norman, Soldier and Peasant 
in Japan: The Origins of Conscription, ix- xii. New York: International Secretariat, 
Institute of Pacific Relations.
São Paulo Shimbun- sha. 1960. Koronia sengo jugonenshi [The history of the Colônia 
in the fifteen years after the war]. São Paulo: São Paulo Shimbun- sha.
———. 1966. Nambei no Nikkeijin [Nikkeijin in South America]. São Paulo: São 
Paulo Shimbun- Sha.
Sassen, Saskia. 1996. Losing Control: Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization. New 
York: Columbia University Press.
Saxenian, AnnaLee. 2004. “The Bangalore Boom: From Brain Drain to Brain Cir-
culation.” In The it Experience in India: Bridging the Digital Divide, ed. Kenneth 
Keniston and Deepak Kumar, 169–81. New Delhi: Sage Publications.
200 References
Scott, James C. 1976. The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in 
Southeast Asia. New Haven: Yale University Press.
———. 1985. Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance. New 
Haven: Yale University Press.
———. 1990. Domination and the Arts of Resistance. New Haven: Yale University 
Press.
searaC (Southeast Asia Resource Action Center). 2011. Southeast Asian Americans 
at a Glance: Statistical Profile 2010. Washington: SEARAC. Available at http://
www.searac.org/sites/default/files/STATISTICAL%20PROFILE%202010.pdf.  
Last accessed February 20, 2013.
Selden, Kyōko Iriye. 1983. “Hayashi Fumiko.” In Kōdansha, Encyclopedia of Japan, 
vol. 3, 116. Tokyo: Kōdansha.
Seol Dong- Hoon, and John D. Skrentny. 2009. “Ethnic Return Migration and Hier-
archical Nationhood: Korean- Chinese Foreign Workers in South Korea.” Ethnici-
ties 9, no. 2: 147–74.
Shimamura, Takashi. 1972. Hiroku kaseki no heitai: Yokoi moto gochō kyokugen no 
nijūhachinen [The records of a fossilized soldier: The twenty- eight years of sur-
vival of corporal Yokoi]. Tokyo: Banchō Shobō.
Shin Gi- Wook. 2006. Ethnic Nationalism in Korea: Genealogy, Politics, and Legacy. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Silvey, Rachel. 2004. “Transnational Domestication: State Power and Indonesian 
Migrant Women in Saudi Arabia.” Political Geography 23 (3): 245–64.
———. 2007. “Unequal Borders: Indonesian Transnational Migrants at Immigra-
tion Control.” Geopolitics 12 (2): 265–79.
Simanski, John, and Lesley M. Sapp. 2012. “Immigration Enforcement Actions: 
2011.” Washington: Office of Immigration Statistics, Homeland Security. Available  
at http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/immigration- statistics 
/enforcement_ar_2011.pdf. Last access February 20, 2013.
Simmel, Georg. 1997. “Bridge and Door.” In Simmel on Culture: Selected Writings,  
ed. David Frisby and Mike Featherstone, 170–73. London: Sage Publications.
Siu, Lok C. D. 2005. Memories of a Future Home: Diasporic Citizenship of Chinese in 
Panama. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Skinner, William G. 1963. “The Chinese Minority.” In Indonesia, ed. R. T. McVey, 
97–117. New Haven: Southeast Asia Studies, Yale University.
Skrentny, John, Stephanie Chan, Jon E. Fox, and Denis Kim. 2007. “Defining Nations 
in Asia and Europe: A Comparative Analysis of Ethnic Return Migration Policy.” 
International Migration Review 41 (4): 793–825.
Smith- Hefner, Nancy J. 1998. Khmer American: Identity and Moral Education in a 
Diasporic Community. Berkeley: University of California Press.
———. 2010. “Khmer Cultural Values and Economic Behavior.” In Cambo-
dian American Experiences: Histories, Communities, Cultures, and Identities, ed. 
Jonathan H. X. Lee, 274–82. Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall Hunt.
Stafford, Charles. 2001. Separation and Reunion in Modern China. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press.
References 201
Star (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia). 2005, March 4. “Illegal Immigrants: None Will Be  
Spared from Ops Tegas.” http://thestar.com.my/story.asp?file=/2005/3/4/nation 
/10322842&sec=nation. Last accessed December 23, 2009.
Stokes, Bruce. 2007. “Between Two Nations.” National Journal 39, no. 2: 56–58.
Sugihara, Kaoru. 2005. “Patterns of Chinese Emigration to Southeast Asia, 1869–
1939.” In Japan, China, and the Growth of the Asian International Economy, 1850–
1949, ed. Kaoru Sugihara, 244–95. New York: Oxford University Press.
Suryadinata, Leo. 1978a. The Chinese Minority in Indonesia: Seven Papers. Singapore: 
Chopmen Enterprises.
———. 1978b. Pribumi Indonesians, the Chinese Minority and China: A Study of Per-
ceptions and Politics. Kuala Lumpur: Heinemann Educational Books (Asia).
Tagliacozzo, Eric, and Wen- Chin Chang, eds. 2011. Chinese Circulations: Capital, 
Commodities, and Networks in Southeast Asia. Durham: Duke University Press.
Takahashi, Tetsurō, Kōtarō Kaneko, and Tokurō Inokuma. 2008. “Kō hansei wa 
heiwa no tame ni tatakatta” [In the second half of our lives, we fought for peace]. 
Sekai 782: 300–11.
Tamanoi, Mariko Asano. 2009. Memory Maps: The State and Manchuria in Postwar 
Japan. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press.
Tanaka Nobumasa, Tanaka Hiroshi, and Hata Nagami. 1995. Izoku to sengo [The 
bereaved families and postwar Japan]. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten.
Thompson, E. P. 1971. “Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Cen-
tury.” Past and Present 50 (1): 76–136.
———. 1975. Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act. London: Allen Lane.
Townsend, James. 1996. “Chinese Nationalism.” In Chinese Nationalism, ed. 
Jonathan Unger, 1–30. Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe.
Trouillot, Michel- Rolph. 2001. “The Anthropology of the State: Close Encounters of 
a Deceptive Kind.” Current Anthropology 42, no. 1: 125–38.
Tsuda, Takeyuki. 2003. Strangers in the Ethnic Homeland: Japanese Brazilian Return 
Migration in Transnational Perspective. New York: Columbia University Press.
Tsuda, Yolanda Alfaro. 2005, December 1–2. “Current Migration Issues in Japan.” 
unesCo- CiMs International Conference Proceeding, International Migrants in 
Northeast Asia, Seoul.
Udupa, Sahana. 2011. “Informing News: Information Revolution and the Transfor-
mation of News Media in Bangalore.” PhD diss., National Institute of Advanced 
Studies, Bangalore.
Unger, Klaus. 1986. “Return Migration and Regional Characteristics: The Case of 
Greece.” In Return Migration and Regional Economic Problems, ed. Russell King, 
129–51. Beckenham, UK: Croom Helm.
Upadhya, Carol. 2003. “Entrepreneurship and Networks in Bangalore’s Information 
Technology Industry: A Sociological Study.” Research report submitted to Indian 
Institute of Information Technology, Bangalore.
———. 2004. “A New Transnational Class? Capital Flows, Business Networks and 
Entrepreneurs in the Indian Software Industry.” Economic and Political Weekly 39, 
no. 48: 5141–51.
202 References
———. 2006. “The Global Indian Software Labor Force: iT Professionals in Europe. 
idpad Working Paper Series 2006, no. 1.
———. 2009. “Imagining India: Software and the Ideology of Liberalization.” South 
African Review of Sociology 40, no. 1: 76–93.
Upadhya, Carol, and A. R. Vasavi. 2006. “Work, Culture, and Sociality in the Indian 
iT Industry: A Sociological Study.” Final Report submitted to idpad, National 
Institute of Advanced Studies, Bangalore.
———, eds. 2008. In an Outpost of the Global Economy: Work and Workers in 
India’s Information Technology Industry. New Delhi: Routledge.
U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 2007. Yearbook of Immigration Statistics: 
2006. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immi-
gration Statistics.
———. 2011. Yearbook of Immigration Statistics: 2010. Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics.
———. 2012. Yearbook of Immigration Statistics: 2011. Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics.
U.S. Senate. 1996. “Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act.” (Bill 735) http://
www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s104-735. Last accessed May 24, 2013.
Vance, Carol. 2005, November 12. “Juanita/Svetlana/Geeta Is Crying: Melodrama, 
Human Rights and Anti- trafficking Interventions.” Lecture presented at Stock-
holm University.
van der Veer, Peter. 2005. “Virtual India: Indian iT Labour and the Nation- State.” 
In Sovereign Bodies: Citizens, Migrants, and States in the Postcolonial World, ed. 
Thomas Blom Hansen and Finn Stepputat, 276–90. Princeton: Princeton Univer-
sity Press.
Varona, Rex. 1998. “A Year After: Surveying the Impact of the Asian Crisis on 
Migrant Workers.” Asian Migrant Yearbook 1998. Hong Kong: Asian Migrant  
Center, http://home.pacific.net.hk/~amc/papers/crisisdoc4.htm. Accessed May 
25, 2013.
Varrell, Aurelie. 2011. “Return Migration in the Light of the New Indian Diaspora 
Policy: Emerging Transnationalism.” In Dynamics of Indian Migration: Histori-
cal and Current Perspectives, ed. S. Irudaya Rajan and Marie Percot, 301–17. New 
Delhi: Routledge.
Vertovec, Steven. 2007. “Circular Migration: The Way Forward in Global Policy?” 
International Migration Institute Working Paper, University of Oxford. http://
www.imi.ox.ac.uk/pdfs/imi- working- papers/wp4- circular- migration- policy.pdf. 
Accessed May 25, 2013.
Visweswaran, Kamala, and Ali Mir. 1999/2000. “On the Politics of Community in 
South Asian- American Studies.” Amerasia Journal 25, no. 3: 97–108.
Vora, Neha. 2011. “From Golden Frontier to Global City: Shifting Forms of Belong-
ing, ‘Freedom,’ and Governance among Indian Businessmen in Dubai.” American 
Anthropologist 113, no. 2: 306–18.
Wakatsuki, Yasuo, and Joji Suzuki. 1975. Kaigai ijuu seisakushi ron [On the history of 
the emigration policy]. Tokyo: Fukumura Syuppan.
References 203
Wako, Shungoro. 1938. Bauru kannai no Nihonjin [The Japanese in the jurisdiction 
of Baurú]. São Paulo: Fazenda Tietê.
Wang Cangbai. 2006. Huozai biechu: Xianggang Yinni huaren koushu lishi [Life is 
elsewhere: Stories of the Indonesian Chinese in Hong Kong]. Hong Kong: Centre 
of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong.
Wang Cangbai and Wong Siu- Lun. 2007. “Home as a Circular Process: A Study 
of the Indonesian Chinese in Hong Kong.” In Beyond Chinatown: New Chinese 
Migration and the Global Expansion of China, ed. Mette Thunø, 183–209. Den-
mark: Nordic Institute of Asian Study Press.
Wang Cangbai, Wong Siu- Lun, and Sun Wenbin. 2006. “Haigui: A New Area in 
China’s Policy toward the Chinese Diaspora?” Journal of Chinese Overseas 2, no. 2: 
294–309.
Wang Gungwu. 1981. “A Note on the Origins of Hua- ch’iao.” In Community and 
Nation: Essays on Southeast Asia and the Chinese, 118–27. Singapore: Heinemann 
Educational Books.
———. 1985. “External China as a New Policy Area.” Pacific Affairs 58, no. 1: 28–43.
———. 1992. “The Origin of Hua- Ch’iao.” In Community and Nation: China, South-
east Asia and Australia, 1–10. St. Leonards: Allen & Unwin.
———. 1996. The Revival of Chinese Nationalism. Leiden, The Netherlands: Interna-
tional Institute for Asian Studies.
Warren, Kay. 2007. “The 2000 un Human Trafficking Protocol: Rights, Enforce-
ment, Vulnerabilities.” In The Practice of Human Rights: Tracking Law between 
the Global and the Local, ed. Mark Goodale and Sally Engle Merry, 242–70. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University.
Werbner, Pnina. 1999. “Global Pathways: Working Class Cosmopolitans and the 
Creation of Transnational Ethnic Worlds.” Social Anthropology 7, no. 1: 17–35.
———. 2000. “Introduction: The Materiality of Diaspora—between Aesthetics and 
‘Real’ Politics.” Diaspora 9, no. 1: 5–20.
Willmott, Donald E. 1961. The National Status of the Chinese in Indonesia, 1900–1958. 
Ithaca, N.Y.: Department of Far Eastern Studies, Cornell University.
Wong, Diana. 2005. “The Rumor of Trafficking: Border Controls, Illegal Migra-
tion, and the Sovereignty of the Nation- State. In Illicit Flows and Criminal Things: 
States, Borders, and the Other Side of Globalization, ed. Willem van Schendel and 
Itty Abraham, 69–100. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
World Bank. 2011. Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011. 2nd ed. Washington,  
D.C.: World Bank. Available at http://data.worldbank.org/data- catalog/migration 
- and- remittances. Last accessed February 19, 2013.
Wu, David Y-H. 1991. “The Construction of Chinese and Non- Chinese Identities.” 
Daedalus 120, no. 2: 159–79.
Wyman, Mark. 1996. Round- Trip to America: The Immigrants Return to Europe, 
1880–1930. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
Xiang Biao. 2007. Global “Body Shopping”: An Indian Labor System in the Informa-
tion Technology Industry. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
———. 2011. “A Ritual Economy of ‘Talent’: China and Overseas Chinese Profes-
sionals.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 37, no. 5: 821–38.
204 References
Xiang Biao and Shen Wei. 2009. “International Student Migration and Social Strati-
fication in China.” International Journal of Educational Development 29, no. 5: 
513–22.
Yamanaka, Keiko. 1996. “Return Migration of Japanese- Brazilians to Japan: The Nik-
keijin as Ethnic Minority and Political Construct.” Diaspora 5, no. 1: 65–98.
Yamazaki Toyoko. 2008a. “Sensō no unda futari zuma wa” [What happened to the 
two wives that war engendered?]. Sekai 778: 280–91.
———. 2008b. “Sensō no unda futari zuma wa, 2.” Sekai 779: 315–23.
Yuzo, Mizoguchi. 1989. Hobo tosibteno Chugoku [China as method]. Tokyo: Tokyo 
Daigaku Shuppan- kai.
Zha Daojoing. 2002. “Chinese Migrant Workers in Japan: Policies, Institutions, and 
Civil Society.” In Globalising Chinese Migration: Trends in Europe and Asia, ed. Pal 
Nyiri and Igor Saveliev, 129–57. London: Ashgate.
Zheng Yijun. 2005. Guiqiao Peng Guanghan de wangshi jinsheng [The memoir of gui-
qiao Peng Guanghan]. Hong Kong: Xianggang Shehui Kexue Chubanshe Youxian 
Gongsi.
Zhongguo Qiaolian, ed. 1996. Zhongguo Qiaolian Sishi Nian: 1956–1996 [Fortieth 
anniversary of All- China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese: 1956–1996]. 
Beijing: Zhongguo Huaqiao Chubanshe.
Zhonguo Renmin Zhengzhi Xieshang Huiyi Quanguo Weiyuan Hui Wenshi Ziliao 
Yanjiu Weiyuanhui, ed. 1994. Zhongguo Renmin Zhengzhi Xieshang Huiyi dan-
sheng jishi ji ziliao xuanbian: Wuxing hongqi cong zheli shengqi [Records and 
documents of the birth of CppCC: The five- star flag rising from here]. Beijing: 
Wenshi Ziliao Chubanshe.
Zhou Nanjing. 1999. Huaqiao huaren baike quanshu: Jiaoyu keji juan [Encyclope-
dia of Chinese overseas: Volume of education, science, and technology]. Beijing: 
Zhongguo Huaqiao Chubanshe.
Zhuang Guotu. 1989. Zhongguo fengjian zhengfu de huaqiao zhengce [Huaqiao poli-
cies of the feudal governments in China]. Xiamen: Xiamen Daxue Chubanshe.
Zweig, David, Chen Changgui, and Stanley Rosen. 2004. “Globalization and Trans-





Americas, 23; as USA, 12, 54, 100–104, 
106–9, 111, 114, 116–17, 118n6, 118n13, 
152, 158n2, 170–71; Central, 119n19; 
Latin, 28, 31–32, 34; North, 15, 18, 
18n15, 23, 25, 144, 146–47; South, 23, 
31. See also United States
Asia, East, 4, 13–14, 26, 28, 41, 59, 83–84, 
86, 98, 143, 145, 163–64; Northeast, 
170; South, 43, 45–46; Southeast, 27, 
36, 43, 46, 50, 61n10, 63, 66–68, 79, 
98n2, 102, 106, 118nn11–12, 119n14, 
122, 124, 145, 171. See also Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations
Asia as a method, 4–6
assimilation, 25, 148
Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 
4, 19n14
Australia/Australasia, 2, 18n7, 84, 118n11, 
125, 129, 146, 158n4
Bangladesh/Bangladeshi, 2, 159
Belgium, 158n3
border, 7–8, 65, 84–85, 107, 110, 117, 126, 
129, 143, 147, 157, 164–65, 170
Brazil/Brazilian, 9, 21, 37, 47, 55–56; 
places in: Mato Grosso, 55–56; 
Paraná, 33; São Paulo, 21, 23, 25–30, 
32–33, 37
Burma/Burmese, 2, 46
Bush, George W., Jr., 117, 118n4, 121n28
Cambodia/Cambodian, 12, 16–17, 100–
121; places in: Phnom Penh, 106, 108, 
112–13, 115, 118n5
Cambodian People’s Party/Democratic 
Kampuchea, 107–13
Canada, 1, 60n5, 84–85, 118n11
Caribbean, 98n2, 119n19
China, 1–2, 4–5, 7, 10–14, 17, 19n15, 26, 
40, 42–43, 45–48, 55, 58, 60–61, 63–74, 
77–82, 84–89, 91–92, 94–96, 98, 99n3, 
99n5, 99n10, 144, 163–65, 170, 172–73, 
175, 176n2, 177n6; places in: Beijing 
68–69, 74, 76, 78, 81, 107; Fujian, 69, 
73–74, 76, 81n6, 97; Guangdong, 69, 
74, 76, 81n6; Manchuria, 26, 28, 60n3, 
60n8, 61n10, 66, 164, 166
citizenship, 2, 6, 9, 18n9, 25, 36, 37n9, 
70, 100, 116, 142–43, 145–48, 154, 156, 
157n1, 159nn7–9, 159n11, 160nn12–13, 
169–70, 172–73; cultural, 113, 116; dual, 
68, 114, 146, 148; quasi- , 146, 169
civil society, 88, 95, 154, 173
class, 10, 44, 65, 70–71, 74, 77, 79–80, 
206 Index
class (continued) 
146, 148–49, 151–57; middle, 25, 108, 
118n13, 124, 146, 151–52, 154, 156, 
158n2; proletariat/working, 10, 70, 94; 
under, 108
Cold War, 8, 11–2, 18n4, 70–71, 104, 163–
64, 168, 171; post–, 6, 11. See also wars
colonialism/colonization, 5, 8, 13, 18n4, 
25, 46, 58, 62n27, 72, 79, 81n11, 106, 
124, 146, 163–4; anti- , 40; post- , 10, 12, 
116. See also imperialism
Commonwealth of Independent States, 
168
Communist Parties, Chinese, 68, 70, 79, 
80n3, 81n10, 94; Japanese, 58; U.S., 104
cosmopolitanism, 25, 153
crises, 58, 107; Asian financial (1997), 2, 
124–25, 136, 169, 172; Brazilian eco-
nomic (1980s–90s), 32; global finan-
cial (2008–09), 9, 35, 97
Cultural Revolution, 11, 58, 64, 77, 78, 
82n14
Deng Xiaoping, 79
deportation/deportees, 2, 12, 15, 18n8, 
19n22, 87, 89–90, 100–106, 110–12, 
114, 116–20, 122, 125–29, 132–33, 135. 
See also expulsion; repatriation
detention centers/camps, 106, 110, 
120n21, 126
displacement, 12, 85, 100–102, 106, 116
Dubai, 5, 160n12
Egypt, 60n5; place in: Cairo, 60n5
emigration, 21, 23–26, 28, 30–31, 33, 
35–37, 66, 81n6, 162
Employment Permit System (South 
Korea), 86, 172, 174, 177n8, 177n13
ethnicity, 36, 64, 171; diversity, 107; eth-
nicization, 162–63, 174; ethnic con-
flicts, 8–9; identity, 10–11, 14, 64, 
67–68, 171–72; minorities, 67, 100,  
107, 164; networks, 14, 164. See also 
identity
ethnography, 3, 94
Europe, 4–6, 10, 15, 19n13, 19n21, 32, 
61n10, 64, 66, 82n12, 97, 103, 143, 
146–49, 170
European Union, 135
expulsion, 69, 101–3, 105
France, 97, 106, 118n11, 120n23
FunCinpeC party, 114–20
gender, 134. See also woman
Germany, 60n4, 97, 158nn3–4
globalization, 6, 8, 11, 14, 22–23, 40, 
60n2, 79, 85, 125, 138, 151, 162–63, 168, 
170–71, 175–76, 180
Gulf (Persian), 2, 146, 159n7. See also 
Middle East
Haiti/Haitian, 111, 114, 119n19, 120n22, 
120n24
health, 75, 91, 104, 115, 128, 153, 166; preg-
nancy, 87; sexually transmitted dis-
eases, 87, 134
homeland, 21–23, 26, 28, 30, 34, 36, 37n3, 
37n8, 44, 64, 73, 79, 100–103, 113, 150, 
165, 172–74
Hong Kong, 1, 17n2, 19n12, 19n15, 66, 
78–79, 165
Hungarians, 104
Hun Sen, 113, 118
identity, 10–11, 14, 17n2, 33, 36, 64, 108, 
113, 142, 148, 151, 153, 156–57, 158n2, 
160n15, 163, 168, 171, 174
imperialism, 5, 8–9, 22–23, 26–28, 36, 
40, 44, 46, 49, 64, 67, 70, 164–65, 168
India/Indian, 2, 8, 13, 16–17, 18n16, 40, 
60n2, 118n12, 141–61; place in: Banga-
lore, 13, 141–44, 149–58, 161
Indochina, 12, 46, 100, 102, 106–7, 116
Indonesia/Indonesian, 10, 15, 40, 42, 
46–7, 50, 62n27, 66, 68–69, 75–76, 78, 
81nn10–12, 122, 124–30, 133–35, 137–40
industrial trainee, 86, 88–91, 94–95, 
99n3
International Organization for Migra-




irregular migration/migrant, 2, 11, 14, 
19n21
Italy, 118n11
Japan/Japanese, 2, 9–10, 13, 16–17, 18n10, 
19n12, 21, 62, 67, 69, 83–99, 163–66, 
170, 175; places in: Kobe, 83, 91, 94, 
98n1; Osaka, 90–92, 99; Tokyo, 51, 55
Jiang Zemin, 79
Khmer Rouge, 100–101, 107–8, 111, 119
Kim Dae Jung, 169
Kim Young- Sam, 170
Laos/Lao, 101, 106, 118n11
Lee Kuan Yew, 7
Macau, 78–79
Mahatma Gandhi, 7–8, 60n2
Malaya, 73
Malaysia, 2, 15, 19n21, 42, 46, 85–86, 122, 
124–29, 131–33, 135–37
Manchukuo, 60n8, 164
Mao Zedong, 70, 81n10
memory, 9, 31, 57, 101, 113
Mexico/Mexican, 104, 109, 115, 118n9, 
119n19
Middle East, 124
migration brokers/agencies, 15–16, 30, 
33–36, 84, 92, 127, 129, 132, 136, 167– 
69
nationalism, 8, 13, 16–17, 40, 59, 63–67, 
80, 81n9, 81n11, 82n12, 148, 162; civic, 
163, 169, 175; cultural, 146, 156; ethno- , 
68, 163, 175–76; neonationalism, 13, 16, 
142, 144. See also patriotism
Nehru, Jawaharlal, 7, 60n2, 149
neoliberalism, 134, 138, 142, 146–47, 
154–55, 171
Netherlands, 158n3
networks, social, 22, 33, 84–85, 95–96
New Zealand, 60n5, 118n11
Nikkeijin, 9, 16, 22–23, 31–36, 38n11
North Korea, 164–65, 169, 171, 173
Pakistan/Pakistani, 2, 12, 159n10
patriotism, 40, 44–45, 53, 56, 59, 60n2, 
114, 150
Peranakan, 78, 82n12
Philippines, 40, 42–43, 45, 47, 50, 54, 
100, 107
Pol Pot, 101, 107
race, 64–65, 67, 79, 81nn7–8, 104, 119n15, 
173; racialization, 67, 103; specific 
groups: Asian, 107, 109, 119n15; Black, 
108–9, 119n15; Hispanic, 108; White, 
108–9, 119n15, 130
refugee, 2, 5–6, 11–12, 19n20, 32, 37n6, 
40, 69, 81n11, 85, 100–111, 113–14, 116–
17, 118n11, 119n13, 137, 176n1
repatriation, 2, 11, 12–13, 15, 18n10, 26– 
27, 29–30, 38, 42–44, 46–50, 52, 54– 
55, 57–58, 61nn8–9, 81n11, 88, 92–94, 
100–102, 110, 116; repatriation com-
pany, 86, 88, 91, 96, 99n8
return/returnee in various languages: 
gui, 72, 82n17; guiqiao, 10, 63, 65–66, 
70–75, 82n16; haigui, 79–80, 176n4; 
hikiage- sha, 30; huixiang, 176n3
rights, 6, 11, 18n9, 19n14, 68, 99nn6–8, 
105, 114, 117n1, 122, 125–26, 138, 139n2, 
139n6, 146, 156, 159n8, 159n10, 174; 
children’s, 132; employment/labor, 
138, 172; to migrate, 19n21; political, 
32, 70; to return, 14, 16, 160, 172–73; 





Singapore, 73, 84–85, 93, 96–97, 99n8, 
127, 129, 146
South Africa, 8
South Korea, 2, 13–4, 84–89, 92–93, 
99n3, 162–77; places in: Seoul, 165–67, 
171–73, 177nn4–5
sovereignty, 3–4, 15, 36, 65, 72, 84, 116, 
125, 129, 134–35, 147, 163
208 Index
Soviet Union, 40, 43, 47–48, 56, 60, 135, 
168
Spain, 97
Sun Yat- sen, 67, 70, 81n7, 82n12
Taiwan, 28, 30, 59n1, 62n27, 79, 144, 176
territoriality, 16; deterritorialization, 146, 
156–57; extra- , 16; reterritorialization, 
151, 157
terrorism, 101, 105, 117, 118n6
Thailand, 2, 46, 100, 107, 146
trade union, 95, 99n9
trafficking in persons, 2, 5, 11–12, 14, 
19n21, 19n23, 137–38, 139n6, 139n10, 
140n15, 123, 125, 129, 132–33, 135; 
countertrafficking programs, 122–23, 
125, 128–29, 132–35, 137–38, 139n6, 
139nn9–10, 140n12; victims of, 133–34, 
136–38
United Kingdom, 2, 18n7, 118n11, 158
United States, 2, 5, 12, 18n7, 19n15, 19n22, 
23, 32, 39–40, 43, 48, 56, 60n5, 61n13, 
100–101, 103, 105–10, 113–14, 116–17, 
118n11, 119n17, 119n19, 120n21, 120n24, 
120n26, 132–33, 143–44, 147, 149–50, 
152–56, 158nn4–5, 160n16, 169, 170; 
places in: Arizona, 111; California, 107, 
111–12; Chicago, 111; Guam, 50, 54, 57; 
Hawai’i, 23, 44; Louisiana, 111; Los 
Angeles, 107, 119n16; Massachusetts, 
102, 107, 117n4; New Jersey, 111; New 
York, 99n10, 105; Oklahoma, 105; Sai-
pan, 43; San Diego, 111; San Francisco, 
111; Silicon Valley, 144, 149–50, 156; 
Texas, 111; Washington, 1
Vietnam/Vietnamese, 69, 75, 100–101, 
106–7, 116, 118nn11–12, 120n26
wars, 9, 40–41, 96, 102, 111, 118n10; 
anti- Japanese war (China), 63, 67; 
Asia- Pacific War, 41; Chinese Civil 
War, 40, 47; El Salvador civil war 111; 
Fifteen- Year War, 41; First World War, 
39, 40, 60n3, 60n6, 104; Greater East 
Asia War, 41; Iraqi War, 117; Korean 
War, 30, 164–65; Opium Wars, 66–67; 
Pacific War, 41; Second World War, 9, 
16, 22, 26, 28, 30–31, 40–41, 45, 118n11, 
164; Vietnam War/American War, 69, 
102, 106–7, 116, 119n17
woman, 13, 40, 46–47, 52, 56, 60n8, 
61n10, 82n12, 83–84, 89, 92–93, 95– 
96, 107, 118n5, 122, 128, 130–33, 136– 
37, 139n6
